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ABSTRACT
Although accounting research continues to focus on earnings management, few studies 
have done so within the context of a single industry, and only one study to date (Paek 2001) has 
investigated this phenomenon within the context of U.S. rate-regulated electric utilities. Most 
utilities are viewed as natural monopolies, and therefore are subjected to rate regulation. These 
firms are permitted to earn a prescribed rate of return on an approved rate base. Although utilities 
are subjected to greater scrutiny than non-regulated public companies, regulatory restraint may 
create incentives to manage earnings (Healy and Whalen 1999), especially coincident with a 
utility’s request to regulators for a rate increase. I use samples drawn from the electric utility and 
manufacturing industries to examine the following three research questions. First, does earnings 
management in rate-regulated electric utilities, as represented by the magnitude of discretionary 
accruals, significantly differ from that observed in comparable non-regulated companies? The 
second question probes whether the deregulation of the generation and marketing of electricity 
within the electric utility industry that began in the late 1990s, significantly altered the 
opportunity to observe earnings management. The third question focuses on whether rate-
regulated electric utilities manage earnings downward in the year that they file for a rate 
increase? And, if indications of earnings management are observed, is industry-specific GAAP 
used to decrease earnings? I estimate the earnings management metric, discretionary accruals, 
using accrual expectation models from prior research. Results indicate the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals, on average, is significantly smaller for rate-regulated electric utilities than 
for non-regulated companies suggesting that rate regulation is adequate in constraining earnings 
management. This is corroborated by the finding that earnings management metric increased for 
those utilities affected by deregulation. Finally, in an intra-industry comparison, I observe 
xsignificantly lower discretionary accruals for utilities in the year they request rate increases when 
compared to years in which rate increases are not requested. This result is consistent with 
opportunistic earnings management and raises a social welfare issue. Evidence that industry-
specific GAAP is used to manage earnings downward is inconclusive.
11. INTRODUCTION
Earnings management is defined by Healey and Whalen (1999) as the use of managerial 
judgment “in (the) financial reporting process and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
company, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers”(p. 
368). It constitutes one of the most popular topics in current accounting research.  However, 
despite the considerable attention earnings management is given by accounting researchers, most 
academic studies have excluded rate-regulated firms, such as electric utilities1.  Only one study to 
date has examined earnings management within the U.S. electric utility industry, and it narrowly 
focuses on comparing pre-1994 utilities based on regulatory differences.2
Historically, electric utilities enjoy a unique status because of their classification as 
natural monopolies (Blacconiere et al. 2000). The potential for monopolistic abuse begets
regulatory oversight; in order to protect “captive” consumers3, the electric utility industry is 
highly regulated by state and federal agencies (Loudder et al. 1996).4  Whereas all industries in 
the U.S. are regulated to some degree,5 rate regulation imposes regulatory oversight that is 
explicitly tied to accounting information. Healy and Whalen (1999) note that, “it is frequently 
asserted that such regulations create incentives to manage the income statement and balance 
sheet variables of interest to regulators” (p. 377). However, because of rate regulation, 
accounting issues affecting electric utilities tend to be treated by researchers as special cases and,
                                                
1 An exception is a study of earnings management within the Spanish electric utility industry (Gill-de-Albornoz and 
Illueca 2005).  
2 Paek (2001) uses a sample of U.S. electric utilities that he then classifies as rate-regulated and incentive-regulated 
based on Landon (1993). Paek finds that utilities adopting incentive regulation have smaller discretionary accruals 
than rate-regulated counterparts.
3 “Captive” customers are those who have no alternative to purchase electricity from another firm.
4 The Energy Policy Act of 1992 was enacted in an effort to deregulate and reduce wholesale electricity prices, and 
to provide the impetus for state-based retail deregulation of electricity generation and marketing. 
5 For purposes of exposition, firms not subject to rate regulation are referred to as “non-regulated” firms.
2as such, are differentiated from non-regulated companies. Hence, accounting researchers 
employing cross-sectional inter-industry research designs usually exclude rate-regulated firms 
from their samples to strengthen internal validity. Conversely, single-industry research designs 
focusing on rate-regulated industries encounter limitations regarding external validity.
Both internal and external validity concerns may arise when including rate-regulated 
sample firms if there is significant variation in how rate regulation is applied across regulatory 
jurisdictions.  For example, focusing on electric utilities, consider the following two simplified 
regulatory regimes; “strict” rate regulation and incentive regulation.  Under the more rigid form 
of rate regulation, electric utilities are narrowly permitted to apply cost-plus pricing (Nwaeze
2000).  That is, utilities are allowed to set rates that recover their operating costs, plus earn an 
authorized (normal) profit.  Alternatively, under an incentive form of rate regulation, electric 
utilities are permitted to share with consumers (through reduced rates) a portion of any profits 
earned above the allowed rate of return. The latter regime provides an economic incentive for 
utilities to reduce costs, whereas the former does not. 
Federal and state statutes require regulated U.S. electric utilities to submit requests for 
rate increases to state Public Utility Commissions (PUCs).  PUCs then evaluate these rate 
requests and conduct public hearings open to all affected parties before rendering their decisions.  
However, even under such scrutiny, opportunities may exist for utilities to employ strategic 
reporting to circumvent this regulatory oversight.  Sappington (1980) and Sherman (1989), for 
example, argue that utilities may deliberately understate earnings before rate reviews to 
circumvent regulatory constraints.  Sappington (1980) further argues that this regulatory 
circumvention is potentially made possible because regulators may not be familiar with 
regulatory accounting issues particular to utilities.  To the extent that public utility commissions 
3lack the capability to uncover biased financial reporting, earnings management may continue 
unabated. This leads to the conjecture that utilities requesting rate increases, and in which 
regulatory approval depends on accounting data, have incentives to report depressed earnings 
levels in order to maximize the probability of successfully gaining such approval.6 One method 
of decreasing earnings is reducing the level of discretionary accruals as permitted under 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).
In providing guidance for accrual accounting, GAAP does not constrain rate-regulated 
electric utilities to the extent that it limits non-regulated companies.  Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards 71 (SFAS 71), Accounting for the Effects of Certain Types of Regulation,
specifically allows qualifying7 rate-regulated utilities greater latitude in making 
accruals/deferrals than non-regulated companies (FASB 1982).  SFAS 71 allows a rate-regulated 
utility to capitalize and amortize a cost that would ordinarily be charged to income by other 
businesses.  For example, the costs of repairing storm damage (e.g., Hurricane Katrina) might be 
deferred and recovered over an extended period.  Likewise, a regulated utility may include in 
current rates sufficient revenue intended to cover costs that are expected to be incurred in the 
future (e.g., nuclear fuel storage and estimated nuclear plant decommissioning costs), with the 
understanding that if those costs are not incurred, future rates will be reduced by corresponding 
amounts (FASB 1982).  “Regulatory” assets and liabilities are recorded on the balance sheet to 
accommodate deferred costs and revenues earned in advance respectively.  Regulatory assets are 
considered necessary by regulators because they tend to act as “shock absorbers,” without which, 
                                                
6In contrast to depressing earnings prior to requests for rate increases, the political cost hypothesis suggests that 
managers artificially reduce reported earnings after the government establishes rate (tariff) increases in order to 
reduce political costs and public visibility (Gill-de-Albornoz and Illueca 2005).  
7According to FASB, a “qualifying entity” may apply SFAS 71 if it has operations that meet all of the following 
criteria;  i) rates charged to customers are established or approved by a regulator or governing board empowered by 
statute, ii) rates are designed to recoup specific costs of providing the service and, iii) based on demand and 
competition, rates can be charged and collected. 
4electricity rates would fluctuate significantly, to the detriment of “captured” utility consumers.  
Therefore GAAP provides more (less) discretion to rate-regulated (non-regulated) companies to 
defer or accrue costs and to accelerate revenues.  Management’s discretionary choices include: 
when, what, and how much to defer or accrue, periods for recovery of deferred items, 
depreciation or amortization methods for expensing capitalized costs, and reporting assumptions 
(D’Souza et al. 1999).  
Given the increased discretion granted utility managers to defer costs, the study’s 
empirical tests focus on discretionary accrual as the earnings management metric. Discretionary 
accruals are estimated using the Jones (1991) model in addition to several modified versions.  
Despite its criticism, the Jones model is widely applied in earnings management studies.8
Using discretionary accrual models found in the literature, this study investigates three 
research questions.  First, does the magnitude of earnings management in rate-regulated electric 
utilities, as represented by discretionary accruals, significantly differ from that observed in 
comparable non-regulated companies? Discretionary accruals for a sample of rate-regulated 
electric utilities are compared with those of a control sample of comparable non-regulated 
manufacturing companies.  This descriptive comparison requires using a time series research 
design to estimate firm-specific discretionary accruals for utilities and manufacturing companies, 
the group means of which are then statistically compared. Because this research question is not 
conditioned on any specific management action, both signed accruals and their absolute values 
are compared in this test. Subsequently, a cross-sectional design is used to determine the 
statistical significance of the difference in the inter-industry means of discretionary accruals for 
each year, as well as for the pooled sample period. 
                                                
8 The time series model used by Jones (1991) assumes temporal stability in the earnings-generating process; long 
time series research designs may violate this assumption. Conversely, cross-sectional models assume all firms use 
the same earnings-generating process, and any significant firm-specific differences may violate this assumption.
5Results indicate that, on average, signed discretionary accruals of rate-regulated electric 
utilities are not significantly different from zero, whereas the means of the signed discretionary 
accruals for manufacturing firms are significantly negative.  Furthermore, the absolute values of 
discretionary accruals of electric utilities are significantly smaller than those observed for a 
matched sample of non-regulated manufacturing companies.  These time series results lead to the 
conclusion that, on average, electric utilities do not manage earnings while non-regulated firms 
do. This finding is consistent with the proposition that regulatory scrutiny, on average, reduces 
earnings management opportunities. Cross-sectional tests confirm that the magnitudes of 
discretionary accruals, as well as total accruals, of the electric utility sample are significantly 
smaller than those estimated for matched manufacturing firms.  These findings provide empirical 
justification for accounting researchers to exclude rate-regulated firms from cross-sectional, 
inter-industry research designs that use the discretionary accrual metric to investigate earnings 
management; not to do so would weaken internal validity and the power of the test. 
The second question examines whether deregulatory forces that affected some regulatory 
jurisdictions in the late 1990s increased the opportunities for earnings management. Specifically, 
as a result of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, which effectively deregulated the wholesale pricing 
of electricity by 1996, certain state regulators and legislatures began thereafter to deregulate the 
retail generation and marketing of electricity (i.e., providing a choice of suppliers to the end-
user) within their jurisdictions. I investigate this question by using 1999 as a temporal 
benchmark to split the pooled utility sample, and then compare discretionary accrual metrics in 
the pre- and post-1999 periods. Because deregulation is associated with reduced regulatory 
scrutiny and increased economic incentives, I would expect the magnitudes of discretionary 
accruals of utilities affected by deregulation to increase. Results indicate that this, in fact, 
6occurred, and there is some evidence that this increase was associated with deregulation rather 
than other macroeconomic forces.
The third research question focuses on whether rate-regulated electric utilities manage 
earnings downward in the year in which they file for rate increases.  In addressing this question I 
draw an additional sample of those electric utilities that requested a rate increase in at least one 
year of the 1994-2005 sample period. In the years, in which sample firms did not request a rate 
increase, they are used as a control group for comparative purposes. Findings using a cross-
sectional research design indicate that the indicator variable for those utilities requesting rate 
increases is significantly negative, consistent with managers depressing earnings in the year the 
rate increase is requested. I find earnings management continuing to the year after the 
submission of a rate increase request. These results infer that, even if there is no evidence of 
earnings management, on average, as found in testing Hypothesis 1, there is evidence of 
downward earnings management when conditioned on the rate request process. If regulators 
heavily rely on this earnings information in their regulatory decisions to increase rates, this 
finding should be of interest, as it potentially biases their decision-making process and could lead 
to a wealth transfer between shareholders and captive utility customers.  
An associated question arises if earnings management by utilities is detected using the 
discretionary accrual metric. Which financial accounts were used to effect earnings
management? In particular, were regulatory assets, deferred costs specifically permitted under 
GAAP for rate-regulated firms (SFAS 71) used to manage earnings? I therefore explore whether 
modifying the Jones (1991) model, by isolating regulatory assets as an additional independent 
variable, can improve the model’s ability to estimate discretionary accruals. To address this 
question, I hand-collect regulatory assets data from SEC 10-K filings and re-estimate accrual 
7expectation models with regulatory assets as an additional independent variable.  Results indicate 
that the regulatory assets variable is not significant in the accrual models.  This result suggests 
that regulatory assets account is not used by utilities to manage earnings. This finding provides 
additional evidence of the adequacy of regulatory scrutiny. Because the establishment of 
regulatory assets requires regulatory approval, this finding suggests the regulatory process 
precludes managerial manipulation of regulatory assets. The implication of this finding also is 
that the original Jones (1991) model and its modified versions work as well for rate-regulated 
electric utilities as they do for non-regulated companies. However, the deferred tax component in 
regulatory assets may be noisy. Decomposing regulatory assets into components with a view to 
excluding deferred tax account and re-examining the research question is left for future research.
I perform a variety of robustness tests for the: independence of the samples; possibility of 
a structural change due to deregulation; exclusion of firms with competing capital market 
incentives for earnings management; reversal of accruals, and; other alternate explanations. After 
these robustness and sensitivity tests, the study’s primary results and the associated conclusions 
remain unchanged.
This study represents the first comprehensive attempt to examine earnings management 
within the rate-regulated U.S. electric utility industry.  Electric utilities are excluded from 
earnings management studies using cross-sectional inter-industry research designs because of 
their operating environment and accounting differences. Although Paek (2001) found differences 
in his pre-1994 sample’s discretionary accruals in which utilities were grouped as either “rate-
regulated” or “incentive regulated,”9 his findings of any relative differences between these 
groups have limited application. Therefore the current study represents an initial broad-based 
                                                
9As determined by another study (Landon, 1993).
8examination of earnings management within this industry and provides empirical evidence 
regarding the adequacy of regulatory scrutiny. This represents the study’s primary contribution.
This study additionally makes a contribution from the public policy perspective. The 
currently stalled attempt to deregulate the retail generation and marketing of electricity within 
the U.S. may have spawned unintended consequences of increased earnings management 
opportunities. Policymakers should be aware of such consequences in the context of the larger 
ongoing debate over the restructuring of the electric utility industry. Finally, the study finds
evidence of earnings management by rate-regulated utilities during periods in which rate requests 
are under consideration. This raises regulatory and social welfare issues. First, since management 
can depress earnings in order to bolster their requests for increasing rates, regulators should be 
fully aware of the potential for receiving biased earnings information. This might lead to 
increased regulatory (monitoring) costs. Second, traditional earnings management is frequently 
motivated by economic incentives for managers to benefit at the expense of shareholders. In the 
rate-regulated setting, operating costs are “passed through” to ratepayers. Increasing costs in 
order to decrease earnings increases the amount passed through which must be covered in rates. 
However, this increase is only a second order effect; the primary effect being that if regulators 
are persuaded to increase the price of electricity by increasing the allowed rate of return. Unlike 
non-regulated earnings management studies, this raises the social welfare issue of a wealth 
transfer between ratepayers (captive customers) and shareholders. Providing empirical evidence 
of earnings management within this context provides a unique contribution to the literature.
In the following section, I review prior literature and develop testable hypotheses. Section 
three describes sample selections and discusses the earnings management models and research 
designs used to test the hypotheses. Section four provides empirical results.  I describe and report 
9results of robustness tests in section five and the final section presents a summary and 
conclusions.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
2.1 Overview of the Electric Utility Industry
The electric utility industry represents one of the largest industries in the United States 
with total annual assets and revenues exceeding $700 billion and $298 billion respectively, and 
employing more than 400,000 personnel (EEI 2006).  Electricity is the life blood of the US 
economy and all industrial economies.  The electric utility industry supplies an essential service 
that is indispensable to industrial, commercial, and residential customers. The number of 
customers by category in 2005 were; industrial 733,862, transportation 518, commercial 
16,871,940; and residential 120,760,389; (EIA 2006, and EEI 2006). 
The majority of customers served by electric companies are residential users, but 
industrial customers consume more than one-third of electricity sold. These statistics 
demonstrate the strategic importance of electric utility industry. Inadequate and unreliable 
supplies of electricity cause not only inconvenience, but also economic loss due to reduced 
economic output. In the extreme weather conditions, fatalities may result from electrical outages 
(e.g., power disruptions to hospitals during Hurricane Katrina and deaths of the elderly during 
heat waves). Industrial users strive to ensure an affordable, safe and uninterrupted supply of 
electricity. The industry’s generating capacity supports economic growth and productivity, 
promotes business development, and provides increasing employment opportunities to hundreds 
of thousands. 
In 2005, the latest year for which data are available, US production of electricity was 
2,554,050 million kilowatt hours.  The major sources of energy used to generate electricity 
include: coal 49.7%; nuclear 19.3%; natural gas10 18.7%; hydro 6.5%; oil/petroleum 3%; and 
                                                
10  In 2005, the supply of natural gas faced unprecedented disruptions from hurricanes Katrina and Rita that 
devastated the U.S. Gulf coast.
11
other 2.8% (EIA 2006; EEI 2006).  Coal is the largest fuel source used for generating electricity 
in the U.S., followed by nuclear and natural gas in that order. When viewed from the context of 
the current global-warming debate, fossil fuels, which produce carbon dioxide (the leading 
greenhouse gas) supply about 70% of electricity-generating requirements. Coal, petroleum, and 
gas are currently the most dominant fossil fuels11 used by the industry. 
Electric utilities have historically been organized as three major vertically 
integrated business units: generation plants that produce electricity; transmission facilities that 
deliver electricity from generation plants to substations via high-voltage lines, and; distribution 
facilities that deliver power from substations to end-use customers (Hyman 1997). The 
ownership structure of electric utilities in the United States includes investor-owned, 
government-owned, and cooperatively owned electric utilities. 
Historically, investor-owned electric utilities have dominated the industry in electricity 
generated and sold, and have attracted prior academic studies (e.g Nunez 2007, Bhojraj et al. 
2004, and Paek 2001). Investor-owned electric utilities are businesses that are highly regulated 
and are financed by the sale of stock, bonds, and other financial instruments in the financial 
markets. In 2005, there were about 23612 investor-owned utilities representing approximately 
75% of U.S. generation, sales and revenues (EIA 2006). Like all businesses, investor-owned 
electric utilities must earn an acceptable return on investment. Investor-owned electric utilities 
have two conflicting motives; first, to supply electricity at “reasonable and just” rates and 
secondly to ensure that investors get adequate return as compensation for the risk capital they 
                                                
11 Burning of fossil fuels emits polluting gases into the atmosphere. In 2005, power plant emissions were: sulfur 
dioxide 10,340 thousand metric tons; nitrogen oxides 3,961 thousand metric tons; and carbon dioxide 2,513,609 
thousand metric tons. Whereas pollution control equipment is used to reduce sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide 
emissions, technology has yet to accommodate the sequestration of carbon dioxide in an economically feasible 
manner.
12 181 investor-owned utilities are members of Edison Electric Institute (EEI 2006).
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supply. Most investor-owned electric utilities include vertically integrated operating companies 
that provide basic services for the generation, transmission, and the distribution of electricity.13
Investor-owned electric utilities operate in all states except Nebraska, where electric utilities 
consist primarily of municipal and public power districts (EIA 2006).  
Government-owned electric utilities are nonprofit local government agencies including 
municipal utilities that provide service to their communities and nearby consumers at cost, 
returning surplus funds to consumers in the form of community contributions and reduced rates.  
As of 2005, there were 2,009 government-owned electric utilities in the United States supplying 
approximately 10% of generation and accounting for 15% of retail and 14% of industry revenue 
(EIA 2006). 
 Cooperative utilities (Co-Ops) are owned by and provide power to customer-members. 
These electric utilities usually operate in rural areas with a low concentration of consumers. 
Frequently, these areas have been viewed as uneconomical areas of operations by investor-
owned utilities. In 2005, there were 912 cooperative electric utilities in the U.S. representing 9% 
of sales and revenue, and approximately 4% of generation and generating capacity (EIA 2006).  
Until recently, policymakers believed that electric power would be delivered to customers 
much more economically if a relatively small number of suppliers, insulated from competition, 
operated in all the three business segments (generation, transmission and distribution). However, 
during the 1990s, the electric utility industry underwent structural changes.  Over the past decade 
there has been an increasing trend towards deregulation.  
                                                
13 A number of electric utilities have adopted a corporate structure consisting of a parent holding company and 
subsidiary operating companies.
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An electric utility operates as a natural monopoly14 by charging their customers regulated 
rates for electrical services within a defined geographic service area.  Electric utilities differ from 
non-regulated competitive firms in three ways.  First, utilities must provide any user with 
electrical services within their defined jurisdiction. This obligation is often referred to as part of 
the “regulatory compact.” Second, electric utilities must expand their capacity, or purchase 
available power from others, as the demand for electrical services increases.  Third, operating 
under prudent management, utilities must charge a rate that provides a reasonable rate of return 
to their owners (Goodman 1998).  
Electric utilities are jointly regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) and State Public Utility Commissions (PUCs)15.  Regulatory agencies attempt to ensure 
that utilities operate efficiently, as if in a competitive environment. In general, PUCs have 
jurisdiction in their respective states over rates to be charged, types of service which can be 
offered, allowable costs that may be deferred, etc. PUCs also control the issuance of Certificates 
of Public Convenience and Necessity (CCN) to allow utilities build the facilities necessary to 
ensure the reliable supply of electricity service.  The federal government through the FERC has 
jurisdiction over interstate as well as intrastate wholesale transactions.  
2.2 Rate Regulation and Ratemaking in Electric Utilities
In the U.S., the electric utility industry is rate regulated16.  Rate regulation is commonly 
based on statutes and ordinances from local, state and federal governments and enforced by state 
PUCs and the FERC. Without rate regulation, the electric utility, acting as a natural monopoly, 
                                                
14 Although an electric utility is not strictly speaking a natural monopoly, it is commonly referred to as such in 
accounting literature.
15 FERC has jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act with respect to rates, service, interconnection, accounting, and 
other matters in connection with wholesale of electricity and interstate transmission.  However, at retail level and 
within the jurisdiction of each state, PUC handle regulatory matters.  
16 Rate regulation is sometimes referred to as rate-of–return regulation or cost-plus Regulation.
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could exploit consumers by charging unreasonably high electricity rates (Loudder et al. 1996; 
Hayward and Schmidt 1999). According to Hayward and Schmidt (1999), there are five basic 
objectives of utility regulation.  First, regulation should prevent excessive (monopoly) profits and 
prevent exploitation of consumers through unreasonably higher prices. Rate regulation is 
required to preclude natural monopolies from excessive use of market power to disadvantage 
consumers. Second, regulators must ensure that adequate earnings can be realized so that the 
public utility sector is capable of development and growth to meet projected consumer demand.  
Third, regulators must require that service be provided to all customers. Fourth, regulation 
promotes the development of the industry.  Finally, regulation should foster managerial 
efficiency while ensuring public safety. Safety has been a critical objective in the nuclear power 
program. 
The legal precedents for rate regulation in the U.S. extend back to the late 1880s.  
Governmental rate regulation can be found in the laws of the colonial period. During the colonial 
period, the legislature in South Carolina fixed rates that could be charged by taverns, ferries, and 
bakers. In 1714, the governor of New York authorized the courts to set reasonable prices on all 
liquors retained in public houses. In seventeenth and eighteenth century Virginia, statutes 
conferred authority on the courts to set maximum rates for drinks, food, lodging, and horse feed.  
In this early legislation, the common law established and enforced by courts required only 
reasonable charges for services (Goodman 1998). 
Rate regulation in the U.S. over the years has been significantly guided in principle by 
precedents established in two U.S. Supreme Court decisions: Bluefield Waterworks Co. v. Public 
Utilities Commission, 262 U.S. 679 (1923), and; Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural 
Gas Co., U.S. 591 (1944).  In the Hope case, in particular, the Court pronounced:
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. . . The investor has a legitimate concern with the financial integrity of the 
company whose rates are being regulated.  From the investor or company point of 
view it is important that there be enough revenue not only for operating expenses 
but also for the capital costs of the business.  These include service on debt and 
dividends on stock.  By that standard the return to equity owners should be 
commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having 
corresponding risks.  That return moreover, should be sufficient to assure 
confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit 
worthiness and to attract capital (U.S. 591, 603).
There are several implications derivable from the Hope case, including:
 Electric utilities have a right to earn adequate revenues and profits for their investors.  
At a minimum, the investors should earn a return that is commensurate with the 
opportunity cost of capital.  If this objective is not achieved, the industry will not be 
able to attract investors willing to provide equity capital.
 For the utility industry to grow and expand capacity in response to increased demand 
for electricity services, the utility must earn adequate revenues that cover not only its 
operating costs but also its capital costs.
 The utility should earn adequate revenues that provide it capacity to attract and 
service debt obligations.
 The utility has to project a sound financial condition for contracting and signaling 
reasons.  
Pronouncements in the Hope case ruling are manifested in the ratemaking process.  
16
The ratemaking process begins with a determination of the required revenues (this is also 
called the revenue criteria).  In a simplified form, the required revenues are given as:  Rev = OC 
+ rCB:  Where OC = Operating Costs17, including maintenance, depreciation and taxes18, r = the 
allowed rate of return and CB = the Capital (or Rate) Base. The rate base is the utility’s 
collective assets that provide the service for which rates are charged and thus represent the base 
(rate base) on which a return should be earned.  The allowed rate of return, r is the percentage 
figure that is applied to the rate base to establish the return to which investors in the utility 
company are entitled.  The regulator uses the following calculations:
Revenue
Less Operating expenses
Less Taxes
Equals  Operating income or income available to provide a return on invested capital
And
Operating income / Rate base = Rate of Return.
The electricity price per unit is then determined as the ratio of the projected revenue to projected
volume of electricity units to be sold.  By approving rate variables that include; revenues, 
operating costs, the rate base and the allowed rate of return, regulators effectively approve 
electricity rates charged to customers.  Regulators do not necessarily accept estimates and data 
provided by the company.  In accounting and ratemaking jargon, an “above-the-line” revenue or 
                                                
17 Fuel costs are a major component of operating costs.  Fuel adjustment clauses have been authorized for use for 
almost 40 years e.g., City of Norfolk Vs. Virginia Electric Power Co, 197 Va. 505, 90 S.E 2d 140 (1955).  Electric 
utilities may be permitted to recoup fluctuating fuel costs on an on going basis without necessarily conducting a full 
rate case.   Such periodically adjusting rate clauses are permitted to be utilized when regulatory commissions 
identify a particular expense (almost frequently the cost of fuel) that is more volatile compared to utility’s other 
costs.  Fuel adjustment clauses are not designed to allow utilities to earn profits.
18 Since 1922, rate-regulated electric utilities have been allowed to recover taxes as part of their operating costs 
(Galveston Electric Company v. Galveston (258 U.S. 388, 399, 1922)). Because utilities are allowed to recover the 
taxes they pay, taxing authorities have historically used them as “tax collectors.”
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expense is one that is included in the rates, while “below-the-line item affects only the 
company’s equity accounts rather than its operating accounts (Goodman 1998).  Revenue and 
operating expenses are adjusted for abnormal weather conditions and changes in the customer 
load (Hyman 1997).  Determining a “fair” or “reasonable” rate of return is usually a formidable 
task. Regulators and utilities often do not agree as to what is “fair” or “reasonable” when 
mandated rates are established.  Utilities strive to earn as much as possible for their investors, 
while regulators attempt to protect consumers from contributing to excessive investor returns. 
Accounting choices, such as the provision for depreciation19 and accounting for income 
taxes20, play an integral role in the regulatory process since they influence the measurement of 
financial information provided to PUCs used in the establishing electricity rates (Bauer 1930).  
In effect, the choice of accounting methods affects how costs are allocated between utility 
stockholders and rate payers.  Whereas Local, State and Federal agencies all exert some 
influence over utilities operations, state PUCs are responsible for setting allowed rates of return 
based upon approved capital bases and for monitoring ratemaking variables (Goodman 1998).  
All rate requests are supported by accounting information provided to regulators by the electric 
utility.  Electric utilities are permitted to charge rates that enable them to earn sufficient revenues 
that recover their operating costs and earn an allowed rate of return on an approved capital base 
(Nwaeze 2000).  
When filing for rate adjustments, utilities are required to submit detailed revenue and cost 
data in order for the PUCs to accurately determine the required revenues needed to cover 
allowed costs, in arriving at rate decisions.  Accrual accounting ultimately influences the rate-
                                                
19 Depreciation methods include: Straight line and accelerated deprecation methods (e.g double declining balance 
and sum-of years’ digits).  The depreciation method that is chosen has an influence on reported earnings.
20 Two accounting methods are used: “flow through” and “normalization”.  Under the former, tax savings are used 
to reduce the rates in the year in which the savings are received “flowed through” to consumers.  Under the latter, 
the savings are spread over the life of the property which produced the saving (normalization).
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setter’s ability to make these decisions, by affecting the timing of revenue and costs. Accrual
accounting is based on management’s choices, within the constraints of GAAP, that ultimately 
determine future revenues, future cash flows, and recovery of future costs (Abdel-Khalik 1988).
Traditionally, the electric utility has assumed the role of initiating (requesting) rate 
reviews whenever earnings are projected to fall short of recovering operating costs.  However, 
there are less frequent situations when the PUC requests a rate review if the utility’s rate of 
return exceeds the commission’s authorized rate of return (Nowell and Shogren 1991). 
Under the ratemaking process, rate-regulated electric utilities are subjected to “prior 
approval” regarding regulatory requirements.  Under the prior-approval requirement, no rates 
become effective until the PUC has reached its decision regarding the reasonableness of the 
company’s new filing.  Similarly, a utility may not commence deferral and amortization of a cost 
by establishing a special account and expect to recover the amortized cost in rates unless it has 
requested the commission’s approval to do so in advance (Goodman 1998).  In most states, 
utilities must seek authority each time they want to adjust rates21.  Before rates are approved, all 
rate requests are subjected to a public hearing.  All stakeholders are allowed to participate in the 
ratemaking process.
  A typical rate case proceeds as follows: A regulated electric utility requesting a rate 
increase first serves a public notice of intent.  It then files a rate case petition with the PUC that 
includes supporting data (including accounting data).  The commission staff then investigate the 
utility’s request for a rate change (discovery period).  During the discovery period, the utility is 
                                                
21 Utilities file for rate changes each time it is deemed necessary.  In order to decrease the frequency of filing formal 
rate requests, some PUCs use Price-Capping (e.g., Alabama Power SEC Form 10K filling for 2005).  Under Price-
Cap regulation, the PUC sets a price ceiling or cap and the firm is allowed to charge any price under the cap.  Sibley 
(1989), however, argues that although price-cap avoids a lengthy regulatory hearing, it gives utilities broad latitude 
in pricing.    
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required to justify all of its expenses for the operations of the company.  An expense that the 
commission staff determines to be improper or unnecessary is disallowed and excluded from the 
approved costs the utility is allowed to collect from its customers.  The staff also examines the 
amount utility stockholders have invested in plant and other facilities and calculates a reasonable 
return on investment necessary to provide quality service.  After the completion of the staff’s 
investigation, an administrative hearing, which is open to the public, is held on the merits of the 
application.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the administrative law judge forwards a proposed 
recommendation to the commissioners for their consideration.  Upon this submission, the 
commissioners review the record that has been developed and issue a decision at the 
commission’s monthly Business and Executive Session.  The commissioners’ decision 
determines the level of rates the company will be permitted to collect.  Once the final order is 
issued, the commission’s decision can be appealed.  During the time between filing of the rate 
case petition and approval of new rates (regulatory lag), current rates are frozen (Goodman, 
1998).      
In considering rate cases, commissions do not consider the utility’s size.  Besley and 
Bolten (1994) find that a utility’s size (which may proxy for political power) does not appear to 
be a significant impediment for regulators when setting rates.  Their study failed to reject the null 
hypothesis that regulated rates for both large and small utilities are equal over the period of their 
study.  
The preceding discussion suggests that the process of ratemaking in rate-regulated 
electric utilities provides opportunities for earnings management, especially given the fact that 
utilities’ operating costs are reimbursable.  A utility can artificially increase operating costs so as
to enhance chances of higher rates being approved.  With higher rates, utilities maximize return 
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to their shareholders at the expense of ratepayers.  Moreover due to asymmetrical information, 
the PUC staff may not be able to determine and disallow all irrelevant costs and/or adjust 
downwards inflated costs (Hagerman 1990).   
2.3 Earnings Management and Agency Theory
Earnings management is the opportunistic use of accruals to window-dress and mislead 
users of financial statements (Dechow and Dichev 2002).  Prior accounting research has 
documented accrual management as the primary method of earnings management (Healey 1985,
Jones 1991, McNichols and Wilson 1988, Rangan 1998, Teoh et al. 1998, and Philips et al. 
2003). 
  According to Nelson et al. (2003), common methods of accrual earnings management 
include, but are not limited to: recognizing too much or too little in approved reserve for the 
current year; recognizing too much or too little asset impairment; capitalizing and deferring too 
much or too little expense; deferring too much or too little revenue; modifying methods used for 
depreciation or amortization, and modifying useful lives, and changing accounting principles.  In 
a recent study, Mvay (2006) finds that companies practice earnings management by shifting 
expenses between core and special items22.  Ultimately, earnings management involves
opportunistically shifting revenues and expenses between periods in order to achieve strategic 
reporting objectives.  Previous researchers have argued that the level of discretionary accruals 
reported by companies is a reflection of management’s use of “financial reporting discretion” 
inherent in GAAP to either increase or decrease reported earnings (Defond and Park 2001, Jones
1991, and Schipper 1989).  Academic literature has also differentiated between nondiscretionary 
and discretionary accruals.  Nondiscretionary accruals are estimated as expected, or normal, 
accrual levels for the company considering factors such as their size, industry, and revenue 
                                                
22 This type of earnings management is a violation of GAAP.
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growth (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994, Jones 1991, Key 1997, and  Kothari et al. 2005).  
Discretionary accruals are estimated as abnormal accruals, the difference between the actual 
reported accruals and the expected (non discretionary) accruals, estimated using an accrual 
expectation model.
Agency theory suggests that an agent acting on behalf of the principal has incentives to 
act in the agent’s self-interest at the expense of the principal (Watts and Zimmerman 1986).  
From the agency theory perspective, earnings management is motivated by a contractual 
relationship between an agent and a principal.  Agents typically manipulate the accounting 
system to increase the likelihood of a more favorable performance outcome (Demski et al. 2004).  
Prior studies have investigated earnings management that is motivated by the following agency 
relationships; management (agents) vs. owners (principals) in compensation contracts; 
management (agents) vs. debt providers (principals) in debt contracts and management (agents) 
vs. investors (principals) in capital markets23.  These agency relationships have led to three 
streams of earnings management research in accounting.
The first stream examines earnings management that is motivated by managerial 
compensation contracts (Healey 1985, Warfield et al. 1995, and Houlthausen et al. 1995).  These 
studies find that managers engage in earnings management if their compensation is linked to 
accounting numbers.  Research findings indicate that if earnings targets for bonuses are binding, 
managers will use income-increasing discretionary accruals in order to meet compensation 
criteria.  However, once the earnings threshold for the bonus has been met or there is absolutely 
no chance of meeting the earnings target in the current period, management will take a “big 
bath”, i.e., use income-decreasing accruals in the current period in order to enhance chances of 
achieving compensation thresholds in the subsequent period.  With a bonus program, managers 
                                                
23 The relationship between investors and management in the capital market represents an implicit contract.
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have incentive to move earnings to a period when a higher bonus can be claimed (Healey 1985).  
With a stock option program, the incentive is to manipulate accounting earnings in order to 
influence the stock price and then exercise options to maximize personal income (Liang 2004).  
Carter et al. (2007) find that financial reporting concerns are positively related to CEO
compensation.  Studies in this area generally find that managers use discretion over accounting 
numbers to ensure that their compensation is not at risk.
The second stream of earnings management research relates to that which is motivated by 
debt covenants.  Earnings management may occur if debt covenants are stated in terms of 
accounting numbers.  Studies find that managers, acting on behalf of owners, will use earnings
management manipulations to increase earnings in order to avoid the breach or violation of debt 
covenants (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994, Sweeney 1994, Begley and Feltham 1999, Dichev and 
Skinner 2002, and Begley and Freedman 2004).  The fundamental assumption implicit in these 
studies is that the interests of managers are aligned with those of the owners. 
A third strand of research investigates earnings management that is motivated by the
management’s need to attract capital market participants with respect to raising capital.  
Managers use income-increasing discretionary accruals in order to beat forecast earnings 
benchmarks (Ayers et al. 2006, Dechow et al. 2003, and Phillips et al. 2003).  Dechow and 
Skinner (2000) document that earnings management will likely be greater when it allows 
managers to meet the analysts’ forecasts.  Abarnell and Lehavy (2003) report that firms that have 
received buy recommendations from analysts are more likely to engage in earnings management 
in order to meet, or just beat, analysts’ forecasts.  Teoh et al. (1998), and Rangan (1998)
document that firms use discretionary accruals to manage earnings in periods immediately prior 
to initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings.
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This study extends the earnings management literature by investigating non-traditional 
agency theory arguments of earnings management that are motivated by regulatory constraints.  
Earnings management that occurs under rate regulation provides the potential for wealth 
transfers between ratepayers and utility managers/shareholders, and is a contribution of this 
study.   
2.4 Earnings Management in Regulated Industries
Regulated industries are subjected to regulatory constraints24 that managers may try to 
relax using earnings management mechanisms.  Schipper (1998) suggests that obtaining 
favorable treatment from regulators is one of the conditions that give rise to earnings 
management.  Healy and Wahlen (1999) similarly argue that there are incentives for firms in 
regulated industries to manage earnings in order to stay within regulatory constraints that are 
stated in terms of accounting numbers.  Consistent with this argument, Galai et al. (2003) 
document that, banks create “hidden reserves” that they use to increase income for the purpose of 
meeting capital adequacy requirements.  Beatty et al. (1995) demonstrate how banks manage 
their financial reports by altering the timing and magnitude of transactions and accruals decisions 
in loan charge-offs, loan loss provisions, and the decisions to issue securities to meet regulatory 
capital levels.  Collins et al. (1995) document that profitable banks use loan loss provisions to 
manage earnings.  Beatty and Harris (1999) and Beatty et al. (2002) document that publicly 
traded banks are more likely than privately held banks to manage earnings upward.  Petroni
(1992) reports that firms in the regulated property-casualty insurance industry understate claim
loss reserves in order to preempt attracting regulatory attention.
According to Heally and Wahlen (1999), other forms of regulation can also provide firms 
with incentives to manage earnings.  Cahan (1992) studied firms that were under investigation 
                                                
24 For, instance banks are subjected to regulated capital adequacy requirements.
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for anti-trust violations.  He finds that discretionary accruals for firms that were under 
investigation were higher than those for the control sample (not under investigation).  He 
concludes that managers adjust earnings in response to monopoly-related antitrust investigations.  
Jones (1991) studied firms that were under import relief investigations.  She finds that firms use 
discretionary accruals to manage earnings downward during the period of investigation.  Key 
(1997) studied firms in the cable television industry that were under congressional investigation 
for breach of industry regulations.  She finds that firms manage earnings to diminish profitability 
when they are under investigation. 
Another stream of research identifies and finds evidence that earnings management may 
be motivated by tax considerations.  Guenther (1994) investigates whether accounting earnings 
are managed in response to the decrease in the statutory corporate tax rate mandated by 1986 Tax 
Reform Act.  He finds that current accruals for large firms are significantly lower in the year 
prior to the tax rate reduction consistent with managers delaying realized earnings until after the 
tax rate is reduced.  Wang (1994) investigates the effect of book income adjustments on financial 
reporting.  His sample included firms that were subjected to Alternate Minimum Tax (AMT) as 
enacted in the 1986 Tax Reform Act.  He finds that sample firms subjected to AMT exhibit
unusual shifts in accounting accruals and suggests that these firms may have managed earnings.  
Phillips et al. (2003) find the firm’s deferred tax expense is a useful metric to detect earnings 
management.  
Findings in this area generally indicate that firms manage earnings in order to minimize 
taxes.  Tax-related motives for managing earnings have minimal implications for ratemaking and
are not relevant because taxes are passed through to ratepayers along with operating costs.
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2.5 Earnings Management in Rate-Regulated Electric Utilities
With respect to complying with U.S. GAAP, rate-regulated electric utilities are different 
from other firms, primarily because the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) permits 
rate-regulated electric utilities to apply SFAS 71, Accounting for the Effects of Certain Types of 
Regulation.  Given the importance of this accounting standard to accrual decisions permitted by 
utilities and to this study, I summarize the ratemaking and accounting requirements of SFAS 71 
(FASB 1982). 
SFAS 71 allows rate-regulated utilities to defer cost recognition to a period other than the 
period in which the cost would be charged to expense by an unregulated enterprise.  This 
accommodation creates “regulatory assets” (future cash inflows that will result from the 
ratemaking process), or conversely “regulatory liabilities” (future cash outflows that will result 
from the ratemaking process).  For general-purpose financial reporting, an incurred cost for 
which a regulator permits recovery in a future period is accounted for like an incurred cost that is 
reimbursable under a cost-reimbursement-type contract.  Accounting requirements that are 
directly related to the economic effects of rate actions may be imposed on regulated firms by 
orders of regulatory authorities, and occasionally by court decisions or statutes.  This does not 
necessarily mean that those accounting requirements conform to generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP).  For example, a regulatory authority may order an enterprise to capitalize 
and amortize a cost that would be charged to income currently by an unregulated enterprise.  
Unless capitalization is appropriate under SFAS 71, GAAP requires the regulated enterprise to 
charge to income currently.  
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SFAS 7125 applies to general-purpose external financial statements of an enterprise that 
has regulated operations that meet all of the following criteria:
 The enterprise’s rates for regulated services or products provided to its customers are 
established by or are subject to approval by an independent, third party regulator or by its 
own governing board empowered by statute or contract to establish rates that bind 
customers.
 The regulated rates are designed to recover the specific enterprise’s costs of providing the 
regulated services or products.
 In view of the demand for the regulated services or products and the levels of 
competition, direct and indirect, it is reasonable to assume that rates set at levels that will 
recover the enterprise’s costs can be charged and collected from customers.  This 
criterion requires consideration of anticipated changes in levels of demand or competition 
during the recovery period of capitalized costs (FASB 1982).
According to SFAS 71, regulatory assets (deferred costs) are created if both of the following 
criteria are met:
 It is probable that future revenue in an amount at least equal to the capitalized cost will 
result from inclusion of that cost in allowable costs for ratemaking purposes.
 Based on available evidence, the future revenue will be provided to permit recovery of 
the previously incurred cost rather than to provide for expected levels of similar future 
costs (FASB 1982).
Likewise, regulatory liabilities (revenues earned in advance) are created if the following 
conditions are met:
                                                
25 SFAS 71 does not apply to accounting for price controls that are imposed by governmental action in times of 
emergency, high inflation, or other unusual conditions.  Nor does it cover accounting for contracts in general (FASB 
1982)  
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 The regulator may require refunds to customers.
 The regulator can provide current rates intended to recover costs that are expected to be 
incurred in the future with the understanding that if those costs are not incurred future 
rates will be reduced by corresponding amounts.
 A regulator can require that a gain or other reduction of net allowable costs be given to 
customers over future periods (FASB 1982).
SFAS 71 general standard is applied to the following specific standards: allowance for funds 
used during construction (AFUDC); inter-company profit; accounting for income taxes; and 
other disclosure. 
Regarding AFUDC, in some cases, a regulator permits a utility to capitalize, as part of the 
cost of plant and equipment, the cost of financing construction, as financed partially by debt and 
partially by equity.  A computed interest cost and a designated cost of equity are capitalized, and 
net income for the current period is increased by a corresponding amount.  After the construction 
is completed, the resulting capitalized cost is the basis for depreciation and un-recovered 
investment for ratemaking purposes.  In such cases, the amounts capitalized for ratemaking 
purposes as a cost of acquiring the assets, shall be capitalized for financial reporting purposes. 
As pertains to inter-company transactions, profit on sales to regulated affiliates shall not 
be eliminated in general-purpose financial statements if both of the following criteria are met:
 The sales price is reasonable26.
 It is probable that, through ratemaking process, future revenue approximately equal to the 
sales price will result from the regulated affiliate’s use of the products.
                                                
26 The sales price is usually considered reasonable if the price is accepted or not challenged by the regulator that 
governs the regulated affiliate.
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In relation to accounting for income taxes, items of revenue and expense are sometimes 
taxable or deductible in periods other than the periods in which those items are recognized for 
financial reporting purposes.  In some cases, a regulator does not include the income tax effect of 
certain transactions in allowable costs in period in which the taxes are payable.  In such cases, if 
it is probable that income taxes payable in future years are because of net reversal of timing 
differences will be recovered through rates based on taxes payable at that time, the enterprise 
shall record neither the deferred income taxes that result from timing differences nor the related 
regulatory asset.  However, the enterprise shall disclose the cumulative net amount of income tax 
timing differences for which deferred income taxes have not been provided.
Other disclosure is required in certain cases where a regulator may permit an enterprise to 
include a cost that would be charged to expense by an unregulated enterprise, to be capitalized 
and then amortized over a period of time for ratemaking purposes.  However, the regulator does 
not include the unrecovered amount in the utility’s rate base.  This procedure will not result in a 
return on investment during the recovery period.  If recovery of such major costs is provided 
without a return on investment during the recovery period, the utility shall disclose the remaining 
amounts of such assets and the remaining recovery period applicable to them.
Implications of SFAS 71 for earnings management may be substantial.  Clearly, this 
standard gives more discretion to rate-regulated utilities in making accrual decisions.  Rate-
regulated utilities have more latitude in accruing or deferring costs, earning revenues in advance, 
and discretionary treatment of transactions between parents and affiliates.  Regarding inter-
company transactions, Thomas et al. (2004) find that parent companies manage earnings by 
manipulating transactions with affiliates.  
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Few studies investigate earnings management in electric utility industry.  The only 
research to-date to investigate earnings management in the U.S. electric utility industry is Paek 
(2001).  A more recent international study was conducted in the Spanish electric utility industry 
(Gill-de-albornoz and Illueca 2005). 
Paek (2001) investigates whether there is systematic management of accounting earnings 
in response to a particular regulatory regime (incentive regulation vs. rate regulation) and 
realized performance relative to allowed return.  His study was motivated by D’Souza (1998) 
who finds that when an accounting change that reduces income is mandated (e.g., SFAS 106), 
rate-regulated utilities managers tend to exercise discretionary choices so that the impact of the 
accounting change on financial statement is accentuated.  The major question that Paek 
investigates is whether a regulatory regime enhances opportunities for earnings management.  He 
draws his pre-1994 utility sample from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) data 
base that lists major electric utilities.  He categorizes utilities as under either incentive or rate-
regulation regimes basing this classification on an unpublished work by Landon (1993).  In 
univariate tests, he estimates discretionary accruals (the earnings management metric) using a 
modified Jones (1991) model.  He modifies the original Jones (1991) model by including 
allowed rate of return (AROE) as an additional independent variable.  In multivariate tests, the 
dependant variable, discretionary accrual (DA) is regressed on test variables (rate-regulated 
overearning, rate-regulated underearning, incentive-regulated overearning, and incentive-
regulated underearning) and control variables.  He finds that rate-regulated overearning firms 
make the most income-decreasing accruals.
I extend Paek (2001) by conducting a comprehensive study of earnings management in 
the US electric utility industry.  Unlike Paek (2001), I omit AROE from discretionary accrual 
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models because it is determined by regulators.  Paek (2001) examines the pre-1994 period, I 
focus on a more current period (1994-2005).  Finally, the research questions that my study 
addresses are entirely different from Paek’s.
In a more recent work, Gill-de-albornoz and Illueca (2005) investigate earnings 
management in the Spanish electricity industry.  They examine whether electric utility managers 
artificially reduce reported earnings after the government establishes tariff (rate) increases.  
These researchers base their study on positive economic theory of regulation which proposes that 
political powers may transfer wealth between various parties (Stigler 1971, and Peltzman 1976).  
The political cost hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman 1986) states that the more a firm is subject 
to potential wealth transfers as a result of the political process, the more its management is likely 
to adopt accounting policies that reduce such transfers.  Gill-de-albornoz and Illueca (2005) 
study a sample of thirteen Spanish electricity utilities over a ten year period (1991-2001).  The 
earnings management metric in their study is discretionary accruals which they compute using; 
the Jones (1991) model, the Jones modified Cash flow model27, and working capital accrual 
models.  They adopt Cahan’s (1992) one-way fixed effects model specification to examine the 
relation between discretionary accruals and the test variable TARRIFNOM, the nominal change 
in the electricity tariff approved by the government in year t for the following year t+1.  The
researchers find that discretionary accruals in Spanish electricity companies are inversely related 
to the annual approved tariff change, which suggests that the accrual policy of sample firms is 
conservative (aggressive) when an increase (decrease) in tariffs is approved.  Gill-de-albornoz 
and Illueca (2005) interpret their findings to mean that after the government increases electricity 
tariffs, utilities manage earnings downward in order to diminish political visibility, and dampen 
public opposition that often follows a government-approved tariff increases.  Although the 
                                                
27 Cash flow from operations are included in the model in order to control for extreme performance
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electric utility industry in Spain significantly differs from that of the U.S.28, the Spanish 
experience motivates this study to examine whether U.S. electric utilities manage earnings.              
The preceding literature reveals that firms in U.S. regulated industries may manage 
earnings.  Furthermore, firms in the U.S. rate-regulated may manage earnings (Paek 2001), this 
would be consistent with international evidence drawing from Spanish utility industry (Gill-de-
albornoz and Illueca (2005).  This review also reveals that the FASB by issuing SFAS 71 
provides rate-regulated utilities more discretion in accrual accounting than non rate-regulated 
firms.  An empirical question is whether electric utility firms in the U.S. rate-regulated electric 
industry manage earnings more, or less, than non-regulated firms.  If regulated electric utilities 
manage earnings more than non-regulated firms, then I would expect discretionary accruals of 
regulated electric utilities to be greater in magnitude than those for non-regulated companies.  
The argument for rate-regulated electricity firms to manage earnings more than non-regulated 
firms is that utilities are given greater discretion to book and amortize accruals under the 
provisions of SFAS 71. For instance, an electric utility may depreciate certain capitalized costs
(e.g. damage resulting from natural disasters) over a nominally lengthy period of time in order to 
recover the costs through a temporary surcharge. Therefore the opportunity to affect accruals 
through the application of SFAS 71 suggests that electric utilities may have more discretion to 
manage earnings.  However, the counterpoint to this proposition is that electric utilities may, in 
fact, have less discretion.  This argument stems from the fact that unlike other companies, the 
earnings of rate-regulated electric utilities are not only closely monitored by conventional 
financial statement users (e.g. investors, creditors, financial analysts, and financial reporting 
oversight agencies), but are also scrutinized by federal and state utility regulators.  Utility 
                                                
28 For instance, In Spain adjustments to electricity tariffs are approved by the government while in the US electric 
rates are approved by public utility commissions.
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managers who decide to manipulate earnings face an increased risk of having their actions 
discovered and therefore, should be more conservative in making accrual decisions than 
managers of non-regulated companies.
The preceding discussion presents two opposing arguments.  As suggested by extant 
earnings management research, regulatory constraints may provide more incentives for rate-
regulated electric utilities to manage earnings with discretionary accruals than non-regulated 
companies.  Additionally, rate-regulated utilities can apply SFAS 71, which provides more 
discretion over accruing/depreciating capitalized costs.  Alternatively, regulated utilities may 
have smaller levels of discretionary accruals than unregulated companies because they are 
subject to additional scrutiny by regulators.  Because of these contrasting arguments, the first 
hypothesis is presented in the null form:
H1: There is no difference between the magnitude of the discretionary accruals of rate-
regulated electric utilities and those of comparable non-regulated companies.
2.6 Earnings Management and the Deregulation of the Electric Utility Industry
Investor-owned electric utilities in the U.S. have been rate-regulated for over 80 years 
(Tschirhart 1991).   Until the 1980s, the U.S. electric utility industry consisted of vertically 
integrated firms with state-franchised monopolies.  Federal regulatory agencies only played a 
minor regulatory role and competition was essentially non-existent.  Rate regulation insulated 
utilities from competition and over that time the industry was transformed from small 
competitive producers to large uncompetitive producers.  Large noncompetitive producers were
thence awarded monopoly franchises by their state commissions, and in return accepted 
guaranteed rates for their obligations to serve all customers.  The vertical integration of 
generation, transmission, and distribution enabled economies of scale.  
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The environment changed in the 1970s.  Inflation soared, fuel prices skyrocketed, gas 
shortages were prevalent, cost overruns on new plant construction became common (particularly 
with nuclear plants) and environment concerns placed new constraints on utilities operations 
(Tschirhart 1991).  State commissions were ill-equipped to handle these changes and to respond 
to associated public concern.  In 1978, the U.S. Congress responded to these events by passing 
the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA).  This statute included provisions that 
instructed the FERC to require utilities to purchase electricity from two statutorily-prescribed 
types of qualifying facilities (QFs) owned by third parties.  PURPA demonstrated the 
effectiveness of an institutional framework in which utilities are required to transmit electricity 
generated by third parties-a necessary element in establishing a competitive wholesale market for 
electricity (Pierce 2005).  PURPA and state statutes that permitted consumers to indirectly buy 
electricity from non-utility sources exposed the electric utility to competition for the first time. In 
order to survive in a more competitive environment, utilities had to become more efficient.
In the early 1990s, technological improvements in the generation of electricity (i.e., 
relatively inexpensive gas-turbine generating plants and natural gas) emboldened deregulatory 
forces within the electric utility industry. An independent power producer could construct a 
relatively inexpensive gas-fired generating plant in a relatively short period of time, and produce 
power at competitive prices to those charged by established utilities. Recognizing this shift in the 
regulatory landscape, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT 92), a statute that 
for the first time gave FERC the authority to require a utility to provide third party access to its 
transmission lines in what came to be known as “ retail wheeling” (D’Souza and Jacob 2001).  In 
effect, EPACT 92 created conditions necessary to support a competitive wholesale market for 
generation and marketing of electricity (Watkiss and Smith 1994).  The 1992 statute deregulated 
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wholesale prices of electricity, and provided States the opportunity to further deregulate at the 
retail level, all aimed at reducing electricity prices.    
FERC implemented the intent of this legislation in 1996 by issuing Orders 888 and 889, 
with the stated objective to “remove impediments to competition in wholesale trade and to bring 
more efficient, lower cost power to the Nation’s electricity consumers”(EIA 2006).  These 
regulatory orders opened power transmission networks around the country, thereby enabling
utilities’ transmission lines to become common carriers. In the past, the owners of vertically 
integrated transmission facilities could deny access and transport across their lines. After Order 
888, electrical generation competitors, in theory, could access transmission lines on the same 
rates, terms, and conditions as their utility owners.  Orders 888 and 889 required every investor-
owned utility to provide third party access to its transmission lines (FERC 1996).  In return for 
providing third party access, FERC authorized each utility to make wholesale electricity 
available at unregulated prices.  
As a result of Federal and state initiatives, the electricity power industry began moving 
away from an environment of highly regulated natural monopolies and toward a more 
competitive market for electricity.  By 1999, deregulation for generation and marketing of 
electricity at the retail level had gained momentum.  FERC aimed at creating competitive 
wholesale markets across the country with hope that states would follow suit and create 
competitive retail markets.  Unfortunately, the California electricity crisis in the summer of 2000 
cast doubt on deregulation efforts. The expectation that electricity prices would fall in California 
after introduction of retail competition did not occur. Joskow (2001), and Joskow and Kahn 
(2002) find that competition was inadequate in reducing prices and stabilizing the California 
market.  Matters were further aggravated by Enron’s collapse.  These two events (the California 
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market “melt down” and the Enron debacle) bolstered the positions held by opponents of electric 
utility deregulation.  Deregulation and restructuring of electric utilities began to stall but did not
completely come to a halt.  By 2005, almost half of the states throughout the U.S. had passed 
major legislation to restructure29 their electric power providers, with the ultimate goal of 
lowering electricity costs to consumers.  However, these state-specific restructuring efforts were 
not uniform with respect to either the final form of deregulation adopted, or the implementation 
schedule executed in restructuring.  States that historically had higher-than-average electricity
rates, such as California, Pennsylvania, New York, and most of the New England states, opened 
their retail electricity markets to competition, allowing customers to choose their own electricity 
supplier.  Some other states are implementing the process on a more measured basis.  While 
some states have delayed beginning the process, others have decided not to restructure, but to 
retain the traditional rate-regulated utility model at the retail level.  
  Retail access, the major objective of restructuring, allows customers to choose their own 
supplier of power generation services. Note that retail deregulation only includes the generation 
and marketing of electricity, and does not include the transmission and distribution functions
which will remain rate-regulated.  
Government regulation (including rate regulation) of business has been strongly debated 
in academic circles.  There are both proponents and opponents of Federal and state regulation of 
public enterprises.  Positive accounting researchers (Leftwich 1980, and Watts and Zimmerman
1986) argue against government regulation by asserting that politicians use regulations as 
mechanisms to transfer wealth to themselves at the expense of consumers, and that the “public 
interest” justification employed by proponents of government regulation is a fallacy.  
                                                
29Restructuring of electric utilities entails separating the heretofore combined generation, transmission and 
distribution functions that characterized these vertical monopolies into separate entities.  
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Alternatively, proponents of government regulation argue that, if natural monopolies are left 
unchecked, they can exploit consumers by either under-producing or inefficiently producing
public goods in order to push up prices (Sappington 1980).  The ultimate effect of unregulated 
monopolistic actions is the deterioration of social welfare.  The degree to which the government 
regulates the free market continues to be a contentious issue.  The U.S. deregulation experience 
has added to this debate.
Not withstanding the views of opponents to deregulation and the California 
experience, the above discussion reveals that abandoning rate regulation and introducing a 
competitive environment may benefit consumers through reduced electricity rates.  States that 
eliminate their utilities’ rate-regulated business models force power providers to compete in the 
marketplace for customers seeking lower rates.  This should lead to increased cost efficiencies. 
Deregulation should also affect the opportunities for earnings management. 
A change from regulation to deregulation introduces the concern for the regulatory 
treatment of “stranded costs”.  Loudder et al. (1996) define stranded costs as; “those costs that 
have been incurred by a public utility with the expectation that the regulator will allow for future 
recovery of the costs, but this recovery may be uncertain in a future regulatory environment” 
(p.358).  Assets representing stranded costs include generating plants, costs that regulators have 
allowed for a variety of social purposes (e.g conservation and low-income assistance programs).  
After deregulation, recovery of these costs is uncertain, i.e., they become “stranded”.  Bhojraj et 
al. (2004) find that before regulators have established cost recovery mechanisms in their 
jurisdictions, firms with high levels of stranded costs tend to refrain from strategic disclosures 
about plans to exploit new opportunities made possible by deregulation.  After regulatory 
concerns abate, firms exhibit an increase in the level of disclosures, diminished only by 
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considerations related to product market competition.  They further find that regulatory 
incentives do not influence voluntary disclosures about plans to counter the threat of revenue 
loss.  Firms do not appear to anticipate more stringent regulatory decisions on the stranded cost 
issue if they reveal their plans to protect existing customer base.  D’Souza and Jacob (2001) find 
a significant association between electric utility stock prices and estimates of utility stranded 
costs, suggesting that investors anticipate that a non-trivial portion of stranded costs will be 
borne by utility shareholders.  Nunez (2007) documents a positive relation between stranded
benefits and share prices.
The studies discussed above suggest that recovery of stranded costs is an issue in the 
aftermath of deregulation.  Of particular interest is the finding that the market considers stranded 
costs to be non-trivial and the associated finding of a negative relation between share prices and 
stranded costs.  After deregulation, utilities may have the incentive to manage earnings upwards 
in order to assure investors that stranded costs are not significantly affecting their earnings.       
Regulatory accounting requires electric utilities that cease to be rate-regulated to 
immediately discontinue applying SFAS 71 in financial reporting.  SFAS 101, “Accounting for 
the Discontinuance of Application of SFAS 71”, requires electric utilities to immediately write 
off any regulatory assets (deferred regulatory costs) that had been created (FASB 1988).  The 
implication is that utilities operating in states that have restructured have reduced capacity for 
accrual management (i.e., SFAS 71).  However, deregulation of the generation and marketing of 
electricity also brings a reduction in regulatory oversight, permitting managers increased 
earnings management opportunities. Additionally, with the price of electricity determined in the 
market rather than by regulatory bodies, managers may have increased incentives to manage 
earnings, i.e., revenues are no longer determined by regulators. For example, executive 
38
compensation in the electric utility industry provides stock option and bonus incentives similar to
that observed for non-regulated firms, although smaller in magnitude.30 Deregulation may 
increase the likelihood of opportunistic earnings management. 
If deregulation provides greater opportunities for earnings management (albeit without
the accrual provisions of SFAS 71), and increased incentives to manage earnings, then the
earnings management metric should increase in magnitude for those utilities in states electing to 
restructure. I investigate this proposition by testing the following directional hypotheses:
H2A: For those utilities in states electing to restructure, the magnitudes of discretionary 
accruals are significantly greater in the post-restructuring period than in the pre-restructuring 
period.
H2B: In the post-restructuring period, the magnitudes of discretionary accruals for utilities in 
states electing to restructure are significantly greater than those of utilities in states electing 
not to restructure.
2.7 Earnings Management Associated with Requests for Rate Increases
The utility’s decision to file for a rate increase depends on the growth rate of earnings 
achieved by the utility in the current and previous year, the level of interest coverage realized in 
the current year, and a variable that measures prior expectations of success in the PUC’s 
deliberation process (Joskow 1973).  The financial indicator that seems to be of most interest to 
the regulators in rate approval process is the growth rate in earnings (Joskow 1973).  Jaskow’s 
findings suggest that negative or lower earnings growth rates serve as important economic 
                                                
30 Dismukes and Hughes (2006) report the mean total compensation paid electric utility CEOs in their sample of 31 
firms was $5.5M in 2004. Their $3M median for utility CEOs is well above the $2.4 million median in total 
compensation for CEOs at 1,522 of the largest U.S. corporations. As a percentage of total compensation, utility 
CEOs’ salaries decreased from 54 percent in 1994 to approximately 14 percent in 2004. Simultaneously, the 
proportion of total compensation paid in exercised stock options increased from approximately 25 percent to nearly 
69 percent during the same period.
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arguments for rate increases.  Sappington (1980) argues that a regulated utility may engage in 
strategic behavior to enhance long-run earnings and the regulator is unable to detect and control 
a wide range of strategic behavior by a regulated firm.  Hagerman (1990) documents that 
regulators can not prevent utilities from maximizing profits because they do not know 
information about firms costs.  He argues that due to asymmetrical information, a regulated firm 
has superior knowledge of costs compared to regulators.  Hagerman (1990) suggests that 
management may attempt to manipulate the rate request-process by either padding expenses in a 
given period to relax “future periods” constraints, or by deliberately seeking to incur losses, and 
therefore realizing negative earnings growth rates in an effort to relax regulatory control 
(including obtaining approval of rate increases).  Sherman (1989) argues that utilities expend 
significant effort in developing valid arguments and supporting documentation to justify rate
increases.  Accounting earnings generated through the accrual process provide the most 
important economic justification for increasing electricity rates.  Utilities that petition for rate 
increases are required to submit detailed cost and revenue data to support their requests.  Prior 
studies find that managers exercise significant discretion in reporting accounting earnings (Healy 
1985, Jones 1991, and Kothari et al. 2005).  Utility managers may have incentives to manipulate 
earnings prior to requesting a rate increase, and regulators may not be effective in detecting 
strategic cost/earnings manipulation (Hagerman 1990, Sherman 1989, and Sappington 1980).  
Prior studies find that regulators’ skills may be limited and their resources inadequate to properly 
assess strategic behavior or inefficiencies in utilities’ production decisions (Kahn 1973, and 
Sappington 1980).31  
                                                
31A noteworthy example of this is Enron’s demonstrated ability to manipulate the California electricity market 
during 2000-2001.
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At the managerial level, private incentives may exist for managers to manipulate earnings 
in order to circumvent regulatory oversight.  Abdel-Khalik (1988) observes that incentives exist 
for implicit contracts to reward managers for their innovativeness in successfully obtaining 
favorable outcomes from a rate case (i.e., a rate increase).  In addition, the compensation contract 
may motivate earnings management.  If an increase in rates is achieved, a manager may meet the 
earnings target for a bonus (Healey 1985).  To the extent that managers are compensated for a 
successful rate increase, they should have incentives to artificially dampen earnings by using 
income-decreasing accruals during those periods in which a rate increase is requested.  Such 
action would tend to increase the probability of the requested rate hike being approved.  Gill-de-
albornoz and Illueca (2005) find that electric utility companies in Spain manage earnings down 
after the government has approved a tariff increase in order to mitigate political costs.  Paek 
(2001) finds that electric utility companies in the U.S. that are under rate regulation make 
significantly greater income-decreasing accounting choices.  Although he did not investigate the 
issue empirically, Paek (2001) opined that utility managers might exercise discretion
opportunistically to decrease earnings, thereby exaggerating poor performance, to obtain 
approval to increase rates.  I extend Paek (2001) study by investigating whether managers of 
rate-regulated electric utilities manage earnings downward in the year they petition for rate 
increases in an effort to obtain regulatory approval for rate requests.  For publicly traded 
companies, especially those that are more heavily followed by analysts, an opposing argument
can be made that companies have more incentives to manage earnings upward rather than 
downward.  Dechow and Skinner (2000) find that managers have become increasingly sensitive 
to the level of their firms’ stock prices and to key accounting numbers such as earnings.  
Consequently, managerial incentives to manage earnings upward in order to maintain or improve 
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stock prices have also increased.  However, these stock market incentives are probably less 
significant in a rate-regulated industry.
The preceding discussion supports the position that utility managers have incentives to 
artificially decrease earnings during those periods in which they submit requests for rate
increases to regulatory bodies.  I investigate this proposition by testing the following directional 
hypothesis:
H3: The magnitude of discretionary accruals is significantly less for those electric utilities 
in the year in which they request a rate increase, than for the same utilities in those years in 
which a rate increase is not requested. 
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3. SAMPLE SELECTION, MODEL SPECIFICATION AND RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1 Sample Selection
This study uses two independent samples.  To construct sample one for testing 
Hypotheses 1 and 2, I begin with all COMPUSTAT firms in the U.S. electric utility industry 
(SICs 4911 and 4931).  I eliminate foreign firms (ADRs), private firms, and then to ensure I am 
examining the nation’s primary electric utilities, I limit the sample to only those firms that are 
members of the U.S. electric utility industry’s largest trade association, the Edison Electric 
Institute (EEI).  Note that electric utilities are frequently organized as holding companies and 
subsidiary operating companies; the latter actually produce and sell electricity. Using EEI 
membership information, I classify those COMPUSTAT firms that are listed as subsidiaries of 
concurrently listed holding companies; if both the holding and its subsidiary or subsidiaries are 
concurrently listed, I drop the holding company, as its financial data is simply a consolidation of 
subsidiaries’. Focusing on operating companies is also advantageous in that these subsidiaries 
are generally located within a single state’s regulatory jurisdiction, simplifying the classification 
process needed to test Hypothesis 2.  The sample, therefore, consists of operating companies and 
those holding companies without COMPUSTAT-listed subsidiaries.  Finally, because a time 
series research design is used in testing Hypothesis 1, I eliminate companies without complete
data for the 1994-2005 sample period.  The sample period starts in 1994 because I assume that 
the Energy Policy Act of 1992 deregulating the wholesale market for electricity began to change 
the utilities’ operating environment by that year.  Furthermore, Paek (2001) investigates pre-
1994 sample period and this study extends Paek’s by focusing on post-1994 period. Table 1 
provides a list of investor-owned rate-regulated electric utility firms and matched non-regulated 
control firms that constitute sample one.    
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Table 1
Investor-Owned Rate-Regulated Electric Utility Firms and Matched Control Firms
Utility Firm Control Firm Utility Firm Control Firm
Alabama Power Co PEPSI Inc. KEYSPAN Corp WYETH
Appalachian Power PEPSI Bottling Group 
Inc
Metropolitan Edison ARVINMERITOR Inc 
AQUILA Inc Advanced Micro 
Devises
Mississippi Power ATMEL Corp
Arizona Public Service Co Union Carbide Corp Northern Indiana PUB 
SERV CO
Emerson Electric Co
AVISTA Corp Newell Rubbermaid 
Inc
Northern States Power/WI Stanley Works
Cleveland Electric ILLUM Crown Holdings Inc Northwestern Corp AVX Corp
Commonwealth Edison Co Motorola Inc NSTAR Valero Energy Corp
Consolidated Edison Inc Weyerhaeuser Co Ohio Edison Co Deere & Co
Consumers Energy Co Abbott Laboratories Otter Tail Corp Integrated Devise Tech Corp
Dayton Power & Light Inc Owens Corning PACIFICORP Merck & Co
Detroit Edison Co Eastman Kodak Co Pennsylvania Electric Co NORBORD Inc 
Dominion Resources Inc Intel Corp Pennsylvania Power Co Pall Corp
Duke Energy Corp Intl paper Co PNM Resources Inc Timken Co
Duquesne Light Co Nucor Corp Progress Energy Inc ALCAN Inc
El Paso Electric Co AMKOR Technology 
Inc
Public Service Co of COLO Sunoco Inc
Entergy Arkansas Kellogg Co Public Service Co/NH Applied Materials Inc
Entergy Louisiana Holdings Sara Lee Corp Sierra Pacific Power Co Reynolds American Inc
Entergy Mississippi Longview FIBRE Co Southwestern Electric PWR 
Co
Thomas Corp
Gulf Power Avery Dennison Corp Southwestern Public SVC 
Co
Sun Microsystems Inc
Hawaiian Electric INDS Cummins Inc UIL Holdings Corp PEPSIAMERICAS Inc 
Indiana Michigan Power Bowater Inc UNISOURCE Energy Corp ITT Industries
Kentucky Power Fairchild 
Semiconductor INTL
Western Massachusetts El 
Co
POLYONE Corp 
Kentucky Utilities Co Lafarge North 
America Inc
Wisconsin Energy Corp PPG Industries Inc
Wisconsin Power and Light Maxxam Inc
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Because Hypothesis 1 requires comparing the discretionary accrual metric of rate-
regulated electric utilities with comparable non-regulated companies, I follow Nwaeze (1998), in
selecting a matched sample of manufacturing firms (SICs 2000 to 3990). The matching process 
first requires identifying the period for which data are available for a utility, then matching the 
utility with a non-regulated firm based on the value of gross property, plant and equipment 
(PPE)32.  The process is repeated until all electric utilities are matched by non-regulated 
manufacturing firms.
These sample selection procedures result in a final sample one of 1,128 firm-year 
observations.  Table 2 Panel A provides the distribution of firm-year observations of sample one.
For time series tests of Hypothesis 1, the observations are distributed as follows; estimation 
period (1994 – 2001); 752 observations, and event period for prediction of earnings management
(2002 – 2005) 376 observations. 
The sample for testing Hypothesis 2 is derived by parsing sample one into two groups 
according to deregulation status after 1999, when most states passed enabling legislation for the 
restructuring of electric utilities operating in their states. I use a COMPUSTAT variable 
“STATE” to search the data base for the state where the utility is registered and conducts 
business operations. Table 2 Panel B reports the distribution of firm-year observations of the 
deregulated sample. Firm-year observations of deregulated utilities for testing Hypothesis 2 are 
distributed as follows: pre-deregulation period (1994-1999), 182 observations; and, post-
deregulation period (2000-2005), 130 observations.  The number of observations for all utilities 
in sample one in post-deregulation period (2000 – 2005) is 282 (Table 2 Panel B).  The list of
sample one firms categorized according to deregulation status is presented in Table 3.
                                                
32 Matched control firms are selected on the basis of gross Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE) because electric 
utilities are capital intensive.  Nwaeze (1998) selects matches on the basis of total assets.
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Table 2
 Sample Selection and Distribution of Firm-Year Observations
Panel A:                                                Sample One: Shareholder-Owned Electric Utilities
Firm-Years
Total No. of Electric Utilities in COMPUSTAT (SICs 4911 and 4931) 3,648
ADRs (315)
Non Shareholder-owned (1,161)
Listed members of Edison Electric Institute (EEI) 2,172
Holding companies with concurrently listed subsidiaries (624)
Firms with insufficient data on COMPUSTAT (984)
Final Sample of Operating Shareholder-owned Electric Utilities 564
Matched manufacturing control firms (SIC 2000-3990) 564
Final sample 1,128
Distribution of Observations Across Estimation Period and Event Period
Estimation period (1994-2001)
    Utilities 376
    Control Firms 376
Total 752
Event period (2002-2005)
    Utilities 188
   Control Firms 188
Total 376
Panel B:         Distribution of Observations as to Deregulation Status
Deregulated Only:
               Pre-deregulation period (1994-1999)                                                        182
               Post-deregulation period (2000-2005)   130
Total 312
Both regulated and deregulated:
        Post-deregulation period(2000-2005) 282
Panel C:                          Sample two: Electric Utilities Requesting Rate Increases -  1994-2005
No. of Firm Years
No rate increase 
requested
Rate increase 
Requested 
Regulatory Research Associates, Inc listed firms that are EEI members 408 92
Outliers trimmed at abs (dffits)<1 and abs (rstudent)<2 (12) (2)
Final Sample 396 90
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Table 3
Electric Utility Firms in Sample One Categorized According to Deregulation Status of 
Generation and Marketing Functions
Deregulated Not Deregulated
Appalachian Power Alabama Power Co
Arizona Public Service Co Progress Energy Inc
Entergy Arkansas Duke Energy Corp
NSTAR Gulf Power
Consolidated Edison Inc Hawaiian Electric INDS
Dominion Resources Inc Indiana Michigan Power
El Paso Electric Co Kentucky Power
KEYSPAN Corp Entergy Louisiana Holdings
Metropolitan Edison Entergy Mississippi
PACIFICORP Northern States Power/WI
Pennsylvania Electric  Co Northwestern Corp
Pennsylvania Power Co Otter Tail Corp
Public service Co/NH PNM Resources Inc
Sierra Pacific Power Co AQUILA Inc
Southwestern Electric PWR Co AVISTA Corp
Southwestern Public SVC Co Wisconsin Energy Corp
UNISOURCE Energy Corp Wisconsin Power & Light
UIL Holdings Corp Northern Indiana PUB SERV Co
Western Massachusetts EL Co Kentucky Utilities Co
Cleveland Electric ILLUM Public Service Co of COLO
Dayton Power & Light Inc Mississippi Power
Consumers Energy Co
Duquesne Light Co
Commonwealth Edison Co
Detroit Edison Co
Ohio Edison Co
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In testing Hypothesis 3, whether utilities depress earnings during those periods in which 
they request rate increases, I draw a new sample (sample two) from a database obtained from 
Regulatory Research Associates, Inc. This database provides information on all major rate case 
decisions from 1990 to 2005.  
To construct sample two, I obtain dates for rate requests for only shareholder-owned
electric utilities and limit the sample period from 1994 to 2005. As stated previously, I do not use 
years prior to 1994 (except for sensitivity and robustness tests) because I assume that the Energy 
Policy Act of 1992 changed utilities’ operating environment after its passage.  As in sample one
accounting data are collected from COMPUSTAT, and the sample is winsorized at dfitts<1 and 
abs(r-student) <2 which approximates to 1 and 99 percent distribution levels, to eliminate 
outliers. The sample selection procedure results into 486 firm-year observations that are 
distributed as follows; no rate increase requested 396; rate increase requested 90 (Table 2 Panel 
C). Note that sample two consists of utilities that requested a rate increase in at least one of the
twelve-year sample period; the magnitude of discretionary accruals for firm-years in which rate 
requests are made are compared to those for firm-years in which no rate increase is requested.
Table 4 reports the list of utilities that requested rate increases at least once during the study 
period (1994-2005). Because I perform robustness and sensitivity tests for the companies in this
sample, I relax the sample period to include 1993 and eliminate those electric utilities that issue 
stock.
I conduct additional tests on this sample to examine the possible use of industry-specific 
GAAP to manage earnings. The test requires data on regulatory assets. I hand collect these data 
from financial statements’ information provided in SEC form 10K filings. 
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Table 4
Investor-Owned Rate-Regulated Electric Utilities that Requested for a Rate Increase at 
Least Once, During the Period 1994-2005
AEP Texas Central Consolidated Edison 
Co of NY
Gulf Power Ohio Edison Co
AEP Texas North Co Consumers Energy 
Co
Hawaiian Electric 
Co
Pacific Gas & 
Electric Co
AMEREN Corp* Delmarva Power & 
Light Co
Idaho Power Co PACIFICORP*
Appalachian Power Duke Energy Corp* Indiana Michigan 
Power
PSI Energy Inc
AQUILA Inc* El Paso Electric Co* Interstate Power & 
Light Co
Public Service 
Co/NH
Arizona Public 
Service Co
Entergy Arkansas Kentucky Utilities 
Co
Public Service Co of 
COLO*
AVISTA Corp* Entergy Gulf States Madison Gas & 
Electric Co
Public Service Co of 
OKLA
Baltimore Gas & 
Electric Co
Entergy Louisiana 
Holdings
MidAmerican 
Energy Co*
Public Service Co of 
New MEX
Black Hills Power 
Inc
Entergy Mississippi Mississippi Power Puget Sound Energy 
Inc
Central Hudson Gas 
& ELECTR
Entergy New 
Orleans
Nevada Power Co Rochester Gas & 
Electric Corp
Central Maine Florida Power Corp New York St ELEC 
& GAS Corp
Sierra Pacific Power 
Co
Central Vermont 
PUB SERV*
Florida Power & 
Light Co
Northern States 
Power/WI
Southern California 
Edison 
Commonwealth 
Edison*
Georgia Power Northwestern Corp* Tampa Electric Co
Wisconsin Electric 
Power Co
Wisconsin Public 
Service Co*
* Are not subsidiary operating companies; these firms issue stock unlike subsidiaries in which 
equity is issued by the holding company.  Companies with asterisks are excluded during 
sensitivity testing aimed at investigating the robustness of rate increase incentive results to 
competing capital market incentives for earnings management.      
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3.2 Research Design and Model Specification
3.2.1 Tests of Hypothesis 1
Accounting researchers have adopted several models in estimating the discretionary 
accrual metric for earnings management.  Dechow and Sloan (1991) use an industry model that 
specifies non-discretionary accruals as a function of the median total accruals in the industry.  
Their model assumes that accruals are largely driven by industry-specific practice. The random-
walk model (Healy 1985, and DeAngelo 1986) estimates discretionary accruals as the difference 
between accruals at a given time and their average over time.  The most commonly applied time-
series Jones model (Jones 1991) and modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) specify total 
accruals as a linear function of variables that affect accruals, such as change in revenues, and 
gross property, plant and equipment.  The residual of this regression is a measure of 
discretionary accruals.  Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) derive an instrumental variables 
model to mitigate the potential effects of simultaneity in the income-generating and accruals-
generating processes.  Dechow and Jiambalvo (1994), among others, make modifications to the 
Jones (1991) model in a bid to adapt it to cross-sectional settings.  Defond and Subramanyam 
(1998) argue that not all sales are non-discretionary as implied in the Jones (1991) model.  Their 
argument stems from the fact that accounting earnings can be managed by shifting credit sales 
between periods.  They accordingly modify the Jones (1991) model by offsetting accounts 
receivable from sales.  Therefore, their model also assumes that all accounts receivable are 
managed.  Dechow et al. (1995) find that all accrual estimation models are misspecified for firms 
with extreme performance.  Although all accrual models are reported to measure discretionary 
accruals with error, Kothari et al. (2005) find that the original Jones (1991) and the modified 
Jones model that includes return on assets (ROA) as a control for extreme performance are better 
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specified than the others in estimating discretionary accruals.  Control for extreme performance 
as suggested by Kothari et al. 2005 may not be appropriate for rate-regulated electric utilities 
because rate of return is regulated, i.e., the rate is predetermined by regulators.  Gill- de-
Albonorz and Illueca (2005), Phillips et al. (2003), Kaznik (1999), and Jeter and Shivakumar 
(1999) include cash flow from operations (CFO) as a control variable to mitigate the effect of 
extreme performance.  Because of the lack of precision of individual accrual models in 
estimating discretionary accruals as discussed above, prior researchers have employed multiple 
discretionary accrual models in earnings management studies (e.g., Gill- de-Albonorz and Illueca 
2005, Kothari et al. 2005, and Jones et al. 2006).
Arising from the above discussion, I apply the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)33
regressions to determine the earnings management metric, discretionary accrual by estimating 
the following models:
TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) +β1 ∆SALESt + β2 PPEt + εt      [Jones Model]                                          (1)
TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + εt     [Modified Jones]                    (2)
TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 ∆ SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt      [Jones +CFO Model]            (3)
TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆ SALESt – ∆RECt)+β2PPEt + β3CFOt + εt  [Mod. Jones + CFO]  (4)
Where: [denotes COMPUSTAT data element number]:
TAC = Total Accruals [Data 18 – Data 308];
∆SALES = Change in Sales [Data 12];
∆REC = Change in Accounts Receivable [Data 2]
PPE = Gross Property, Plant and Equipment [Data 7]; and
CFO = Cash flow from Operations [Data 308].
                                                
33 All models estimated in this study are based on OLS analysis based on the assumption that there is a linear 
relationship between dependent and independent variables and that the dependent variable in each regression is 
continuous.
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Following prior studies that investigate discretionary accruals (e.g., Dechow et al. 1995, 
Defond and Subramanyam 1998, Dechow et al. 2003, and Phillips et al. 2003), I scale all 
variables in the models by lagged total assets [Data 6] in order to mitigate heteroskedasticity in 
the residual.  
Models 1 through 4 are used to test Hypothesis 1 in two different research designs.  First, 
I perform time series regressions, consistent with Jones (1991) methodology.  Second, I perform 
annual and pooled cross-sectional regressions with one-way fixed effects model following Cahan 
(1992).
Because Hypothesis 1 requires the estimation of the actual magnitudes of discretionary 
accruals for two sets of firms, a time series research design, i.e., Jones (1991), is appropriate. 
Since prior researchers have excluded regulated utilities from their samples, the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals for rate-regulated utilities presents an empirical question.  Following the 
Jones (1991) methodology, I estimate the firm-specific coefficients for Models 1 – 4, using an 
eight-year estimation period (1994 -2001).  I then use the estimated coefficients from the 
estimation period to compute discretionary accruals in a four-year event period (2002 – 2005).  
Discretionary accruals are residuals from the regressions.  After computing mean discretionary 
accruals for both the sample of electric utilities and the control sample of manufacturing firms, I 
then perform statistical tests to determine if their magnitudes are significantly different. 
Jones’ (1991) time series research design, because of the requirement for a long time 
series, has been criticized for allowing serial correlation and survivorship bias to potentially 
affect the estimation process (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994).  Because of this, most researchers 
have adapted their discretionary accrual models following Jones (1991) to incorporate cross-
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sectional research designs.  In order to corroborate results of time series tests, I estimate the 
following cross-sectional models. 
│TACt│ = α (1/ASSETSt-1) +β1 ∆SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3RATE_REGt + εt                                      (5)
│TACt│ = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 RATE_REGt + εt                  (6)
│TACt│ = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 ∆ SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + β4 RATE_REGt + εt                 (7)
│TACt│ = α(1/ASSETSt-1) + β1(∆ SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2PPEt + β3CFOt + β4RATE_REGt + εt   (8)
These models are specified basing on Cahan (1992), where the cross-sectional variables 
are defined as in Models 1-4 with the following exceptions: (1) Because the discretionary accrual 
metric is not conditioned on an event from which direction may be hypothesized, I use the 
absolute value of total accruals (|TACt|) as the dependent variable; (2) I introduce the indicator
variable RATE_REG, which equals one for observations of rate-regulated utilities, and zero 
otherwise.  Again, all continuous variables are scaled by lagged total assets.  I use these models 
to carry out a two-tailed test for the statistical significance of RATE_REG’s coefficient, as there 
are plausible arguments as to why the sign of the coefficient could either be positive or negative. 
In addition to annual regressions, I estimate a one-way fixed effects model by pooling all 
observations and incorporating dummy variables (∑α,jYDUMt ) to control for specific year 
effects.  Because a single-industry sample may exhibit cross-sectional dependence, I estimate 
models using pooled observations with fixed time effects.  Following Fama and MacBeth (1973), 
I also use the means of the twelve annual cross-sectional coefficients and the time series standard 
error to test the significance of variable RATE_REG.
3.2.2 Tests of Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 examines if there were any changes in the magnitude of discretionary 
accruals associated with the restructuring of the electric utility industry in the late 1990s, when 
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some states implemented retail deregulation of utilities’ generation and marketing functions. 
Such a change might indicate an unintended consequence associated with deregulation, if relaxed 
regulatory oversight provided increased opportunities for earnings management. Limiting the 
sample only to electric utilities, I estimate the original Jones model and its modified versions 
(models 1 through 4) to examine discretionary accruals using Cahan’s (1992) cross-sectional 
design.  For cross-sectional tests, I first split the sample period into pre- and post-deregulation 
periods using the year 1999 as the benchmark year. Although some deregulation occurred prior 
to 1999, the preponderance of implementation started after that date. Because of the reduced 
observations from limiting the sample, I pool observations and add dummy variables for years in 
estimating the following one-way fixed-effect models to test Hypothesis 2A:
│TACt│ = α (1/ASSETSt-1) +β1 ∆SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3POSTt + ∑α,jYDUMt + εt                           (9)
│TACt│ = α (1/ASSETt-1) + β1 (∆SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 POSTt + ∑α,jYDUMt + εt       (10)
│TACt│ = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 ∆ SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + β4 POSTt + ∑α,jYDUMt + εt    (11)
│TACt│ = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆ SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + β4 POSTt + 
+ ∑α,jYDUMt + εt                                                                                                         (12)
Where:  the variables are as defined in Models 1 - 4, and ∑α,jYDUMt are dummy variables for 
years minus one. In addition, the indicator variable POST is introduced; POST is equal to one for 
years 2000 to 2005 and zero otherwise (1994-1999). If deregulation leads to increased 
opportunities for earnings management, I would expect the coefficient for POST to be positive.
I then test whether any changes observed between the pre- and post-deregulation periods 
did not result from changes in the operating environment not associated with deregulation.  
Considering only those observations for year 2000 and later (the deregulated period), I parse the 
sample into those utilities in states that have implemented retail deregulation and utilities in those 
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states that have not.  Because of the reduced observations, I pool observations and add dummy 
variables for years in estimating the following one-way fixed-effect models to test Hypothesis 
2B:
│TACt│ = α (1/ASSETSt-1) +β1 ∆SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3DEREGt + ∑α,jYDUMt + εt                     (13)
│TACt│ = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2PPEt + β3DEREGt + ∑α,jYDUMt + εt    (14)
│TACt│ = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1∆SALESt + β2PPEt + β3CFOt + β4DEREGt + ∑α,jYDUMt + εt     (15)
│TACt│ = α (1/ASSETSt -1) + β1(∆ SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2PPEt + β3CFOt + β4 DEREGt + 
∑α,jYDUMt + εt                                                                                                          (16)
Where variables are as defined in Models 1 – 4. In addition, the indicator variable DEREG is 
introduced; DEREG is equal to one for utilities in those states that have implemented retail 
deregulation, and zero otherwise. If deregulation leads to increased opportunities for earnings 
management, I would expect the coefficient for DEREG to be positive.
3.2.3 Tests of Hypothesis 3
In testing Hypothesis 3, I limit my sample to electric utilities that have requested a rate 
increase in at least one year of the eleven-year sample period. Discretionary accruals for firm-
years in which a rate release was requested are compared to firm-years in which no request was 
made. The same firm will appear in both firm-year classifications, but not in the same year. 
To address potential alternative explanations, I employ multivariate cross-sectional 
analysis to control for those factors identified in prior research to be associated with levels of 
discretionary accruals. However, some of these determinants used in prior earnings management 
studies are not applicable to the specification of models used in this research. These exceptions 
are discussed below.
55
DeAngelo (1981) provides the theoretical arguments for the requirement to control for 
audit quality, and Morsfield and Tan (2006) include an indicator variable to differentiate between 
big-five and non-big five auditors to control for audit quality in estimating discretionary accruals.  
They argue that larger sized audit firms (the big five audit firms) provide higher quality audit 
services, and therefore are more likely to inhibit earnings management. However, all of the 
electric utilities in this study’s sample two (used to test H3) employ big-five auditors, so the use 
of this determinant is moot.
Kothari et al. (2005), and Morsfield and Tan (2006) include return-on-assets (ROA) as a 
control variable, arguing that more profitable firms, with higher ROAs, are expected to have 
higher discretionary accruals.  Because ROA is specified for rate-regulated electric utilities, I do 
not include it in specifying a multivariate model.  Other potential control variables found in prior 
literature, including variables representing equity issues and institutional holdings, are also not 
applicable to this study because the majority of operating companies in the utility sample do not 
issue equity.  This said, the following determinants of discretionary accruals are incorporated in 
specifying the multivariate model; 
Firm size:  Ashbaugh et al. (2003), and Butler et al. (2004) find that size (SIZE) is 
negatively related to discretionary accruals.  I use the natural log of total assets as the measure of 
firm size.
Cash Flows:  I include cash flow from operations (CFO) because prior research has 
shown that CFO is negatively related to discretionary accruals (Becker at al. 1998, Chung and 
Kallapur 2003, and Frankel et al. 2002).
Growth:  Growth has been found to be positively associated with discretionary accruals 
(Menon and Williams 2004).  High-growth firms are believed to have incentives to meet or beat 
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earnings benchmarks; hence, a positive relationship between growth and discretionary accruals is 
expected.  A popular measure for growth is the market-to-book ratio.  However, since the study’s 
sample includes operating companies that do not issue equity, I follow Morsfield and Tan (2006) 
and use change in sales as a growth measure (GROWTH).  
Lagged total accruals:  Firms with larger absolute values of totals accruals may also have 
larger discretionary accruals (Becker et. al (1998). Therefore, I include lagged total accruals 
(TAC) as a control variable. 
Leverage: I control for leverage because companies with high debt levels have greater 
incentives to use accruals to increase earnings in order to avoid violating debt covenants 
(Dechow and Jiambalvo 1994). Leverage is measured as total debt / total assets.  A positive 
association is predicted between leverage (LEV) and discretionary accruals.
To test Hypothesis 3, that those utilities requesting rate increase have significantly less
discretionary accruals in the year of the request than utilities not requesting increases, I first 
estimate models 1, 2, 3 and 4 using a cross-sectional research design to obtain signed 
discretionary accruals (DACC) for each model.  I then estimate the following multivariate model 
year-by-year and pooled in a one-way fixed-effects model.  
DACCt = α + β1REQt + β2CFOt + β3TACt-1 + β4 GROWTHt + β5 SIZEt + β6 LEVt + εt       (17)
Where [denotes COMPUSTAT data element number]:
DACC = Signed value of discretionary accruals (residuals) from the four estimation models.
REQ = Dummy variable equal to one if the firm requested a rate increase in year t; zero 
otherwise.
CFO = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets. [Data 308 / Data 6 lag1]
TACt-1 = Lagged total accruals scaled by lagged assets. [(Data 18 – Data 308) / Data 6 lag1]
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GROWTH = Sales growth.  [(Data 12-Data 12 lag1) / Data 12 lag1]
SIZE = natural log of total assets.  [logData 6]
LEV = Total debt divided by total assets.  [(Data 9 + Data 34) / Data 6]
I predict REQ’s coefficient to have a negative sign consistent with the argument that electric 
utilities depress earnings in those years they request rate increases.  In the one-way fixed-effects 
model I include year dummies (∑ δtYDUMt) to control for specific year effects.
3.2.3.1 Additional Tests of Hypothesis 3:  Models Incorporating Regulatory Assets (RA)
Attempts have been made to modify the Jones (1991) model to incorporate unique utility 
accounting.  Paek (2001) adds allowed return on investment (AROE) to the Jones model arguing 
that allowed rate of return is one of the key economic factors in utilities operations.  Loudder et 
al (1996) argue that there may be overstatement of regulatory assets in utility balance sheets due 
to discretion given to utilities in creating those assets.  If utilities manage earnings in years they 
petition for rate increases, then I would expect them to use regulatory assets as one of the 
accounts for managing earnings.  To test the proposition, I hand collect regulatory assets from 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) form 10K filings for the period 1994-2005 using 
Lexis/Nexis and Edgar Plus to search the SEC data base.  Before incorporating regulatory assets 
to model 17 above, I first test the significance of regulatory assets in the accrual specification 
models by estimating the following models cross-sectionally:
TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) +β1 ∆SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3REGASSETt + εt  (18)
TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3REGASSETt + εt  (19)
TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 ∆SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + β4 REGASSETt + εt (20)
TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆SALESt–∆RECt) + β2PPEt + β3 CFOt + 
β4 REGASSET + εt (21) 
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Where:  REGASSET are Regulatory Assets scaled by lagged assets.  All the other variables are 
as defined above.
Finally, conditional on the variable REGASSET being significant in the estimation of 
models 18 through 21 above, I estimate the following model in testing whether electric utilities 
manage earnings through regulatory assets in the year they file for rate increases.
DACCt = α + β1REQt + β2CFOt + β3TACt-1 + β4GROWTHt + β5SIZEt + β6LEVt +
    Β7 REGASSET + εt                       (22)
Where:  DACCt represent Discretionary Accruals, residuals from estimating models 18 to 21 
above. All variables are as previously defined.
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4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5 (Panel A) provides descriptive statistics for samples of rate-regulated electric 
utilities used in testing hypotheses one and two, and non-regulated manufacturing firms used in 
testing Hypothesis 1, i.e., sample one. The sample period for these observations is 1994-2005. 
Panel B depicts a separate sample (sample two) of utilities that requested a rate increase in at 
least one of the twelve sample years (1994-2005); these firms are used in testing Hypothesis 3.
Sample one’s descriptive statistics show that, on average, control firms are significantly 
larger than utilities, and have significantly greater cash flows and sales growth.  Median cash 
flows from operations of utilities are approximately 70 percent of their manufacturing 
counterparts.  The median growth rate of control firms is 7 per cent, which is nearly twice that of 
electric utilities (4 percent).  Panel A shows that electric utilities are more highly levered than the 
matched set of manufacturing firms by a factor of approximately 14 percent.  These findings are 
consistent with Smith and Watts (1992) who find that regulated firms tend to be smaller, have 
lower growth rates and are more levered than non-regulated firms.
Sample two’s descriptive statistics show that there is no significant difference in the 
values of control variables except for cash flows from operations (CFO). During the periods in 
which firms request for rate increases, the CFO has a depressed mean of 0.073 compared with a
higher mean of 0.086 during the periods in which rate increases are not requested.  The 
difference in mean cash flow’s t-statistic is 2.45, statistically significant at p<0.05.  This finding 
is logical because it is expected for utilities to petition for rate increases during those periods in 
which they face cash flow problems. 
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Table 5
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for rate-regulated electric utilities and matched control firms (Sample one: n=188 for event period)
Control Firms Utilities Test of differences
Variables Mean Median Std p25 p75 Mean Median Std p25 p75
Δ
Means T-statistic
Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank
Pr >= |S|
SIZE 8.940 8.920 1.056 8.180 9.730 8.410 8.200 0.990 7.700 9.100 -0.530 5.08*** <0.0001
CFO 0.100 0.100 0.070 0.060 0.130 0.040 0.070 0.040 0.050 0.130 -0.060 4.9*** <0.0001
GROWTH 0.070 0.070 0.190 -0.001 0.130 0.000 0.040 0.210 -0.040 0.110 -0.070 3.63*** 0.0003
LEV 0.280 0.260 0.180 0.170 0.380 0.350 0.350 0.090 0.290 0.390 0.070 -4.48*** <0.0001
TAC -0.067 -0.050 0.080 -0.080 -0.032 -0.044 -0.043 0.039 -0.060 -0.024 0.023 -3.62*** <0.0001
LAG_TAC -0.070 -0.060 0.070 -0.090 -0.039 -0.045 -0.045 0.040 -0.060 -0.028 0.025 -4.24*** <0.0001
DACC1 -0.059 -0.001 0.310 -0.050 0.032 -0.002 -0.002 0.050 -0.020 0.020 0.057 -3.43*** 0.008
DACC2 -0.059 -0.001 0.310 -0.053 0.032 -0.004 -0.003 0.040 -0.024 0.016 0.055 -2.65*** 0.2453
DACC3 -0.005 0.000 0.400 -0.051 0.033 0.003 0.003 0.044 -0.010 0.014 0.008 0.13 0.2830
DACC4 -0.006 -0.001 0.380 -0.054 0.040 0.003 0.002 0.043 -0.010 0.014 0.009 0.27 0.2200
AB_ACC1 0.100 0.042 0.190 0.019 0.095 0.030 0.020 0.035 0.010 0.040 -0.070 4.81*** <0.0001
AB_ACC2 0.113 0.040 0.300 0.020 0.077 0.030 0.020 0.030 0.010 0.040 -0.083 3.73*** <0.0001
AB_ACC3 0.145 0.040 0.390 0.010 0.090 0.020 0.010 0.040 0.006 0.030 -0.125 4.25*** <0.0001
AB_ACC4 0.144 0.045 0.350 0.016 0.110 0.030 0.010 0.040 0.005 0.022 -0.114 4.75*** <0.0001
Variable definitions:
SIZE Log (assets)
CFO Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets
GROWTH Sales growth
LEV Leverage (total debt/total assets)
TAC Total accruals scaled by lagged assets
LAG_TAC Lag total accruals scaled by lagged assets
DACC1 Discretionary accruals from the original Jones model 
(equation 1) (time series version)
DACC2 Discretionary accruals from the modified Jones model 
(equation 2) (time series version)
DACC3 Discretionary accruals from the original Jones model with 
control for extreme performance (equation 3) (time series 
version)
DACC4 Discretionary accruals from the modified Jones model with 
control for extreme performance (equation 4) (time series 
version)
AB_ACC1 - AB_ACC4 are absolute values of DACC1 - DACC4 
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Table 5 (Continued)
Descriptive Statistics
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for electric utilities requesting and not requesting rate increases (Sample two)
No rate increase request sample Rate increase request sample Tests of Differences
Variables n Mean Median Std p25 p75 n Mean Median Std p25 p75 Δ Means T-statistic
Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank
Pr >= |S|
SIZE 396 8.200 8.252 0.990 7.483 8.794 90 8.135 8.233 1.145 7.456 8.928 -0.065 0.58 0.78
CFO 396 0.086 0.086 0.030 0.068 0.104 90 0.073 0.081 0.048 0.060 0.097 -0.013 2.45** 0.03
GROWTH 396 0.110 0.036 0.800 -0.019 0.092 90 0.028 0.021 0.380 -0.085 0.111 -0.082 1.53 0.1019
LEV 396 0.350 0.347 0.080 0.310 0.377 90 0.342 0.342 0.060 0.310 0.392 -0.008 1.03 0.7990
TAC 396 -0.050 -0.049 0.030 -0.065 -0.035 90 -0.043 -0.048 0.040 -0.062 -0.031 0.007 -1.32 0.4677
LAG_TAC 396 -0.052 -0.047 0.070 -0.064 -0.032 90 -0.056 -0.050 0.080 -0.064 -0.027 -0.004 0.46 0.8469
DACC1 396 -0.001 -0.002 0.025 -0.016 0.015 90 0.001 0.000 0.029 -0.014 0.015 0.003 -0.83 0.3003
DACC2 396 -0.001 -0.002 0.025 -0.016 0.015 90 0.001 0.000 0.029 -0.014 0.015 0.003 -0.84 0.2970
DACC3 396 0.001 0.001 0.013 -0.007 0.008 90 -0.004 -0.004 0.015 -0.013 0.005 -0.005 2.68*** 0.0089
DACC4 396 0.001 0.001 0.013 -0.006 0.008 90 -0.004 -0.005 0.015 -0.013 0.005 -0.005 2.88*** 0.0085
Variables 
Definition:
SIZE Log (assets)
CFO Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets
GROWTH Sales growth
LEV Leverage (total debt/total assets)
TAC Total accrual scaled by lagged assets
LAG_TAC Lag  total accrual scaled by lagged assets
DACC1 Discretionary (Abnormal) Accruals from the original Jones Model (Equation 1) (cross-sectional version).
DACC2  Discretionary (Abnormal) Accruals from the modified Jones Model (Equation 2) (cross-sectional version).
DACC3  Discretionary (Abnormal) Accruals from the original Jones Model with control for extreme performance (Equation 3) (cross-sectional version).
DACC4  Discretionary (Abnormal) Accruals from the modified Jones Model with control for extreme performance (Equation 4) (cross-sectional version).
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Table 6 presents results of both Pearson’s and Spearman’s rank-order correlations for
sample one.  Correlation results reveal that earnings management metrics, absolute discretionary 
accruals estimated from all the four models (AB_ACC1, AB_ACC2, AB_ACC3, and AB_ACC4) 
are strongly correlated with each other and strongly negatively correlated with the rate-regulation 
variable (RATE_REG).  In the Pearson correlation diagonal, the correlation coefficients between 
RATE_REG and AB_ACC1, AB_ACC2, AB_ACC3 and AB_ACC4 are: -0.24, -0.19, -0.21 and -
0.24 respectively.  Spearman’s rank-order correlation shows the correlation coefficients between 
RATE_REG and AB_ACC1, AB_ACC2, AB_ACC3 and AB_ACC4 to be: -0.3, -0.31, -0.36 and -
0.44 respectively.  All of these correlation coefficients are statistically significant (p<0.01).  
These results provide strong evidence that rate regulation is strongly negatively correlated with 
absolute discretionary accruals. Although authoritative conclusions can not be drawn from 
correlation analysis, tentatively, I infer that rate regulation constrains earnings management.
Regression analyses that conducted in later sections provide more valid results and inferences.  
Pearson and Spearman correlations are in general agreement. Pearson (Spearman) shows 
that CFO is positively correlated with SIZE and GROWTH with correlation coefficients of 
0.1110 (0.104), and 0.169 (0.267) respectively and is negatively correlated with TAC and
LAG_TAC with coefficients -0.412 (-0.575) and -0.185 (-0.281). Both Pearson and Spearman 
show that LEV is positively correlated with LAG_TAC, and negatively correlated with GROWTH
and CFO. All the aforementioned correlations are statistically significant at conventional levels.
These correlations are as expected, and suggest that multicollinearity does not affect 
inferences drawn from multiple regression analysis. As expected, diagnostic tests for 
multicollinearity (results not reported) find no evidence of multicollinearity among independent 
variables.
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Table 6
Correlations of Selected Variables
Pearson (Upper Diagonal) / Spearman (Lower Diagonal)
RATE_REG AB_ACC1 AB_ACC2 AB_ACC3 AB_ACC4 TAC LAG_TAC SIZE CFO GROWTH LEV
RATE_REG 1.0000 -0.2400 -0.1890 -0.2100 -0.2400 0.1860 0.2180 -0.2100 -0.2230 -0.1630 0.2010
< 0.0001 0.0002 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.0003 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.0014 < 0.0001
AB_ACC1 -0.3000 1.0000 0.9522 0.4281 0.9860 -0.1420 0.0200 -0.0300 -0.0120 -0.0900 0.2700
< 0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0060 0.6300 0.5700 0.8100 0.1000 < 0.0001
AB_ACC2 -0.3100 0.8842 0.3496 0.9437 -0.0800 0.0200 -0.0800 -0.0500 -0.1000 0.3400
< 0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.1200 0.6700 0.1100 0.3400 0.0600 < 0.0001
AB_ACC3 -0.3600 0.4339 0.4151 0.4377 -0.0700 0.0600 0.1000 -0.0500 -0.0300 -0.0400
< 0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.1700 0.2800 0.0500 0.3200 0.6200 0.4400
AB_ACC4 -0.4400 0.6941 0.6441 0.7407 -0.0800 0.0600 0.0800 -0.0560 -0.0400 0.0150
< 0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.1400 0.2200 0.1000 0.2800 0.4400 0.7700
TAC 0.2000 -0.1600 -0.1860 -0.2100 -0.2400 1.0000 0.2700 0.0330 -0.4120 0.0070 0.0270
< 0.0001 0.0020 0.0003 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.5210 < 0.0001 0.8920 0.6000
LAG_TAC 0.2670 -0.1900 -0.2100 -0.1600 -0.1900 0.3740 1.0000 0.0730 -0.1850 -0.0320 0.1130
< 0.0001 0.0003 < 0.0001 0.0020 0.0002 < 0.0001 0.1560 0.0003 0.5340 0.0300
SIZE -0.2430 0.0500 0.0800 0.0700 0.0900 -0.0020 -0.0160 1.0000 0.1110 0.1340 -0.0140
< 0.0001 0.2900 0.1300 0.1900 0.0800 0.9700 0.7600 0.0300 0.0090 0.7810
CFO -0.2100 0.1000 0.1180 0.1200 0.1400 -0.5750 -0.2810 0.1040 1.0000 0.2670 -0.2950
< 0.0001 0.0500 0.0200 0.0200 0.0060 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.0400 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
GROWTH -0.1230 -0.0280 -0.0600 0.0800 0.0500 0.0630 -0.0180 0.0680 0.1690 1.0000 -0.1860
0.0160 0.6000 0.2100 0.1100 0.2900 0.2180 0.7260 0.1850 0.0009 0.0003
LEV 0.2740 -0.1200 -0.1200 -0.1200 -0.1400 0.0590 0.1010 -0.0460 -0.3050 -0.1750 1.0000
< 0.0001 0.0200 0.0200 0.0200 0.0600 0.2500 0.0480 0.3710 < 0.0001 0.0006
  Variable Definitions:
RATE_REG An indicator variable equal to one for rate-regulated electric utilities 
and zero for control firms
AB_ACC1 Absolute DACC1
AB_ACC2 Absolute DACC2
AB_ACC3 Absolute DACC3
AB_ACC4 Absolute DACC4
TAC Total accruals scaled by lagged assets
LAG_TAC Lag  total accrual scaled by lagged assets
SIZE Log (assets)
CFO Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets
GROWTH Sales growth
LEV Leverage (total debt/total assets)
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4.2 Hypothesis 1 Results
4.2.1 Results of Time Series Tests 
Table 5 (Panel A) presents results of mean discretionary accruals estimated from all the 
four time series models (Models 1 - 4) for both utilities and control firms.  For electric utilities, 
these values are not significantly different from zero which suggests that, on average, electric 
utilities do not manage earnings using discretionary accruals.  Table 5 (Panel A) also reports t-
test and Wilcoxon rank sum results for differences in means and medians respectively of 
earnings management metrics between utility firms and control firms. Because Hypothesis 1 is 
non-directional, the absolute value of discretionary accruals is the variable of interest. 
Differences in the means of absolute discretionary accruals (AB_ACC) between regulated electric 
utilities and the control firms estimated from models are significant (p<0.01) for each of the four 
discretionary accrual models. Together with the mean values of the discretionary accruals 
provided in the table, this difference test indicates that the discretionary accruals of rate-
regulated electric utilities are significantly smaller than those of matched manufacturing firms.  
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is rejected. This result is consistent with regulatory scrutiny, on 
average, reducing opportunities for earnings management by utilities.  This might be viewed as 
an unanticipated benefit provided by rate regulation, suggesting that, on average, rate regulation 
provides sufficient monitoring to preclude earnings management as measured by discretionary 
accruals. 
4.2.2 Results of Cross-Sectional Tests
Table 7 reports the results of cross-sectional estimations of models 5 - 8 in Panels A 
through D respectively.  The models follow Cahan’s (1992) specification, regressing total 
accruals on the Jones (and modified Jones) model’s determinants. The indicator variable 
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RATE_REG is introduced to test Hypothesis 1. The logic here is that the model’s error term 
captures discretionary accruals, and if the introduced indicator variable is omitted from the 
model, its effect will be captured by the error term. Therefore, if the indicator variable is 
statistically significant, then discretionary accruals are related to the indicator variable.  I report 
the results for cross-sectional annual regressions for each model, as well as the results for the 
one-way fixed effects model using pooled observations. Following Fama and MacBeth (1973), I 
also use the means of the 12 annual cross-sectional coefficients and the time series standard error 
to provide cumulative results of the year-by-year regressions for variable of interest, 
RATE_REG.
The annual regressions have R-Squares ranging from 0.90 to 0.35.  Higher values tend to 
appear earlier in the sample period, and 2005 stands out with its low values. This trend in R-
Squares might be indicative of a change in the operating environment for rate-regulated utilities 
over time, i.e. deregulation effects that are examined in testing Hypothesis 2.  ΔSALES is not 
significant in models 5 and 6, and becomes significantly negative with the addition of CFO in 
models 7 and 8. All other variables are directionally significant as expected.  The coefficient of 
RATE_REG is significantly negative at standard levels for at least six of the twelve annual 
regressions depicted for each model (Panels A – D). Out of the 12 annual regressions, the test 
variable, RATE_REG is negative and significant in 9, 10, 6, and 6 years for regression models 5, 
6, 7, and 8 respectively.
 In the one-way fixed effects models with pooled observations, the test variable, 
RATE_REG has the following coefficient estimate (T-statistic): -0.0306 (-10.15), -0.0306 (-
10.15), -0.0196 (-6.35), and -0.0195 (-6.32) for model 5, model 6, model 7, and model 8 
estimations respectively. Each model’s T-statistic is significant at p<0.01. The results present 
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strong evidence that after pooling observations and controlling for fixed time effects (year 
dummies), the test variable, RATE_REG is significant and negatively related to earnings 
management metric. These results are consistent across all the four models.
In order to provide additional support to the one-way fixed effects model estimation 
results, I perform Fama and MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of total absolute accruals on the 
test variable, RATE_REG and Jones and modified Jones model variables. The results presented 
in table 7 (Panels A-D) indicate the following mean coefficient estimates (t-statistics) for the test 
variable, RATE_REG; -0.028 (-5.98), -0.028 (5.64), -0.014 (-2.65), and -0.014 (-2.54) for model 
5, model 6, model 7, and model 8 estimations respectively.  Each model’s t-statistic is significant 
at p<0.05 or better.  Fama and MacBeth procedure results corroborate those of annual cross-
sectional estimations and one-way fixed effects analysis that the test variable, RATE_REG has a 
significantly negative coefficient.  These regression results provide evidence and support 
correlation analysis results that the absolute values of total accruals are negatively associated 
with the rate-regulation variable. Furthermore, cross-sectional test results are consistent with 
time series results that electric utilities’ discretionary accruals are significantly less than those of 
their manufacturing counterparts (control sample).
Therefore, Hypothesis 1, stated in the null form that no differences exist between 
absolute discretionary accruals of rate-regulated electric utilities and non-regulated firms (control 
sample), is rejected. Because absolute discretionary accrual is used as an earnings management 
metric in this study, the interpretation of these results is that there is a lower magnitude of 
earnings management in rate-regulated electric utilities than in comparable non-regulated 
companies. This finding suggests that rate regulation constraints earnings management and 
should be an interesting finding to electric utility regulators. 
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Table 7
Tests of Hypothesis 1: Results of Cross-Sectional Estimation of 
Discretionary Accruals with an Indicator Variable of Rate Regulation
Coefficient (T-statistic)
Panel A: Model 5: │TACt│ = α(1/TAt-1) + β1∆SALESt +  β2PPEt +  β3RATE_REGt + εt
One-way Fixed Effects: │TACt│ = α(1/TAt-1)+ β1∆SALESt + β2PPEt + β3RATE_REGt + ∑αYDUMt + εt
Year n α β1 β2 β3 Adj.R2
1994 86 8.089 0.125 0.0356 -0.001 0.81
(1.60) (4.25***) (6.00***) (-0.14)
1995 88 -0.963 0.1354 0.0346 0.003 0.81
(-0.15) (5.89***) (5.52***) (0.39)
1996 89 -13.528 0.0882 0.0669 -0.0287 0.76
(-1.56) (3.85***) (10.19***) (-3.83***)
1997 89 19.488 -0.04 0.065 -0.0324 0.60
(1.28) (-1.42) (6.40***) (-2.78***)
1998 93 59.867 0.031 0.058 -0.0444 0.68
(4.08***) (1.07) (6.34***) (-4.21***)
1999 93 8.68 0.0488 0.0614 -0.0316 0.62
(0.59) (2.57**) (7.03***) (-3.19***)
2000 93 (15.059) (0.0188) (0.0462) (-0.0167) 0.62
(1.07) (1.82*) (6.63***) (-2.02**)
2001 94 6.15 -0.0184 0.081 -0.0355 0.55
(0.26) (-0.76) (7.49***) (-2.84)
2002 94 21.472 -0.0399 0.0815 -0.0417 0.47
(0.73) (-2.12**) (5.72***) (-2.34**)
2003 94 12.965 -0.015 0.0707 -0.0346 0.56
(0.66) (-0.39) (6.80***) (-2.88***)
2004 94 0.27 0.0073 0.063 -0.0224 0.65
(0.02) (0.36) (7.43***) (-2.50***)
2005 94 20.931 0.0389 0.0747 -0.0489 0.35
(0.68) (0.85) (4.28***) (-2.71***)
Fixed 
effects 1101 10.5823 0.0009 0.0167 -0.0306 0.64
(2.66***) (0.15) (3.85***) (-10.15***)
Fama and MacBeth procedure:  T-test to determine whether the test variable, RATE_REG is different from 
zero
Variable
Coefficient 
Mean T-statistic
RATE_REG -0.028 -5.98***
***, **, * Denote significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (two-tailed test)
│TAC│        = Absolute total accruals scaled by lagged assets
TA                 = Total assets 
∆SALES       =  Change in total sales scaled by lagged assets
PPE               = Plant, Property and Equipment scaled by lagged assets
RATE_REG = An indicator variable that equals one for rate-regulated electric utilities and zero for 
matched control firms
YDUM          = Year dummy
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Table 7 (Continued)
Tests of Hypothesis 1: Results of Cross-Sectional Estimation of Discretionary 
Accruals with an Indicator Variable of Rate Regulation
Coefficient (T-statistic)
Panel B: Model 6: │TACt│ = α(1/TAt-1) + β1(∆Salest - ∆RECt) +  β2PPEt +  β3RATE_REGt + εt
One-way fixed effects: │TACt│ =  α (1/TAt-1) +  β1(∆Salest - ∆RECt) +  β2PPEt + β3RATE_REGt + ∑αYDUMt +  εt
Year n α β1 β2 β3 Adj.R2
1994 86 7.0997 0.1707 0.0348 0.0000 0.83
(1.46) (5.03***) (6.23***) (0.999)
1995 88 0.9837 0.155 0.0324 0.0054 0.80
(0.15) (5.44***) (4.81***) (0.66)
1996 89 -9.894 0.106 0.0659 -0.0288 0.77
(-1.15) (4.26***) (10.16***) (-3.92***)
1997 89 19.811 -0.0422 0.0647 -0.0323 0.60
(1.30) (-1.35) (6.37***) (-2.77***)
1998 93 60.017 0.0369 0.0581 -0.0446 0.68
(4.10***) (1.18) (6.36***) (-4.23***)
1999 93 9.038 0.05 0.0621 -0.0322 0.62
(0.61) (2.50***) (7.12***) (-3.24***)
2000 93 14.889 0.0215 0.0463 -0.0163 0.62
(1.06) (1.87*) (6.67***) (-1.97**)
2001 94 7.3049 -0.0086 0.0809 -0.0365 0.55
(0.31) (-0.34) (7.45***) (-2.89***)
2002 94 21.176 -0.0398 0.0812 -0.0412 0.47
(0.72) (-2.06**) (5.69***) (-2.31**)
2003 94 13.9238 0.0005 0.0689 -0.0333 0.56
(0.71) (0.01) (6.79***) (-2.81***)
2004 94 0.73 0.0129 0.062 -0.0216 0.65
(0.05) (0.59) (7.34***) (-2.42***)
2005 94 20.277 0.0243 0.0775 -0.0505 0.35
(0.66) (0..50) (4.47***) (-2.80***)
Fixed effects 1101 10.5823 0.0009 0.0167 -0.0306 0.64
(2.66***) (0.15) (3.85***) (-10.15***)
Fama and MacBeth procedure: T-test to determine whether the test variable, RATE_REG is different from zero
Variable
Coefficient 
Mean T-statistic
RATE_REG -0.028 -5.64***
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (two-tailed test)
│TAC│       = Absolute total accruals scaled by lagged assets
TA                 = Total assets 
∆SALES       =  Change in total sales scaled by lagged assets
∆REC            =  Change in receivables scaled by lagged assets
PPE               = Plant, Property and Equipment scaled by lagged assets
RATE_REG = An indicator variable that equals one for rate-regulated electric 
utilities and zero for matched control firms
YDUM          = Year dummy
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Table 7 (Continued)
Tests of Hypothesis 1: Results of Cross-Sectional Estimation of Discretionary 
Accruals with an Indicator Variable of Rate Regulation
Coefficient (T-statistic)
Panel C: Model 7: │TACt│ = α(1/TAt-1) + β1∆SALESt + β2PPEt + β3CFOt + β4RATE_REGt + εt
One-way fixed effects: │TACt│ = α(1/TAt-1) + β1∆SALESt + β2PPEt + β3CFOt + β4RATE_REGt +  ∑αYDUMt + εt
Year n α β1 β2 β3 β4     Adj. R2
1994 86 2.096 0.04 0.0135 0.2822 0.005 0.90
(0.54) (1.69*) (2.58**) (8.07***) (0.014)
1995 88 -3.3271 0.0931 0.0103 0.2226 0.0144 0.84
(-0.57) (4.03***) (1.29) (4.31***) (1.95*)
1996 89 -10.286 0.0228 0.0349 0.263 -0.0132 0.83
(-1.39) (1.01) (4.41***) (5.71***) (-1.90*)
1997 89 16.1584 -0.0551 0.0055 0.472 0.0000 0.82
(1.60) (-2.90***) (0.62) (10.44***) (0.992)
1998 93 58.2017 -0.0022 0.0306 0.256 -0.0317 0.71
(4.20***) (-0.08) (2.62***) (3.47***) (-2.99***)
1999 93 -4.2187 0.0221   0.0189 0.3689 -0.0029 0.77
(-0.36) (1.41) (2.07**) (7.16***) (-0.33)
2000 93 -2.316 0.0024 0.0224 0.2379 0.0013 0.73
(-0.19) (0.27) (3.20***) (6.20***) (0.18)
2001 94 5.1233 -0.0214 0.0667 0.1408 -0.0305 0.56
(0.22) (-0.88) (4.78***) (1.61) (-2.38**)
2002 94 23.7224 -0.047 0.0549 0.3049 -0.0418 0.50
(0.83) (-2.53**) (3.07***) (2.36**) (-2.41**)
2003 94 14.3374 -0.0297 0.0304 0.4345 -0.023 0.65
(0.82) (-0.87) (2.49**) (5.04***) (-2.11**)
2004 94 3.9392 -0.0316 0.0245 0.3807 -0.0094 0.78
(0.33) (-1.81*) (2.82***) (7.06***) (-1.26)
2005 94 16.1044 -0.0089 0.0495 0.2876 -0.0362 0.39
(0.54) (-0.18) (2.49**) (2.42**) (-1.97**)
Fixed effects 1101 7.5798 -0.0117 0.0105 0.2235 -0.0196 0.67
(1.99**) (-2.01**) (2.50**) (10.16***) (-6.35***)
Fama and MacBeth procedure:  T-test to determine whether the test variable, RATE_REG is different 
from zero
Variable 
Coefficient 
Mean T-statistic
RATE_REG -0.014 -2.65**
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (two-tailed test)
│TAC│       = Absolute total accruals scaled by lagged assets
TA                = Total assets
∆SALES      =  Change in sales scaled by lagged assets
PPE              = Plant, property and equipment scaled by lagged assets
CFO           = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets
RATE_REG = An indicator variable that equals one for rate-regulated electric utilities and zero for 
matched control firms
YDUM          = Year dummy
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Table 7 (Continued)
Tests of Hypothesis 1: Results of Cross-Sectional Estimation of Discretionary Accruals 
with an Indicator Variable of Rate Regulation
Coefficient (T-statistic)
Panel D: Model 8: │TACt│ = α(1/TAt-1) + β1(∆SALESt -  ∆RECt)+  β2PPEt +  β3CFOt +  β4RATE_REGt + εt
One-way fixed effects: │TACt│= α(1/TAt-1) + β1(∆SALESt - ∆RECt)+ β2PPEt +  β3CFOt +  β4RATE_REGt + ∑αYDUMt + εt
Year n α β1 β2 β3 β4 Adj.R2
1994 86 1.2943 0.076 0.013 0.269 0.0069 0.90
(0.34) (2.68***) (2.57**) (7.90***) (1.28)
1995 88 -1.957 0.1017 0.0083 0.2313 0.016 0.84
(-0.33) (3.57***) (1.02) (4.40***) (2.05**)
1996 89 -9.1877 0.0336 0.0355 0.2539 -0.0137 0.83
(-1.24) (1.33) (4.50***) (5.46***) (-1.97**)
1997 89 16.6016 -0.055 0.0052 0.4695 -0.0003 0.82
(1.63) (-2.65***) (0.59) (10.32***) (-0.03)
1998 93 58.101 0.0015 0.031 0.253 -0.0319 0.72
(4.20***) (0.05) (2.64***) (3.42***) (-3.01***)
1999 93 -4.1705 0.0237 0.0191 0.3697 -0.0031 0.76
(-0.35) (1.44) (2.09**) (7.21***) (-0.35)
2000 93 -2.3249 0.0026 0.0224 0.2379 0.0014 0.85
(-0.19) (0.26) (3.20***) (6.18***) (0.18)
2001 94 6.1949 -0.0127 0.0667 0.1396 -0.0314 0.55
(0.27) (-0.51) (4.76***) (1.59) (-2.42**)
2002 94 23.23 -0.0462 0.055 0.298 -0.0412 0.50
(0.81) (-2.42**) (3.07***) (2.30**) (-2.36**)
2003 94 15.0838 -0.0193 0.029 0.4335 -0.0217 0.65
(0.86) (-0.55) (2.40**) (5.00***) (-2.02**)
2004 94 4.048 -0.029 0.0241 0.3773 -0.009 0.77
(0.34) (-1.56) (2.75***) (6.95***) (-1.19)
2005 94 14.2158 -0.0311 0.0502 0.3087 -0.0369 0.39
(0.47) (-0.60) (2.53**) (2.59**) (-2.02**)
Fixed effects 1101 7.4737 -0.0117 0.0105 0.223 -0.0195 0.67
(1.96**) (-1.89*) (2.49**) (10.13***) (-6.32***)
Fama and MacBeth procedure: T-test to determine whether the test variable, RATE_REG is different from zero
Variable 
Coefficient 
Mean T-statistic
RATE_REG -0.014 -2.54**
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (two-tailed test)
│TAC│         = Absolute total accruals scaled by lagged assets
TA                  = Total assets
∆SALES        =  Change in sales scaled by lagged assets
∆REC            = Change in receivables scaled by lagged assets
PPE               = Plant, property and equipment scaled by lagged assets
CFO             = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets
RATE_REG = An indicator variable that equals one for rate-regulated electric utilities and zero for matched control firms
YDUM          = Year dummy
71
4.3 Hypothesis 2 Results
Hypothesis 2 examines if the deregulation of the generating and marketing functions that 
occurred in certain states in the late 1990s and early 2000s affected the earnings management 
metric. Table 8 reports results of regression tests for H2A and Table 9 presents results for H2B.
Table 8 includes only utilities from those states that undertook some deregulatory action 
within the sample period. It reveals that the variables representing ∆SALES and (∆SALES -
∆REC) are not significant in all models and the PPE variable is only significant in models 1 and 
2. CFO is significantly positive in models 3 and 4.  The variable of interest, POST, parses the 
sample with respect to time and compares the pre-deregulation period (1994-1999) and post-
deregulation period. POST is significantly positive (p<0.01) in each of the four model
regressions.  This suggests that the discretionary accruals for utilities in deregulating states were 
significantly greater after year 2000, consistent with Hypothesis 2. 
Table 9 includes all of sample two’s utilities for the post-deregulation period only (2000-
2005). It reveals that the variables representing ∆SALES and (∆SALES - ∆REC) are significantly 
negative in all models and the PPE variable is only significant in models 1 and 2. CFO is again 
significantly positive in models 3 and 4.  The variable of interest, DEREG, parses utilities into 
those operating in states that have implemented some form of retail deregulation, and those in 
states that have not implemented deregulation.  DEREG is significantly positive (p<0.05) in 
models 1 and 2.  This indicates that after the year 2000, the discretionary accruals for utilities in 
deregulating states were significantly greater than those of utilities in states that did not 
deregulate. However, DEREG is statistically insignificant in models 3 and 4.  Therefore, given 
these mixed results regarding the difference in discretionary accruals between utilities in 
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deregulated and rate-regulated jurisdictions, Table 9 provides some evidence that that this 
change in utilities’ operating environment was associated with deregulation.
Table 8
Electric Utilities in Those States that Have Implemented Retail Deregulation:
Contrasting Discretionary Accruals Between Pre- and Post-Deregulation Periods 
Coefficient (T-statistic)
Regression Models Testing Hypothesis 2A:
          Model 1: │TACt│ = α (1/ASSETSt-1) +β1 ∆SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3POSTt + ∑α,jYDUMt + εt
    Model 2: │TACt│  = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1( ∆SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 POSTt + ∑α,jYDUMt + εt
     Model 3:│TACt │ = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 ∆ SALESt  + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + β4 POSTt + ∑α,jYDUMt + εt
            Model 4: │TACt│  = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆ SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + β4 POSTt
+ ∑α,jYDUMt + εt
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
1/TAt-1 11.2049 11.1878 5.661 5.6428
(2.25**) (2.24**) (1.34*) (1.33*)
∆SALES 0.0114 0.0078
(0.82) (0.67)
PPE 0.0141 0.0142 -0.0004 -0.0004
(3.22***) (3.24***) (-0.10) (-0.09)
(∆Sales - ∆REC) 0.0119 0.0053
(0.85) (0.45)
CFO 0.3865 0.3863
(10.95***) (10.93***)
POST 0.0239 0.029 0.0152 0.0153
(3.81***) (3.81***) (2.84***) (2.86***)
R2 0.82 0.82 0.87 0.87
n 308 308 308 308
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test)
|TAC|         = Absolute total accruals scaled by lagged assets
∆SALES   =  Change in sales scaled by lagged assets
PPE           = Plant, property and equipment scaled by lagged assets
∆REC       = Change in receivables scaled by lagged assets
CFO         = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets
POST      = An indicator variable that equals one for post-deregulation and zero for pre-deregulation periods
YDUM    = Year dummy
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Table 9
Electric Utilities in the Post-Deregulation Period:
Contrasting Discretionary Accruals Between Utilities Located in States Implementing 
Retail Deregulation and Utilities in States Not Implementing Retail Deregulation
Coefficient (T-statistic)
Regression Models Testing Hypothesis 2B:
                Model 1:      |TACt│ = α (1/ASSETSt-1) +β1 ∆SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3DEREGt + ∑α,jYDUMt + εt
                Model 2:     │TACt | = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1( ∆SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 DEREGt + ∑α,jYDUMt + εt
       Model 3:     │TACt│ = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 ∆ SALESt  + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + β4 DEREGt + ∑α,jYDUMt + εt
                Model 4:    │TACt│  = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆ SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + β4 DEREGt +
                                + ∑α,jYDUMt + εt  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
1/TAt-1 9.5476 9.478 1.7025 1.5726
(1.58*) (1.57*) (0.32) (0.30)
∆Sales -0.0149 -0.0223
(-2.39***) (-4.15***)
PPE 0.0283 0.0281 0.0036 0.0032
(7.74***) (7.73***) (0.89) (0.81)
(∆Sales - ∆REC) -0.0168 -0.0245
(-2.55***) (-4.28***)
CFO 0.4811 0.4808
(9.97***) (9.99***)
DEREG 0.0062 0.0063 0.0018 0.0018
(1.83**) (1.84**) (0.60) (0.61)
R2 0.71 0.71 0.79 0.79
n 282 282 282 282
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test)
|TAC|           = Absolute total accruals scaled by lagged assets
∆SALES    =  Change in sales scaled by lagged assets
PPE           = Plant, property and equipment scaled by lagged assets
∆REC       = Change in receivables scaled by lagged assets
CFO         = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets
DEREG   = An indicator variable that equals one if a utility operates in a state that has passed deregulation 
legislation and zero otherwise
YDUM    = Year dummy
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4.4 Hypothesis 3 Results
Table 5 (Panel B) presents descriptive statistics of variables used to test Hypothesis 3. 
Descriptive statistics reveal that the only significant difference between these two samples relates 
to cash flows.  This should not be surprising because the same firms appear in both categories: 
those requesting a rate increase that year, and those not requesting a rate increase that year.  I am 
therefore trying to capture only those determinants that change significantly between years.  For 
those years in which utilities request rate increases, they experience a mean cash flow from 
operations (CFO) of 0.07 while for those years in which firms do not make a rate request have a 
mean of 0.09.  The difference in means is statistically significant (p<0.05).  Reduced cash flows 
as depicted by the above statistics may be a driving force for utilities to manage earnings in an 
attempt to convince regulators to increase rates.
Differences in means of the cross-sectional earnings management metrics (DACC1 –
DACC4), estimated using models 1, 2, 3, and 4 between the two groups of firm-years appear in 
Table 5 (Panel B).  Results provide evidence that signed discretionary accruals estimated from 
models 3 and 4 are significantly more positive (p<0.01) for firm-years in which no rate request is 
made when compared to firm-years in which a utility requests a rate increase.  This result is 
consistent with Hypothesis 3. However, there is no significant difference between the 
discretionary accruals generated for these two groups by models 1 and 2. Therefore, the 
univariate results are mixed. 
The results of the multivariate tests of Hypothesis 3 are reported in Table 10 and in Table 
11, I report the results of Fama and MacBeth cross-sectional regressions in Table 10. In Table 
11, I report results of annual cross-sectional regressions along with those of pooled estimation 
using a one-way fixed effects model.
75
Table 10
Tests of Hypothesis 3:  Results of Fama and MacBeth Cross-Sectional Regression of 
Discretionary Accruals on an Indicator Variable for the Presence of a Rate Increase 
Request Plus Control Variables
Coefficient (T-statistic34)
Model 1: DACC1 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV + ε
Model 2: DACC2 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV + ε
Model 3: DACC3 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV + ε
Model 4: DACC4 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV + ε
Variables Exp. Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept ? 0.083
(6.84***)
0.083
(6.67***)
0.02
(3.24***)
0.02
(3.23***)
Test variable
REQ - -0.006
(-2.41**)
-0.005
(-2.27**)
-0.007
(-4.28***)
-0.007
(-4.54***)
Controls
SIZE - -0.006
(-2.26**)
-0.002
(-2.16**)
0.0002
(0.40)
0.0002
(0.45)
CFO - -0.612
(-12.01***)
-0.61
(-12.00***)
-0.061
(-2.34**)
-0.063
(-2.38**)
LG_TAC + -0.018
(-0.28)
-0.033
(-0.49)
0.0146
(0.35)
0.0156
(0.37)
GROWTH + 0.0117
(1.26)
0.0138
(1.43*)
-0.003
(-1.20)
-0.00086
(-0.33)
LEV + -0.053
(-2.93***)
-0.055
(-2.99***)
-0.043
(-3.15***)
-0.043
(-3.18***)
n 468 465 471 471
R2 0.53 0.54 0.18 0.17
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test) 
DACC1-DACC4 are signed discretionary accruals, residuals from the following estimations:
DACC1: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) +β1 ∆SALESt + β2 PPEt + εt      [Jones Model]   
DACC2: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + εt     [Modified Jones Model]   
DACC3: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 ∆ SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt   [Jones +CFO Model]
DACC4: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆ SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt   [Mod. Jones + CFO Model]  
REQ = Dummy variable equal to one if a firm requested a rate increase in year t; zero otherwise
SIZE = Natural log of total assets  
CFO = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets 
LG_TAC = Lagged total accruals scaled by lagged assets 
GROWTH = Sales growth  
LEV =Leverage defined as total debt divided by total assets  
                                                
34 T-statistic computation follows Fama and MacBeth procedure of dividing the average of annual coefficient 
estimates by the time series standard error. T-statistic  = 
1nstdest
meanest
   Where: meanest = Average of annual 
coefficient estimates; stdest = standard deviation of estimates and n = number of years.
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Table 11
Tests of Hypothesis 3: Results of Annual Cross-Sectional and Fixed Effects Regressions of 
Discretionary Accruals on an Indicator Variable for the Presence of a Rate Increase 
Request Plus Control Variables
Coefficient (P-value)
Panel A
Model: DACC1t=α + β1REQt + β2SIZEt + β3CFOt + β4LG_TACt + β5GROWTHt + β6LEVt + εt
Year n α β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 R2
1994 38 0.1394 -0.0149 -0.0039 -0.8436 -0.0025 0.0644 -0.1104 0.73
(<0.0001***) (0.006***) (0.07*) (<0.0001***) (0.40) (0.03**) (<0.0001***)
1995 39 0.1269 0.0102 -0.0034 -0.6289 0.1889 0.0139 -0.0994 0.75
(<0.0001***) (0.02**) (0.04**) (<0.0001***) (0.02**) (0.13) (<0.0001***)
1996 38 0.0266 -0.0066 -0.0026 -0.4526 -0.1058 -0.0273 0.0983 0.52
(0.17) (0.09*) (0.08*) (0.0002***) (0.16) (0.03**) (0.03**)
1997 39 0.1204 -0.0127 -0.0040 -0.3081 0.4212 0.0050 -0.1130 0.35
(0.0009***) (0.1*) (0.09*) (0.02***) (0.03**) (0.20) (0.03**)
1998 39 0.0476 -0.0081 0.0016 -0.5088 0.0640 -0.0004 -0.0259 0.62
(0.04**) (0.18) (0.26) (<0.0001***) (0.32) (0.48) (0.27)
1999 43 0.1128 -0.0127 -0.0054 -0.7890 -0.1923 -0.0136 -0.0411 0.76
(0.0001***) (0.03**) (0.01***) (<0.0001***) (0.03**) (0.03**) (0.14)
2000 39 0.0206 -0.0128 0.0012 -0.4728 -0.3123 -0.0045 -0.0085 0.37
(0.32) (0.1*) (0.38) (0.001***) (0.006***) (0.35) (0.43)
2001 44 0.0638 0.0021 0.0013 -0.7756 -0.2333 -0.0202 -0.0689 0.8
(0.04**) (0.39) (0.35) (<0.0001***) (0.07*) (0.0005***) (0.08*)
2002 44 0.0943 -0.0013 -0.0005 -0.7699 -0.1565 0.0207 -0.0598 0.61
(0.006***) (0.44) (0.44) (<0.0001***) (0.02**) (0.07*) (0.08*)
2003 53 0.0779 -0.0016 -0.0003 -0.6098 0.0720 0.0266 -0.0744 0.5
(0.008***) (0.40) (0.46) (<0.0001***) (0.1*) (0.09*) (0.06*)
2004 52 0.0842 -0.0034 -0.0021 -0.5783 0.0574 0.0640 -0.0827 0.56
(0.0002***) (0.29) (0.15) (<0.0001***) (0.24) (0.02**) (0.01***)
Fixed 
effects 468 0.0790 -0.0022 -0.0019 -0.6114 -0.0085 -0.0028 -0.0683 0.53
(<0.0001***) (0.15) (0.01***) (<0.0001***) (0.22) (0.15) (<0.0001***)
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test)
DACC1 = Signed discretionary accrual, residual from the following estimation:
TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) +β1 ∆SALESt + β2 PPEt + εt      [Jones Model]   
REQ = Dummy variable equal to one if a firm requested a rate increase in year t; zero otherwise
SIZE = Natural log of total assets  
CFO = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets 
LG_TAC = Lagged total accruals scaled by lagged assets 
GROWTH = Sales growth.  
LEV =Leverage defined as total debt divided by total assets  
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Table 11 (Continued)
Tests of Hypothesis 3: Results of Annual Cross-Sectional and Fixed Effects Regressions of 
Discretionary Accruals on an Indicator Variable for the Presence of a Rate Increase Request 
Plus Control Variables
Coefficient (P-value)
Panel B
Model: DACC2t= α + β1REQt + β2SIZEt + β3CFOt + β4LG_TACt + β5GROWTHt + β6LEVt + εt
Year n α β1 Β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 R2
1994 38 0.1397 -0.0147 -0.004 -0.8419 -0.0021 0.0796 -0.1099 0.73
(<0.0001***) (0.007***) (0.07*) (<0.0001***) (0.42) (0.01***) (0.0001***)
1995 39 0.1284 0.0096 -0.0036 -0.6333 0.1853 0.019 -0.1001 0.76
(<0.0001***) (0.02**) (0.03**) (<0.0001***) (0.02**) (0.06*) (<0.0001***)
1996 38 0.0265 -0.0065 -0.0026 -0.4514 -0.1051 -0.0260 0.0981 0.52
(0.17) (0.1*) (0.08*) (0.0002***) (0.16) (0.04**) (0.03**)
1997 39 0.1204 -0.0126 -0.0040 -0.3100 0.4195 0.0050 -0.1124 0.35
(0.0009***) (0.1*) (0.09*) (0.02***) (0.03**) (0.20) (0.03**)
1998 39 0.0486 -0.0085 0.0015 -0.5093 0.0634 -0.0011 -0.0269 0.62
(0.04**) (0.17) (0.27) (<0.0001***) (0.32) (0.45) (0.27)
1999 43 0.1111 -0.0119 -0.0052 -0.7845 -0.1933 -0.0100 -0.0419 0.77
(0.0001***) (0.04**) (0.01***) (<0.0001***) (0.03**) (0.08*) (0.13)
2000 39 0.0206 -0.0128 0.0012 -0.4727 -0.3129 -0.0046 -0.0087 0.37
(0.32) (0.1*) (0.38) (0.001***) (0.006***) (0.35) (0.43)
2001 43 0.0509 0.0039 0.0024 -0.7636 -0.3494 -0.0193 -0.0799 0.82
(0.07*) (0.29) (0.23) (<0.0001***) (0.01***) (0.0003***) (0.04**)
2002 44 0.0945 -0.0025 -0.0005 -0.7730 -0.1613 0.0223 -0.0591 0.6
(0.006***) (0.39) (0.44) (<0.0001***) (0.02**) (0.06*) (0.08*)
2003 52 0.0777 -0.0021 -0.0002 -0.6270 0.0352 0.0352 -0.0775 0.51
(0.007***) (0.32) (0.47) (<0.0001***) (0.3200) (0.05**) (0.05**)
2004 51 0.0980 -0.0004 -0.0040 -0.5414 0.0552 0.0512 -0.0840 0.59
(<0.0001***) (0.47) (0.03**) (<0.0001***) (0.23) (0.04**) (0.006***)
Fixed 
effects 465 0.0829 -0.0021 -0.0022 -0.6162 -0.0148 -0.0019 -0.0693 0.54
(<0.0001***) (0.15) (0.004***) (<0.0001***) (0.08*) (0.24) (<0.0001***)
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test)
DACC2 = Signed discretionary accrual, residual from the following estimation:
TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + εt     [Modified Jones Model]   
REQ = Dummy variable equal to one if a firm requested a rate increase in year t; zero otherwise
SIZE = Natural log of total assets  
CFO = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets 
LG_TAC = Lagged total accruals scaled by lagged assets 
GROWTH = Sales growth  
LEV =Leverage defined as total debt divided by total assets  
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Table 11 (Continued)
Tests of Hypothesis 3: Results of Annual Cross-Sectional and Fixed Effects Regressions of 
Discretionary Accruals on an Indicator Variable for the Presence of a Rate Increase 
Request Plus Control Variables
Coefficient (P-value)
Panel C: 
Model: DACC3t= α + β1REQt + β2SIZEt + β3CFOt + β4LG_TACt + β5GROWTHt + β6LEVt + εt
Year    n        α       β1        β2          β3       β4    β5        β6 R2
1994 38 0.0492 -0.0069 -0.001 -0.0824 -0.0024 0.0007 -0.0939 0.51
(0.004***) (0.04**) (0.29) (0.1*) (0.37) (0.49) (<0.0001***)
1995 39 0.0385 0.0063 -0.0003 -0.0134 0.0876 0.0073 -0.0931 0.72
(0.003***) (0.02**) (0.4) (0.40) (0.05**) (0.16) (<0.0001***)
1996 38 -0.0047 -0.0087 -0.0008 -0.1173 -0.0856 -0.0177 0.0592 0.26
(0.46) (0.02**) (0.28) (0.09*) (0.15) (0.06*) (0.07*)
1997 38 0.0307 -0.0103 -0.0004 0.0956 0.2786 -0.0008 -0.0571 0.24
(0.07*) (0.04**) (0.40) (0.12) (0.01***) (0.40) (0.04**)
1998 39 0.0089 -0.0123 0.0001 0.0298 0.0513 0.0031 -0.0254 0.17
(0.29) (0.01***) (0.47) (0.27) (0.26) (0.28) (0.16)
1999 43 -0.0008 -0.0118 0.0001 -0.0194 -0.0747 0.0059 -0.0063 0.32
(0.48) (0.003***) (0.48) (0.34) (0.1*) (0.08*) (0.39)
2000 38 -0.0108 -0.0113 0.0039 -0.2253 -0.2571 0.0003 -0.0365 0.37
(0.38) (0.1*) (0.1*) (0.03**) (0.006***) (0.49) (0.19)
2001 48 0.0299 -0.0040 -0.0012 -0.0984 0.0380 -0.0040 -0.0273 0.26
(0.07*) (0.18) (0.25) (0.001***) (0.30) (0.1*) (0.1*)
2002 44 0.0073 -0.0027 0.0028 -0.1316 -0.0633 -0.0176 -0.0529 0.33
(0.38) (0.33) (0.12) (0.06*) (0.1*) (0.04**) (0.04**)
2003 54 0.0340 -0.0075 -0.0010 -0.0255 0.1082 -0.0156 -0.0458 0.25
(0.05**) (0.03**) (0.29) (0.33) (0.003***) (0.1*) (0.07*)
2004 52 0.0382 -0.0070 0.0001 -0.0878 0.0797 0.0014 -0.0973 0.25
(0.02**) (0.04**) (0.48) (0.09*) (0.1*) (0.48) (0.0005***)
Fixed 
effects 471 0.0208 -0.0052 0.0002 -0.0804 -0.0024 0.0023 -0.0600 0.18
(0.0003***) (0.0002***) (0.38) (<0.0001***) (0.37) (0.1*) (<0.0001***)
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test)
DACC3 = Signed discretionary accrual, residual from the following estimation:
TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 ∆ SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt   [Jones +CFO Model]
REQ = Dummy variable equal to one if a firm requested a rate increase in year t; zero otherwise
SIZE = Natural log of total assets  
CFO = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets 
LG_TAC = Lagged total accruals scaled by lagged assets 
GROWTH = Sales growth  
LEV =Leverage defined as total debt divided by total assets  
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Table 11 (Continued)
Tests of Hypothesis 3: Results of Annual Cross-Sectional and Fixed Effects 
Regressions of Discretionary Accruals on an Indicator Variable for the Presence of 
a Rate Increase Request Plus Control Variables
Coefficient (P-value)
Panel D:
Model: DACC4t= α + β1REQt + β2SIZEt + β3CFOt + β4LG_TACt + β5GROWTHt + β6LEVt + εt
Year n         α         β1      β2         β3       β4      β5         β6 R2
1994 38 0.0488 -0.0068 -0.0009 -0.085 -0.0022 -0.0001 -0.0938 0.51
(0.004***) (0.05**) (0.3) (0.1*) (0.38) (0.49) (<0.0001***)
1995 39 0.0394 0.0061 -0.0004 -0.0172 0.0867 0.0089 -0.0934 0.72
(0.002***) (0.02**) (0.38) (0.38) (0.05**) (0.1*) (<0.0001***)
1996 38 -0.0051 -0.0087 -0.0008 -0.1181 -0.0869 -0.0152 0.0589 0.26
(0.41) (0.02**) (0.29) (0.09*) (0.14) (0.09*) (0.07*)
1997 38 0.0306 -0.0104 -0.0004 0.0999 0.2810 -0.0009 -0.0578 0.24
(0.07*) (0.04**) (0.40) (0.1*) (0.01***) (0.39) (0.04**)
1998 39 0.0089 -0.0123 0.0001 0.0294 0.0513 0.0032 -0.0255 0.17
(0.29) (0.01***) (0.47) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.16)
1999 43 -0.0009 -0.0117 0.0001 -0.0198 -0.0749 0.0064 -0.0065 0.32
(0.48) (0.003***) (0.48) (0.33) (0.1*) (0.07*) (0.39)
2000 38 -0.0106 -0.0114 0.0039 -0.2255 -0.2592 0.0000 -0.0371 0.37
(0.38) (0.1*) (0.1*) (0.04**) (0.01***) (0.5) (0.19)
2001 48 0.0298 -0.0040 -0.0012 -0.0982 0.0368 -0.0035 -0.0282 0.26
(0.07*) (0.18) (0.26) (0.001***) (0.32) (0.14) (0.1*)
2002 44 0.0075 -0.0043 0.0028 -0.1362 -0.0694 -0.0166 -0.0520 0.32
(0.38) (0.24) (0.12) (0.05**) (0.1*) (0.05**) (0.04**)
2003 54 0.0357 -0.0072 -0.0011 -0.0370 0.1148 -0.0024 -0.0463 0.27
(0.04**) (0.04**) (0.27) (0.26) (0.01***) (0.43) (0.06*)
2004 52 0.0346 -0.0082 0.0004 -0.0818 0.0942 0.0107 -0.0924 0.24
(0.03**) (0.02**) (0.47) (0.1*) (0.08*) (0.33) (0.001***)
Fixed 
effects 471 0.0204 -0.0055 0.0002 -0.0782 0.0033 -0.0014 -0.0590 0.17
(0.001***) (<0.0001***) (0.36) <0.0001*** (0.32) (0.21) (<0.0001***)
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test)
DACC4 = Signed discretionary accrual, residual from the following estimation:
TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆ SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt   [Mod. Jones + CFO Model]  
REQ = Dummy variable equal to one if a firm requested a rate increase in year t; zero otherwise
SIZE = Natural log of total assets  
CFO = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets 
LG_TAC = Lagged total accruals scaled by lagged assets 
GROWTH = Sales growth  
LEV =Leverage defined as total debt divided by total assets  
80
The results reveal that coefficient estimates on the test variable, REQ are consistently negative 
and significant in all the four regression models as predicted in the hypothesis.  T-statistics for 
REQ obtained from model 1 (model 2) regressions are -2.41 and (-2.27) each is significant at 
P<0.05.  T-statistics for model 3 (model 4) are -4.28 (-4.54) each significant at P<0.0001.  These 
findings confirm Hypothesis 3 that discretionary accruals are significantly lower for electric 
utilities in the year they request a rate increase than for the same utilities in the years in which a 
rate increase is not requested.  All the four regression models predict lowering of discretionary 
accruals to manage earnings downward in the year a rate increase request is submitted.
Findings further indicate that the relationships between Discretionary Accruals (DACC) 
and control variables are generally consistent with predictions from theory and prior findings.  
The coefficient for Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) is consistently negative and significant.  
T-statistics are -12.01, -12.00, -2.34, and -2.38 for regression models 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively.  
T-statistics of model 1 and model 2 are each significant at P<0.01 while those for model 3 and 
model 4 are each significant at P<0.05.  This result is consistent with prior findings (Becker at al. 
1998, Chung and Kallapur 2003, and Frankel et al. 2002).  The coefficient for SIZE is negative 
and significant in models 1 and 2.  The T-statistic for model 1 is -2.26 and for model 2 is -2.16, 
each significant at P<0.05.  Finding on SIZE variable is consistent with Ashbaugh et al. 2003,
and Butler et al. 2004.  The coefficient for GROWTH is positive and significant at P<0.1 in 
model 2 consistent with the finding by Menon and Williams 2004.  The coefficient for Leverage 
(LEV) is negative and significant in all the four regression models (P<0.01).  This finding is 
contradictory to that by Dichev and Skinner 2002, and DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994.  It appears 
that leverage for rate-regulated utilities is inversely related to discretionary accruals, i.e., firms 
with high equity to debt capital structure are associated with the high discretionary accruals.
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Results of annual cross-sectional regressions reported in Table 11 indicate that REQ is 
significantly negative at conventional levels in at least five years. Results of pooled regressions 
with fixed time effects (year dummies) provide further evidence that the test variable REQ is 
significantly negative at conventional levels for earnings management metrics, DACC3 and 
DACC4 (p<0.01) and marginally significant for DACC1 and DACC2.  These results are 
consistent with Hypothesis 3 and suggest that rate-regulated electric utilities have depressed 
levels of discretionary accruals and therefore earnings in the year they file for rate increase.
4.4.1 Results of Additional Tests Involving Regulatory Assets
Evidence exists that utilities manage earnings downward in the years they request for rate 
increases (Table 11). The associated question then is; how do managed earnings arise?
Specifically, do utilities use regulatory assets to manage earnings? 
Table 12 presents Fama and MacBeth cross-sectional regressions results of total accruals 
(TAC) regressed on regulatory assets (REGASSET) in addition to the traditional variables used in 
accrual models, i.e., Jones (1991) model and its modified versions.  The results indicate that 
regulatory assets are not significantly related to total accruals.  The coefficient on REGASSET is 
marginally significant in models 5 and 6 with p-values of 0.15 and 0.11 respectively.  The 
coefficient is insignificant in models 7 and 8.  In all the four models, REGASSET variable has a 
negative sign, consistent with the fact that regulatory assets get written-off or amortize over time.  
This finding does not support the proposition that electric utilities use regulatory assets to 
manipulate earnings. This result is consistent with the tests of Hypothesis 1, i.e., that regulatory 
oversight diminishes earnings management in rate-regulated electric utilities.  Perhaps because 
regulators must approve regulatory-asset provisions, it is not surprising to find that regulatory 
assets are not actively manipulated by utility managers.  However, the measurement of 
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regulatory assets includes deferred income tax accounts and may be noisy.  Further isolation of 
regulatory asset components in deferred tax accounts may reduce measurement error.  This task
is left for future research.   
Findings further indicate that CFO has an expected negative sign and is significant at 
P<0.0001 level.  Similarly, PPE is significant at P<0.0001 in model 5 and model 6; and p<0.05 
in model 7 and model 8.  These findings are consistent with prior literature that finds 
depreciation of PPE as an important accrual variable (Jones 1991).  ∆SALES and (∆SALES -
∆REC) have insignificant coefficients.  These findings suggest that electric utilities may be using
long-term asset accruals but not working capital accruals to manage earnings.   
Table 12
Results of Regressions Based on the Standard Jones and Modified Jones Models
with Regulatory Assets as Additional Independent Variable
Model 5:  TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) +β1 ∆SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3REGASSETt + εt
Model 6:  TACt  = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1( ∆SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3REGASSETt + εt
Model 7: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 ∆ SALESt  + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + β4 REGASSETt + εt
Model 8:  TACt  = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆ SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + β4 REGASSET + εt  
Variables Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
1/ASSETSt-1 2.43
(0.24)
2.43
(0.24)
1.29
(0.34)
1.29
(0.34)
∆SALES -0.02
(0.32)
0.012
(0.27)
∆SALES-∆REC -0.02
(0.32)
0.012
(0.27)
PPE -0.04***
(<0.0001)
-0.04***
(<0.0001)
0.01**
(0.04)
0.01**
(0.04)
CFO -0.711***
(<0.0001)
-0.711***
(<0.0001)
REGASSET -0.021
(0.15)
-0.025
(0.11)
-0.002
(0.44)
-0.003
(0.40)
R2 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test)
TAC                   = Total accruals scaled by lagged assets
∆SALES            = Change in sales scaled by lagged assets
∆REC                = Change in receivables scaled by lagged assets
PPE                   = Plant, property and equipment scaled by lagged assets
CFO                  = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets 
REGASSET   = Regulatory assets scaled by lagged assets
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5. ROBUSTNESS TESTS
5.1 Hypothesis 1
5.1.1 Elimination of Firms that Requested for Rate Increases
Hypothesis 1 tests whether absolute discretionary accruals of rate-regulated electric 
utilities are significantly different from those for matched control firms.  In testing this 
hypothesis, I use a sample of firms shown on Table 1.  However, after reconciling utilities in 
sample one with those in sample two, some sample one utilities were found to have petitioned 
for rate increases.  In tests of Hypothesis 3, I find that utilities petitioning for rate increases
depressed discretionary accruals during the years of rate requests. Therefore, including electric 
utilities that petitioned for rate increases potentially biases discretionary accruals downward and 
confounds Hypothesis 1 results.  In robustness tests, I eliminate firms that petitioned for rate 
increases in tests of Hypothesis 1.  Table 13 reports univariate test results after excluding rate 
increase requesting firms.  Results indicate that mean absolute discretionary accruals for rate-
regulated electric utilities are significantly lower than those for matched control firms for model 
1 through model 4 estimations.  Tests of differences in mean discretionary accruals between rate-
regulated utilities and matched control firms gives T-statistics of 3.84, 3.12, 3.93, and 4.29 for 
model 1, model 2, model 3 and model 4 estimations respectively.  Each T-statistic is significant 
at P<0.0001. 
Table 14 reports Multivariate test results of cross-sectional estimation of discretionary 
accruals with an indicator variable of rate regulation after excluding rate increase requesting 
firms.  Multivariate results indicate that the indicator variable for rate regulation, RATE_REG is 
negative and statistically significant in all the four regression models.   
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Table 13
Robustness Tests of Hypothesis 1:  Univariate Test Results After Elimination of  Rate-
Increase Requesting Firms
Model 1:  │TACt│ = α (1/ASSETSt-1) +β1 ∆SALESt + β2 PPEt + εt
Model 2:  │TACt│  = α (1/ASSETSt-1)+ β1( ∆SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + εt
Model 3:  │TACt│ = α (1/ASSETSt-1)+ β1 ∆ SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt
Model 4:  │TACt│  = α (1/ASSETSt-1)+ β1 (∆ SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Mean absDACC 
Control
0.1221 0.1538 0.2275 0.2229
Mean absDACC, 
Utilities
0.024 0.025 0.0174 0.0159
Diff. in means 
absDACC 0.098 0.1288 0.2101 0.207
T-statistic 3.84*** 3.12*** 3.93*** 4.29***
P-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
n (Pairs) 96 96 96 96
***, **, *    Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (two-tailed test) 
│TAC│         = Absolute total accruals scaled by lagged assets
∆SALES        =  Change in sales scaled by lagged assets
∆REC            = Change in receivables scaled by lagged assets
PPE               = Plant, property and equipment scaled by lagged assets
CFO             = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets           
absDACC   = Absolute discretionary accruals, residuals from the above models
In each Model, the RATE_REG coefficient is significantly negative at p<0.0001.  Moreover the
models retain sufficient explanatory power, each with R-squared of 0.60 or better.   
Robustness test results, both univariate and multivariate presented in Tables 13 and 14 
respectively indicate that primary results of Hypothesis 1 are not sensitive to the elimination of 
firms that petitioned for rate increases during the study period.  Primary results of Hypothesis 1
that rate-regulated electric utility firms have significantly lower absolute discretionary accruals 
than non-regulated matched control firms remain unchanged.  
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Table 14
Robustness Tests of Hypothesis 1: Multivariate Test Results of Cross-Sectional Estimation of 
Discretionary Accruals with an Indicator Variable of Rate Regulation After Elimination of 
Rate Increase Requesting Firms
Coefficient (p-value) 
Model 1:  |TACt| = α (1/ASSETSt-1) +β1 ∆SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3RATE_REGt + ∑α,jYDUMt + εt
Model 2: | TACt|  = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1( ∆SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 RATE_REGt  +∑α,jYDUMt+ εt
Model 3: |TACt| = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 ∆ SALESt  + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + β4 RATE_REGt +∑α,jYDUMt + εt
Model 4 : |TACt|  = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆ SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + β4 RATE_REGt
+∑α,jYDUMt + εt  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
1/ASSETSt-1 7.098
(0.24)
7.244
(0.23)
7.132
(0.21)
7.075
(0.22)
∆SALES 0.003
(0.80)
-0.019*
(0.08)
∆SALES-∆REC 0.009
(0.47)
-0.014
(0.24)
PPE 0.02***
(0.005)
0.019***
(0.006)
0.008
(0.24)
0.007
(0.29)
CFO 0.25***
(<0.0001)
0.253***
(<0.0001)
RATE_REG -0.038***
(<0.0001)
-0.037***
(<0.0001)
-0.025***
(<0.0001)
-0.024***
(<0.0001)
n 563 563 563 563
R2 0.60 0.60 0.64 0.64
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (two-tailed test)
│TAC│         = Absolute total accruals scaled by lagged assets
∆SALES        =  Change in sales scaled by lagged assets
∆REC            = Change in receivables scaled by lagged assets
PPE               = Plant, property and equipment scaled by lagged assets
CFO             = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets
RATE_REG = An indicator variable that equals one for rate-regulated electric utilities and zero for matched control 
firms
YDUM          = Year dummy
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5.1.2 Whether a Possibility of a Structural Change Affected Time Series Results
In univariate tests of Hypothesis 1, I use 1994-2001 as estimation period and 2002-2005 
as event period.  However, in tests of Hypothesis 2 on whether deregulation increases or 
decreases the magnitude of earnings management, I estimate cross-sectional models from year 
2000 to 2005.  I commence the post-deregulation period in year 2000 because most states 
deregulated their electric utility industry in 1999.  The partitioning of the sample periods is not 
consistent between tests of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.  If deregulation created a structural 
change, time series results of Hypothesis 1 tests may not hold.  I conduct robustness tests to 
examine whether deregulation caused instability in coefficients that may have affected time 
series results of Hypothesis one.  I change partitioning of the sample period in tests of 
Hypothesis 1 to agree with that used in Hypothesis 2.  Accordingly, 1994-1999 becomes the new 
estimation period and 2000-2005 the new event period, then re-estimate models 1 through 4.  
Table 15 reports results of these re-estimations.  Results indicate that the mean absolute 
discretionary accruals of rate-regulated electric utilities are significantly lower than those for 
matched control firms.  The T-statistics for tests of the difference in mean absolute discretionary 
accruals are 4.54, 4.44, 4.76, and 4.75 for model 1, model 2, model 3, and model 4 estimations 
respectively.  Each T-statistic is significant at p<0.0001. 
This test indicates that even after altering the estimation and event period periods in order 
to discount the possibility of a structural shift associated with deregulation, the primary result of 
Hypothesis 1 remain unchanged; absolute discretionary accruals of rate-regulated utilities are 
significantly lower than those for matched control firms. However, shortening the estimation and 
lengthening the event period is inappropriate from econometrics stand point because the 
efficiency of the estimators is compromised.  For this reason, prior studies on earnings 
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management that use time series research designs e.g., Jones (1991) ensure that there are as 
many observations (i.e., years) as possible in the estimation period relative to the event period.
        Table 15
Robustness Test Results of Hypothesis 1 for a Possibility of a Structural Change Due to 
Deregulation
Model 1:  │TACt│ = α (1/ASSETSt-1) +β1 ∆SALESt + β2 PPEt + εt
Model 2:  │TACt│  = α (1/ASSETSt-1)+ β1( ∆SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + εt
Model 3:  │TACt│ = α (1/ASSETSt-1)+ β1 ∆ SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt
Model 4:  │TACt│  = α (1/ASSETSt-1)+ β1 (∆ SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Mean absDACC, 
Control 0.1029 0.1307 0.1142 0.1142
Mean absDACC, 
Utilities 0.0535 0.0535 0.049 0.0483
Diff. in means 
absDACC 0.0494 0.0772 0.0652 0.0659
T-statistic 4.54*** 4.44*** 4.76*** 4.75***
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
n (Pairs) 282 282 282 282
***, ***, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, respectively ( two-tailed test)
│TAC│         = Absolute total accruals scaled by lagged assets
∆SALES        =  Change in sales scaled by lagged assets
∆REC            = Change in receivables scaled by lagged assets
PPE               = Plant, property and equipment scaled by lagged assets
CFO             = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets           
absDACC   = Absolute discretionary accruals, residuals from the above models
5.2 Hypothesis 3
5.2.1 Reversal of Accruals
Accruals by their very nature reverse over time.  Hypothesis 3’s results indicate that 
utility firms use accruals to manage earnings downward in the year they file for rate increase.  I
therefore conduct robustness tests to evaluate whether and when these accruals reverse.  If 
electric utility firms actually used working capital accruals to manage earnings, then accruals are 
expected to reverse a year later.  However, if on the other hand, electric utilities use long-term 
accruals to manage earnings, accruals are not expected to reverse so quickly.  I therefore repeat 
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tests of Hypothesis 3 using the year after the rate requests and two years subsequent to the rate 
request.  Table 16, Panel A-D reports annual cross-sectional, a pooled one-way fixed effects 
model and Fama and MacBeth cross-sectional results of discretionary accruals regressed on an 
indicator variable for the presence of a rate increase request and control variables in the year
after the rate request.
Table 16
Robustness Tests of Hypothesis 3: Results of Cross-Sectional Regression of Discretionary 
Accruals on an Indicator Variable for the Presence of a Rate Increase Request Plus Control 
Variables in the Year After Request
Coefficient (P-value)
Panel A 
Model: DACC1t=α + β1REQt + β2SIZEt + β3CFOt + β4LG_TACt + β5GROWTHt + β6LEVt + εt
Year n α β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6     R2
1995 38 0.1516 -0.0032 -0.0055 -0.7554 -0.013 0.0162 -0.1072 0.66
(<0.0001***) (0.28) (0.02**) (<0.0001***) (0.25) (0.13) (<0.0001***)
1996 39 0.0255 -0.0049 -0.0027 -0.4236 -0.0869 -0.0202 0.0969 0.55
(0.13) (0.16) (0.08*) (0.0003***) (0.20) (0.08*) (0.004***)
1997 39 0.1162 0.0012 -0.0030 -0.3417 0.3536 0.0057 -0.1299 0.32
(0.002***) (0.44) (0.16) (0.01***) (0.05**) (0.17) (0.02***)
1998 39 0.0433 -0.0109 0.0006 -0.4995 0.0392 -0.0030 0.0039 0.62
(0.05**) (0.1*) (0.40) (<0.0001***) (0.39) (0.36) (0.46)
1999 41 0.1101 0.0016 -0.0053 -0.7576 -0.1428 -0.0169 -0.0353 0.77
(0.0002***) (0.43) (0.01***) (<0.0001***) (0.09*) (0.02**) (0.20)
2000 41 0.0159 -0.0256 0.0031 -0.4726 -0.2848 -0.0118 -0.0322 0.37
(0.35) (0.006***) (0.20) (0.001***) (0.005***) (0.15) (0.25)
2001 45 0.0366 0.0027 0.0019 -0.6831 -0.3251 -0.0198 -0.0431 0.75
(0.14) (0.40) (0.29) (<0.0001***) (0.006***) (0.0009***) (0.19)
2002 45 0.0970 -0.0027 -0.0010 -0.7611 -0.1999 0.0193 -0.0660 0.63
(0.006***) (0.37) (0.39) (<0.0001***) (0.001***) (0.09*) (0.06*)
2003 52 0.0790 -0.0060 -0.0010 -0.5551 0.0804 0.0320 -0.0729 0.46
(0.01***) (0.22) (0.37) (<0.0001***) (0.1*) (0.07*) (0.07*)
2004 54 0.0812 -0.0015 -0.0021 -0.5873 0.0361 0.0578 -0.0742 0.55
(0.0002***) (0.38) (0.15) (<0.0001***) (0.33) (0.02**) (0.02**)
2005 49 -0.0046 -0.0089 0.0054 -0.8424 -0.0592 0.0667 -0.0085 0.81
(0.40) (0.03**) (0.003***) (<0.0001***) (0.12) (0.0004***) (0.38)
Fixed 
effects 482 0.0573 -0.0050 -0.0013 -0.5677 -0.0316 -0.0024 -0.0521 0.5
(<0.0001***) (0.011**) (0.07*) (<0.0001***) (0.03**) (0.20) (<0.0001***)
Fama and Mac-Beth procedure:  T-Test to determine whether the test variable, REQ is 
different from  zero
   
Variable
Coefficient 
Mean T-statistic
REQ -0.005 -2.20**
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Table 16 (Continued)
Robustness Tests of Hypothesis 3: Results of Cross-Sectional Regression of Discretionary 
Accruals on an Indicator Variable for the Presence of a Rate Increase Request Plus Control 
Variables in the Year After Request
Coefficient (P-value)
Panel B 
Model: DACC2t= α + β1REQt + β2SIZEt + β3CFOt + β4LG_TACt + β5GROWTHt + β6LEVt + εt
Year      n       α β1 β2         β3 β4        β5           β6 R2
1995 38 0.1522 -0.0035 -0.0055 -0.7576 -0.0124 0.0211 -0.1079 0.68
(<0.0001***) (0.25) (0.02**) (<0.0001***) (0.25) (0.07*) (<0.0001***)
1996 39 0.0255 -0.0048 -0.0027 -0.4227 -0.0860 -0.0189 0.0965 0.55
(0.13) (0.16) (0.08*) (0.0003***) (0.20) (0.09*) (0.004***)
1997 39 0.1161 0.0011 -0.0030 -0.3437 0.3518 0.0057 -0.1293 0.32
(0.002***) (0.44) (0.16) (0.01***) (0.06*) (0.17) (0.02***)
1998 39 0.0440 -0.0108 0.0006 -0.5005 0.0389 -0.0038 0.0032 0.62
(0.05**) (0.1*) (0.41) (<0.0001***) (0.39) (0.32) (0.47)
1999 41 0.1082 0.0018 -0.0052 -0.7546 -0.1437 -0.0133 -0.0357 0.77
(0.0002***) (0.42) (0.01***) (<0.0001***) (0.09*) (0.04**) (0.19)
2000 41 0.0159 -0.0256 0.0031 -0.4725 -0.2853 -0.0119 -0.0323 0.37
(0.35) (0.006***) (0.20) (0.001***) (0.005***) (0.15) (0.25)
2001 46 0.0348 -0.0010 0.0010 -0.6852 -0.3270 -0.0204 -0.0139 0.74
(0.16) (0.47) (0.39) (<0.0001***) (0.007***) (0.0007) (0.36)
2002 45 0.0962 -0.0023 -0.0010 -0.7589 -0.2021 0.0207 -0.0642 0.62
(0.007***) (0.39) (0.39) (<0.0001***) (0.001***) (0.08*) (0.07*)
2003 51 0.0788 -0.0056 -0.0010 -0.5633 0.0749 0.0452 -0.0725 0.48
(0.01***) (0.23) (0.37) (<0.0001***) (0.16) (0.02**) (0.07*)
2004 53 0.0972 -0.0036 -0.0036 -0.5566 0.0340 0.0409 -0.0762 0.59
(<0.0001***) (0.20) (0.20) (<0.0001***) (0.33) (0.07*) (0.01***)
2005 49 -0.0104 -0.0079 0.0049 -0.8294 -0.0645 0.0946 0.0090 0.83
(0.27) (0.04**) (0.005***) (<0.0001***) (0.08*) (<0.0001***) (0.37)
Fixed 
effects 481 0.0595 -0.0052 -0.0018 -0.5739 -0.0458 -0.0025 -0.0440 0.5
(<0.0001***) (0.01***) (0.02**) (<0.0001***) (0.003***) (0.19) (0.0002***)
Fama and MacBeth procedure:  T-test to determine whether the test variable, REQ is different from zero
Variable
Coefficient 
Mean T- statistic
REQ -0.006 -2.47**
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test) 
DACC1 (appearing in the prior page) = Signed discretionary accrual, residual from the following estimation:
TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆SALESt ) + β2 PPEt + εt     [ Jones Model]   
DACC2 = Signed discretionary accrual, residual from the following estimation:
 TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + εt     [Modified Jones Model]   
REQ = Dummy variable equal to one if a firm requested a rate increase in year t; zero otherwise
SIZE = Natural log of total assets  
CFO = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets 
LG_TAC = Lagged total accruals scaled by lagged assets 
GROWTH = Sales growth  
LEV =Leverage defined as total debt divided by total assets  
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Table 16 (Continued)
Robustness Tests of Hypothesis 3: Results of Cross-Sectional Regression of Discretionary 
Accruals on an Indicator Variable for the Presence of a Rate Increase Request Plus Control 
Variables in the Year After Request
Coefficient (P-value)
Panel C
Model: DACC3t= α + β1REQt + β2SIZEt + β3CFOt + β4LG_TACt + β5GROWTHt + β6LEVt + εt
Year n α β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 R2
1995 38 0.0548 -0.0019 -0.0016 -0.0886 -0.0095 0.0084 -0.0964 0.64
(0.0006***) (0.27) (0.14) (0.08*) (0.2) (0.16) (<0.0001***)
1996 38 -0.0081 -0.0045 -0.0008 -0.0816 -0.0777 -0.0096 0.0579 0.18
(0.36) (0.13) (0.29) (0.20) (0.19) (0.21) (0.09*)
1997 38 0.0248 -0.0094 0.0005 0.0357 0.1724 -0.0014 -0.0604 0.28
(0.11) (0.02**) (0.38) (0.32) (0.07*) (0.34) (0.03**)
1998 39 0.0017 -0.0024 0.0001 0.0241 0.0489 -0.0011 -0.0052 0.03
(0.46) (0.33) (0.47) (0.32) (0.29) (0.42) (0.43)
1999 41 0.0010 -0.0033 -0.0001 0.0033 -0.0527 0.0044 -0.0094 0.05
(0.48) (0.28) (0.46) (0.47) (0.21) (0.18) (0.36)
2000 40 -0.0145 -0.0266 0.0059 -0.2281 -0.2294 -0.0066 -0.0627 0.42
(0.33) (0.001***) (0.03**) (0.03**) (0.01***) (0.24) (0.06*)
2001 48 0.0266 -0.0032 -0.0011 -0.0916 0.0412 -0.0038 -0.0229 0.25
(0.09*) (0.29) (0.27) (0.001***) (0.29) (0.12) (0.14)
2002 44 0.0126 -0.0105 0.0022 -0.1549 -0.1190 -0.0066 -0.0502 0.47
(0.30) (0.04**) (0.16) (0.02**) (0.003***) (0.26) (0.04**)
2003 52 0.0346 -0.0103 -0.0003 -0.0209 0.1231 -0.0219 -0.0636 0.27
(0.05**) (0.02**) (0.44) (0.36) (0.001***) (0.05**) (0.02**)
2004 54 0.0394 -0.0038 -0.0007 -0.1054 0.0411 -0.0015 -0.0857 0.22
(0.01***) (0.16) (0.34) (0.07*) (0.27) (0.48) (0.002***)
2005 51 -0.0031 -0.0031 0.0018 -0.0204 -0.0183 0.0031 -0.0346 0.08
(0.42) (0.23) (0.15) (0.36) (0.34) (0.42) (0.08*)
Fixed 
effects 483 0.0173 -0.0059 0.0004 -0.0650 -0.0076 -0.0018 -0.0506 0.14
(0.002***) (<0.0001***) (0.22) (<0.0001***) (0.25) (0.16) (<0.0001***)
Fama and MacBeth procedure:  T-test to determine whether the test variable, REQ is
             different from zero
Variable Coefficient Mean   T-statistic
REQ   -0.007 -3.31***
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test) 
DACC3 = Signed discretionary accrual, residual from the following estimation:
TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 ∆ SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt   [Jones +CFO Model]
REQ = Dummy variable equal to one if a firm requested a rate increase in year t; zero otherwise
SIZE = Natural log of total assets  
CFO = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets 
LG_TAC = Lagged total accruals scaled by lagged assets 
GROWTH = Sales growth  
LEV =Leverage defined as total debt divided by total assets  
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Table 16 (Continued)
Robustness Tests of Hypothesis 3: Results of Cross-Sectional Regression of 
Discretionary Accruals on an Indicator Variable for the Presence of a Rate Increase 
Request Plus Control Variables in the Year After Request
Coefficient (P-value)
Panel D
Model: DACC4t= α + β1REQt + β2SIZEt + β3CFOt + β4LG_TACt + β5GROWTHt + β6LEVt + εt
Year n α β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 R2
1995 38 0.0554 -0.002 -0.0017 -0.0919 -0.0093 0.0099 -0.0967 0.65
(0.0005***) (0.25) (0.13) (0.07*) (0.2) (0.12) (<0.0001***)
1996 38 -0.0086 -0.0046 -0.0008 -0.0820 -0.0783 -0.0071 0.0579 0.17
(0.35) (0.12) (0.30) (0.19) (0.19) (0.27) (0.09*)
1997 39 0.0400 -0.0075 -0.0020 0.0765 0.2159 0.0007 -0.0556 0.2
(0.06*) (0.08*) (0.16) (0.22) (0.07*) (0.42) (0.08*)
1998 39 0.0017 -0.0024 0.0001 0.0237 0.0499 -0.0009 -0.0052 0.03
(0.46) (0.33) (0.47) (0.32) (0.29) (0.43) (0.43)
1999 41 0.0008 -0.0032 -0.0001 0.0027 -0.0529 0.0049 -0.0095 0.05
(0.48) (0.28) (0.47) (0.48) (0.21) (0.16) (0.35)
2000 40 -0.0144 -0.0265 0.0059 -0.2279 -0.2316 -0.0068 -0.0632 0.42
(0.33) (0.001***) (0.03**) (0.03**) (0.01***) (0.23) (0.06*)
2001 48 0.0265 -0.0032 -0.0011 -0.0915 0.0399 -0.0034 -0.0237 0.25
(0.09*) (0.29) (0.27) (0.001***) (0.29) (0.14) (0.13)
2002 44 0.0115 -0.0100 0.0022 -0.1527 -0.1221 -0.0059 -0.0479 0.46
(0.32) (0.05**) (0.16) (0.02**) (0.002***) (0.23) (0.05**)
2003 52 0.0364 -0.0101 -0.0004 -0.0324 0.1293 -0.0084 -0.0637 0.29
(0.04**) (0.02**) (0.41) (0.29) (0.001***) (0.26) (0.02**)
2004 54 0.036 -0.0046 -0.0005 -0.1032 0.0479 0.0068 -0.0784 0.19
(0.02**) (0.13) (0.38) (0.08*) (0.25) (0.39) (0.005***)
2005 51 -0.0024 -0.0031 0.0015 -0.0263 -0.0147 0.0160 -0.0311 0.07
(0.44) (0.23) (0.20) (0.32) (0.37) (0.16) (0.11)
Fixed 
effects 484 0.0183 -0.0059 0.0002 -0.0609 -0.0057 -0.0005 -0.0494 0.13
(0.001***) (<0.0001***) (0.34) (0.0001***) (0.30) (0.39) (<0.0001***)
Fama and Mac-Beth procedure:  T-test to determine whether the test variable, REQ is different from zero 
Variable
Coefficient 
Mean T-statistic
REQ -0.007 -3.30***
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test) 
DACC4 = Signed discretionary accrual, residual from the following estimation:
 TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆ SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt   [Mod. Jones + CFO Model] 
REQ = Dummy variable equal to one if a firm requested a rate increase in year t; zero otherwise
SIZE = Natural log of total assets  
CFO = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets 
LG_TAC = Lagged total accruals scaled by lagged assets 
GROWTH = Sales growth  
LEV =Leverage defined as total debt divided by total assets  
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The results reveal that coefficient estimates on the test variable, REQ are consistently negative
significantly in all the four regression models.  Fama and MacBeth T-statistics for the variable 
REQ obtained from models1 and 2 are -2.20 and -2.47 respectively each is significant at p<0.05.  
T-statistics for models 3 and 4 are -3.31 and -3.30 respectively, each significant at p<0.0001.  
Results of a pooled regression with fixed time effects (year dummies) provides further 
evidence that the test variable REQ is significantly negative at conventional levels for all the four 
earnings management metrics, DACC1, DACC2, DACC3, and DACC4.  
Results of individual year cross-sectional estimations indicate that REQ is significantly 
negative at conventional levels in 3, 3, 4, and 4 annual regressions using model 1, model 2, 
model 3, and model 4 respectively.  These results present evidence that accruals do not reverse 
one year after rate request.  On the contrary, the findings suggest that earnings management 
continues a year after a rate increase request is submitted.  This finding is plausible given the fact 
that the regulatory lag, the time between the submission of a rate request and its approval, is 
about nine months.  In addition, once the PUC approves a rate increase request, a test period of 
up to a year is established.  During the test period, the PUC monitors whether the utility’s 
profitability as measured by return on equity (ROE) exceeds that allowed by the commission.  It 
is not surprising then for a utility to continue managing earnings a year later.  Furthermore, these 
findings are consistent with the argument that relevant costs and revenues for decision making 
are future costs and revenues.  The findings suggest that PUC base approval of rate increase 
requests on future performance.  These arguments are consistent with earnings management
continuing a year after the submission of a rate request. 
Motivated to examine whether accruals reverse, I extend multivariate tests of Hypothesis 
3 to the second year after the submission of the rate request.  Table 17, Panel A-D reports Fama
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and MacBeth cross-sectional regression results and those from fixed effects model along with 
annual cross-sectional regressions in the second year after the submission of a rate request.  The 
Fama and MacBeth analysis results indicate that the average coefficients for the test variable, 
REQ, are indistinguishable from zero with T-statistics of -1.26, -1.18, -1.26 and -1.25 for 
regressions based on model 1, model 2, model3, and model 4 respectively.  Negative and 
significant coefficients for the test variable REQ, observed in the year of request, and the year
following the request, disappear in the second year following the request.  Results of pooled 
estimations with fixed time effects indicate that REQ is still significant at conventional levels but 
at lower magnitudes than in the year of request and the year following.  In individual year cross-
sectional regressions, only 2, 2, 3, and 3 years two out of 11 years have significant REQ 
coefficients in model 1, model 2, model 3, and model 4 regressions respectively.  
The results of pooled estimations with fixed time effects are puzzling.  The test variable
REQ, is significantly negative at conventional levels and yet individual year cross-sectional 
regressions and Fama and MacBeth analysis suggest the opposite.  It could be that cross-
sectional dependence, i.e., positive cross-sectional correlation of residuals may be overstating 
inferences in pooled regressions, even after including fixed time effects to mitigate the problem.  
Tucker and Zarowin (2006) raise this as valid concern and use Fama and MacBeth analysis in an 
attempt to avoid this potential problem.  The preponderance of evidence depicted in Table 17 is 
that accruals reverse (to some degree) in the second year following the year of rate request.  If 
the analysis is extended to several years following the rate request, it may be possible to find 
evidence that accruals completely reverse.   
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Table 17
Robustness Tests of Hypothesis 3: Results of Cross-Sectional Regression of Discretionary 
Accruals on an Indicator Variable for the Presence of a Rate Increase Request Plus 
Control Variables in the Second Year After Request
Coefficient (P-value)
Panel A
Model:  DACC1t=α + β1REQt + β2SIZEt + β3CFOt + β4LG_TACt + β5GROWTHt + β6LEVt + εt
Year n α β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 R2
1996 38 0.0294 -0.0044 -0.0027 -0.4277 -0.0035 -0.0241 0.1011 0.51
(0.132) (0.18) (0.12) (0.0004***) (0.38) (0.05**) (0.003***)
1997 39 0.1265 -0.0137 -0.0043 -0.4252 0.2400 0.0086 -0.1149 0.39
(0.0005***) (0.03**) (0.07*) (0.002***) (0.12) (0.07*) (0.02***)
1998 39 0.0434 -0.0024 0.0017 -0.5137 0.0662 -0.0035 -0.0151 0.61
(0.05**) (0.36) (0.25) (<0.0001***) (0.31) (0.34) (0.36)
1999 41 0.1055 -0.0111 -0.0058 -0.7402 -0.1810 -0.0173 -0.0177 0.8
(0.0002***) (0.07*) (0.06*) (<0.0001***) (0.04**) (0.01***) (0.33)
2000 39 -0.0147 0.0176 0.0032 -0.4105 -0.3193 -0.0054 0.0206 0.39
(0.36) (0.06*) (0.19) (0.003***) (0.005***) (0.32) (0.34)
2001 48 0.0411 -0.0084 0.0018 -0.7136 -0.2764 -0.0203 -0.0323 0.74
(0.11) (0.19) (0.300 (<0.0001***) (0.017**) (0.006***) (0.26)
2002 44 0.0998 -0.0074 -0.0010 -0.7642 -0.1430 0.0219 -0.0638 0.62
(0.005***) (0.27) (0.29) (<0.0001***) (0.03**) (0.06*) (0.07*)
2003 51 0.0781 0.0018 0.0018 -0.6111 0.0722 0.0270 -0.0770 0.5
(0.01***) (0.40) (0.40) (<0.0001***) (0.12) (0.1*) (0.06*)
2004 52 0.0834 -0.0040 -0.0023 -0.5915 0.0302 0.0663 -0.0776 0.56
(0.0002***) (0.23) (0.13) (<0.0001***) (0.36) (0.015**) (0.01***)
2005 52 -0.0003 -0.0026 0.0044 -0.8216 -0.0559 0.0526 -0.0018 0.82
(0.49) (0.26) (0.01***) (<0.0001***) (0.13) (0.001***) (0.48)
Fixed 
effects 443 0.0493 -0.0037 -0.0006 -0.5903 -0.0079 -0.0034 -0.0382 0.54
(<0.0001***) (0.06*) (0.24) (<0.0001***) (0.27) (0.12) (0.003***)
Fama and MacBeth procedure:  T-test to determine whether the test variable, REQ is different from 
zero 
Variable
Coefficient 
Mean T-statistic
REQ -0.003 -1.26
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test) 
DACC1 = Signed discretionary accrual, residual from the following estimation:
TACt       = α (1/ASSETSt-1) +β1 ∆SALESt + β2 PPEt + εt      [Jones Model]   
REQ      = Dummy variable equal to one if a firm requested a rate increase in year t; zero 
otherwise
SIZE     = Natural log of total assets  
CFO     = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets 
LG_TAC = Lagged total accruals scaled by lagged assets 
GROWTH = Sales growth  
LEV            =Leverage defined as total debt divided by total assets  
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Table 17 (Continued)
Robustness Tests of Hypotheses 3: Results of Cross-Sectional Regression of Discretionary 
Accruals on an Indicator Variable for the Presence of a Rate Increase Request Plus 
Control Variables in the Second Year After Request
Coefficient (P-value)
Panel B 
Model: DACC2t= α + β1REQt + β2SIZEt + β3CFOt + β4LG_TACt + β5GROWTHt + β6LEVt + εt
Year n α β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 R2
1996 38 0.0295 -0.0045 -0.0028 -0.4278 -0.0036 -0.0227 0.1011 0.51
(0.131) (0.18) (0.12) (0.0004***) (0.37) (0.06**) (0.003***)
1997 39 0.1264 -0.0138 -0.0043 -0.4274 0.2379 0.0086 -0.1149 0.39
(0.0005***) (0.03**) (0.07*) (0.002***) (0.13) (0.07*) (0.02***)
1998 39 0.0441 -0.0024 0.0016 -0.5146 0.0657 -0.0043 -0.0151 0.61
(0.06**) (0.36) (0.26) (<0.0001***) (0.32) (0.30) (0.36)
1999 41 0.1038 -0.0112 -0.0056 -0.7375 -0.1829 -0.0136 -0.0177 0.78
(0.0002***) (0.065*) (0.07*) (<0.0001***) (0.04**) (0.03**) (0.33)
2000 39 -0.0146 0.0176 0.0032 -0.4104 -0.3199 -0.0055 0.0206 0.39
(0.37) (0.06*) (0.19) (0.003***) (0.005***) (0.32) (0.34)
2001 48 0.0331 -0.0076 0.0013 -0.6953 -0.3227 -0.0196 -0.0323 0.75
(0.15) (0.20) (0.34) (<0.0001***) (0.005***) (0.0005***) (0.26)
2002 44 0.0996 -0.0075 -0.0010 -0.7614 -0.1456 0.0232 -0.0638 0.6
(0.006***) (0.27) (0.38) (<0.0001***) (0.03**) (0.06*) (0.07*)
2003 52 0.0768 0.0027 0.0012 -0.5639 0.0769 0.0492 -0.0770 0.48
(0.01***) (0.36) (0.34) (<0.0001***) (0.103) (0.01***) (0.06*)
2004 52 0.0805 -0.0039 -0.0021 -0.5909 0.0379 0.0686 -0.0776 0.55
(0.0003***) (0.24) (0.15) (<0.0001***) (0.32) (0.013**) (0.01***)
2005 52 -0.0038 -0.0022 0.0038 -0.7933 -0.0624 0.0783 -0.0018 0.83
(0.41) (0.29) (0.02**) (<0.0001***) (0.09*) (<0.0001***) (0.48)
Fixed 
effects 444 0.0461 -0.0032 -0.0008 -0.5628 -0.0062 -0.0018 -0.0382 0.51
(<0.0001***) (0.09*) (0.20) (<0.0001***) (0.32) (0.26) (0.003***)
Fama and MacBeth procedure:  T-Test to determine whether the test variable, REQ is different from zero
Variable
Coefficient 
Mean T-statistic
REQ -0.003 -1.18
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test). 
DACC2 = Signed discretionary accrual, residual from the following estimation:
 TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + εt     [Modified Jones Model]   
REQ = Dummy variable equal to one if a firm requested a rate increase in year t; zero otherwise.
SIZE = Natural log of total assets
CFO = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets 
LG_TAC = Lagged total accruals scaled by lagged assets 
GROWTH = Sales growth  
LEV =Leverage defined as total debt divided by total assets  
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Table 17 (Continued)
Robustness Tests of Hypotheses 3: Results of Cross-Sectional Regression of 
Discretionary Accruals on an Indicator Variable for the Presence of a Rate Increase 
Request Plus Control Variables in the Second Year After Request
Coefficient (P-value)
Panel C 
Model: DACC3t= α + β1REQt + β2SIZEt + β3CFOt + β4LG_TACt + β5GROWTHt + β6LEVt + εt
    Year    n     α       β1      β2       β3      β4     β5        β6 R2
1996 37 0.0024 -0.0044 -0.0007 -0.1092 -0.0024 -0.0111 0.0428 0.13
(0.46) (0.14) (0.35) (0.14) (0.40) (0.18) (0.17)
1997 39 0.0484 -0.0098 -0.0029 0.0370 0.1716 0.0038 -0.0532 0.24
(0.03**) (0.028**) (0.07*) (0.35) (0.12) (0.18) (0.09*)
1998 39 0.0037 -0.0076 0.0002 0.0239 0.0529 -0.0023 -0.0089 0.12
(0.41) (0.03**) (0.46) (0.32) (0.26) (0.32) (0.36)
1999 41 -0.0030 -0.0026 -0.0026 0.0123 -0.0489 0.0033 0.0008 0.05
(0.48) (0.29) (0.29) (0.40) (0.24) (0.23) (0.48)
2000 38 -0.0408 0.0149 0.0057 -0.1756 -0.2635 -0.0009 -0.0105 0.39
(0.12) (0.06*) (0.03**) (0.07*) (0.005***) (0.46) (0.40)
2001 50 0.0261 -0.0079 -0.0010 -0.0882 0.0617 -0.0024 -0.0221 0.27
(0.08*) (0.05**) (0.29) (0.001***) (0.19) (0.21) (0.14)
2002 44 0.0078 -0.0019 0.0026 -0.1184 -0.0555 -0.0179 -0.0527 0.32
(0.38) (0.41) (0.14) (0.06*) (0.15) (0.04**) (0.04**)
2003 52 0.0335 -0.0014 -0.0008 -0.0317 0.1095 -0.0144 -0.0526 0.2
(0.06*) (0.39) (0.34) (0.30) (0.004***) (0.14) (0.05**)
2004 52 0.0361 -0.0026 -0.0003 -0.0988 0.0459 0.0030 -0.0884 0.2
(0.02**) (0.28) (0.44) (0.08*) (0.25) (0.40) (0.001***)
2005 53 0.0000 -0.0041 0.0012 -0.0082 -0.0179 -0.0037 -0.0283 0.09
(0.50) (0.13) (0.22) (0.44) (0.34) (0.40) (0.13)
Fixed 
effects 445 0.0131 -0.0034 0.0006 -0.0635 0.0082 -0.0019 -0.0402 0.11
(0.02**) (0.015**) (0.18) (0.0001***) (0.17) (0.16) (<0.0001***)
Fama and MacBeth procedure:  T-test to determine whether the test variable, REQ is different 
from zero
Variable
Coefficient 
Mean T-statistic
REQ -0.003 -1.27
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test) 
DACC3 = Signed discretionary accrual, residual from the following estimation:
  TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 ∆ SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt   [Jones +CFO Model]
REQ = Dummy variable equal to one if a firm requested a rate increase in year t; zero otherwise
SIZE = Natural log of total assets  
CFO = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets 
LG_TAC = Lagged total accruals scaled by lagged assets 
GROWTH = Sales growth  
LEV =Leverage defined as total debt divided by total assets  
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Table 17 (Continued)
Robustness Tests of Hypotheses 3: Results of Cross-Sectional Regression of 
Discretionary Accruals on an Indicator Variable for the Presence of a Rate 
Increase Request Plus Control Variables in the Second Year After Request
Coefficient (P-value)
Panel D
Model: DACC4t= α + β1REQt + β2SIZEt + β3CFOt + β4LG_TACt + β5GROWTHt + β6LEVt + εt
Year n α β1 Β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 R2
1996 37 0.0021 -0.0045 -0.0007 -0.1108 -0.0025 -0.0085 0.0424 0.13
(0.47) (0.13) (0.36) (0.13) (0.39) (0.24) (0.17)
1997 39 0.0482 -0.0097 -0.0029 0.0414 0.1744 0.0036 -0.0540 0.24
(0.03**) (0.029**) (0.08*) (0.34) (0.12) (0.19) (0.08*)
1998 39 0.0038 -0.0076 0.0002 0.0234 0.0529 -0.0021 -0.0090 0.12
(0.42) (0.03**) (0.45) (0.32) (0.26) (0.33) (0.36)
1999 41 -0.0032 -0.0026 -0.0001 0.0117 -0.0492 0.0038 0.0007 0.05
(0.43) (0.29) (0.47) (0.40) (0.22) (0.20) (0.49)
2000 38 -0.0406 0.0149 0.0057 -0.1757 -0.2657 -0.0011 -0.0111 0.39
(0.13) (0.06*) (0.03**) (0.08*) (0.004***) (0.45) (0.40)
2001 50 0.0259 -0.0079 -0.0010 -0.0880 0.0602 -0.0020 -0.0229 0.27
(0.08*) (0.05**) (0.29) (0.001***) (0.20) (0.26) (0.13)
2002 44 0.0074 -0.0019 0.0025 -0.1154 -0.0588 -0.0172 -0.0512 0.31
(0.39) (0.41) (0.15) (0.07*) (0.14) (0.05**) (0.05**)
2003 52 0.0352 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0427 0.1161 -0.0120 -0.0530 0.22
(0.05**) (0.48) (0.31) (0.24) (0.003***) (0.46) (0.05**)
2004 52 0.0321 -0.0025 -0.0001 -0.0930 0.0568 0.0122 -0.0821 0.17
(0.04**) (0.29) (0.49) (0.1*) (0.21) (0.32) (0.004***)
2005 53 0.0012 -0.0043 0.0008 -0.0139 -0.0145 0.0087 -0.0246 0.08
(0.47) (0.12) (0.31) (0.40) (0.37) (0.27) (0.17)
Fixed 
effects 445 0.0124 -0.0033 0.0005 -0.0600 0.0093 -0.0009 -0.0393 0.1
(0.03**) (0.018**) (0.18) (0.0002***) (0.15) (0.32) (<0.0001***)
Fama and MacBeth procedure:  T-test to determine whether the test variable, REQ is different from zero 
Variable
Coefficient 
Mean T-statistic
REQ -0.003 -1.25
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test) 
DACC4 = Signed discretionary accrual, residual from the following estimation:
  TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆ SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt   [Mod. Jones + CFO Model]  
REQ = Dummy variable equal to one if a firm requested a rate increase in year t; zero otherwise
SIZE = Natural log of total assets  
CFO = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets 
LG_TAC = Lagged total accruals scaled by lagged assets 
GROWTH = Sales growth  
LEV =Leverage defined as total debt divided by total assets  
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5.2.2 Alternate Argument: Year Prior to Rate Increase Request
A contrasting argument can be made that management may plan to request a rate increase 
a year before filing a rate request.  If this is true then earnings management might be observed a 
year prior to making a rate request.  Motivated by this alternate argument, I carry out robustness 
tests of Hypothesis 3 in the year prior to rate request.  Results are presented in Table 18, Panel 
A-D. Fama and MacBeth cross-sectional regression results reveal that the average coefficients 
are indistinguishable from zero with T-statistics of -0.5, -0.55, -0.86, and -0.86 for models 1
through 4 respectively.  Results of fixed effects model reveal that the coefficients for the test 
variable, REQ, are indistinguishable from zero in all models except model 2.  These insignificant 
results provide evidence of no earnings management in the year prior to submission of a rate 
increase request. 
5.2.3 Elimination of Firms that Issue Stock
Healy and Wahlen (1999) identify capital market incentives as a motive for earnings 
management.   Prior studies find that managers use discretionary accruals to manage earnings in 
order to beat earnings forecasts (Ayers et al. 2006, Dechow et al. 2003, and Phillips et al. 2003).  
Dechow and Skinner (2000) document that earnings management will likely be greater when it 
allows managers to meet the analyst forecast.  Abarnell and Lehavy (2003) report that firms that 
have received buy recommendations from analysts are more likely to engage in earnings 
management in order to meet, or just beat, analysts’ forecasts.  This study attempts to isolate the 
approval of a rate increase as an incentive for earnings management.  The presence of firms in 
the sample with a competing capital market incentive (i.e., to increase earnings) for earnings 
management may weaken the results.  To examine the robustness of Hypothesis 3’s primary 
results, I eliminate stock-issuing firms from the sample.  
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Table 18
Robustness Tests of Hypotheses 3: Results of Cross-Sectional Regression of Discretionary 
Accruals on an Indicator Variable for the Presence of a Rate Increase Request Plus Control 
Variables in the Year Prior to Request
Coefficient (P-value)   
Panel A
Model: DACC1t=α + β1REQt + β2SIZEt + β3CFOt + β4LG_TACt + β5GROWTHt + β6LEVt + εt
Year n α β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 R2
1993 38 0.0723 -0.0003 0.0012 -0.5135 0.0076 0.0244 -0.0952 0.53
(0.008***) (0.48) (0.32) (<0.0001***) (0.26) (0.14) (0.0005***)
1994 39 0.1127 0.0026 -0.0036 -0.752 -0.2427 0.0507 -0.108 0.72
(0.0001***) (0.33) (0.07*) (<0.0001***) (0.03**) (0.06*) (0.0001***)
1995 39 0.137 0.0046 -0.0043 -0.6447 0.2271 0.0144 -0.0963 0.72
(<0.0001***) (0.2) (0.02**) (<0.0001***) (0.008***) (0.14) (<0.0001***)
1996 38 0.0244 0.0014 -0.0023 -0.4377 -0.1131 -0.0223 0.0874 0.5
(0.20) (0.43) (0.13) (0.0004***) (0.16) (0.07*) (0.05**)
1997 39 0.1158 0.0004 -0.0029 -0.3454 0.3477 0.0056 -0.1282 0.32
(0.002***) (0.48) (0.16) (0.01***) (0.06*) (0.17) (0.02**)
1998 41 0.0407 -0.0055 0.0018 -0.5134 0.0691 -0.0004 -0.0110 0.65
(0.07**) (0.24) (0.23) (<0.0001***) (0.30) (0.48) (0.40)
1999 41 0.1128 -0.0026 -0.0055 -0.7589 -0.1396 -0.0157 -0.0373 0.77
(0.0001***) (0.38) (0.01***) (<0.0001***) (0.1*) (0.03**) (0.17)
2000 38 0.0153 0.0004 0.0023 -0.5250 -0.2950 -0.0101 -0.0033 0.38
(0.37) (0.48) (0.27) (0.001***) (0.009***) (0.20) (0.47)
2001 43 0.0537 -0.0009 0.0024 -0.7684 -0.3364 -0.0205 -0.0807 0.82
(0.05**) (0.45) (0.23) (<0.0001***) (0.02**) (0.0001***) (0.03**)
2002 46 0.1023 -0.0100 -0.0014 -0.7494 -0.1402 0.0188 -0.0619 0.62
(0.002***) (0.08*) (0.33) (<0.0001***) (0.03**) (0.08*) (0.06*)
  2003 49 0.0711 0.0028 0.0004 -0.5800 0.0235 0.0151 -0.0856 0.47
(0.01***) (0.35) (0.44) (<0.0001***) (0.38) (0.25) (0.04**)
Fixed 
effects 451 0.0868 -0.0009 -0.0016 -0.6189 -0.0128 -0.0039 -0.0738 0.55
(<0.0001***) (0.33) (0.03**) (<0.0001***) (0.15) (0.07*) (<0.0001***)
Fama and MacBeth procedure:  T-test to determine whether the test variable, REQ is different from 
zero 
Variable
Coefficient 
Mean T-statistic
REQ -0.0006 -0.5
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test) 
DACC1 = Signed discretionary accruals, residual from the following estimation:
TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) +β1 ∆SALESt + β2 PPEt + εt      [Jones Model]   
REQ = Dummy variable equal to one if a firm requested a rate increase in year t; zero otherwise
SIZE = Natural log of total assets 
CFO = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets 
LG-TAC = Lag total accruals scaled by lagged assets
GROWTH = Sales growth  
LEV =Leverage defined as total debt divided by total assets  
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Table 18 (Continued)
Robustness Tests of Hypotheses 3: Results of Cross-Sectional Regression of Discretionary 
Accruals on an Indicator Variable for the Presence of a Rate Increase Request Plus Control 
Variables in the Year Prior to Request
Coefficient (P-value)   
Panel B
DACC2t= α + β1REQt + β2SIZEt + β3CFOt + β4LG_TACt + β5GROWTHt + β6LEVt + εt
Year N α β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 R2
1993 38 0.0756 -0.0011 0.001 -0.523 0.0079 0.0231 -0.0977 0.54
(0.005***) (0.43) (0.34) (<0.0001***) (0.25) (0.15) (0.0003***)
1994 39 0.1134 0.003 -0.0038 -0.7511 -0.2311 0.066 -0.1073 0.71
(<0.0001***) (0.31) (0.06*) (<0.0001***) (0.03**) (0.02**) (0.0001***)
1995 39 0.1379 0.0045 -0.0044 -0.6478 0.2216 0.0194 -0.0971 0.73
(<0.0001***) (0.20) (0.02**) (<0.0001***) (0.008***) (0.07*) (<0.0001***)
1996 38 0.0243 0.0013 -0.0023 -0.4367 -0.1127 -0.0211 0.0873 0.49
(0.20) (0.43) (0.13) (0.0004***) (0.17) (0.08*) (0.05**)
1997 39 0.1157 0.0005 -0.0030 -0.3473 0.3460 0.0056 -0.1276 0.32
(0.002***) (0.48) (0.16) (0.01***) (0.06*) (0.17) (0.02**)
1998 41 0.0414 -0.0054 0.0018 -0.5146 0.0687 -0.0012 -0.0115 0.65
(0.06**) (0.25) (0.23) (<0.0001***) (0.30) (0.44) (0.39)
1999 41 0.1114 -0.0030 -0.0054 -0.7561 -0.1400 -0.0119 -0.0380 0.77
(0.0001***) (0.36) (0.01***) (<0.0001***) (0.1*) (0.07*) (0.16)
2000 38 0.0153 0.0004 0.0023 -0.5248 -0.2955 -0.0102 -0.0035 0.38
(0.37) (0.48) (0.27) (0.001***) (0.009***) (0.19) (0.47)
2001 43 0.0554 -0.0010 0.0022 -0.7725 -0.3600 -0.0200 -0.0848 0.82
(0.05**) (0.45) (0.25) (<0.0001***) (0.01***) (0.0002***) (0.03**)
2002 46 0.1020 -0.0100 -0.0014 -0.7468 -0.1424 0.0202 -0.0607 0.61
(0.002***) (0.09*) (0.33) (<0.0001***) (0.03**) (0.08*) (0.07*)
2003 49 0.0710 0.0029 0.0002 -0.5791 0.0228 0.0302 -0.0827 0.48
(0.01***) (0.34) (0.47) (<0.0001***) (0.38) (0.08*) (0.04**)
Fixed 
effects 451 0.0870 -0.0009 -0.0016 -0.6179 -0.0129 -0.0027 -0.0742 0.55
(<0.0001***) (0.34) (0.02**) (<0.0001***) (0.15) (0.16) (<0.0001***)
Fama and MacBeth procedure:  T-test to determine whether the test variable, REQ is different from zero
Variable
Coefficient 
Mean T-statistic
REQ -0.0007 -0.55
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test) 
DACC2 = Signed discretionary accrual, residual from the following estimation:
 TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + εt     [Modified Jones Model]   
REQ = Dummy variable equal to one if a firm requested a rate increase in year t; zero otherwise
SIZE = Natural log of total assets  
CFO = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets 
LG_TAC = Lagged total accruals scaled by lagged assets 
GROWTH = Sales growth  
LEV =Leverage defined as total debt divided by total assets  
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Table 18 (Continued)
Robustness Tests of Hypotheses 3: Results of Cross-Sectional Regression of Discretionary 
Accruals on an Indicator Variable for the Presence of a Rate Increase Request Plus 
Control Variables in the Year Prior to Request
Coefficient (P-value)   
Panel C
DACC3t= α + β1REQt + β2SIZEt + β3CFOt + β4LG_TACt + β5GROWTHt + β6LEVt + εt
Year n α β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 R2
1993 38 0.0531 -0.0048 0.0005 -0.2136 0.0022 0.0084 -0.1016 0.45
(0.01***) (0.17) (0.41) (0.01***) (0.41) (0.32) (<0.0001***)
1994 39 0.0373 0.0029 -0.0004 -0.0452 -0.0221 -0.0047 -0.0918 0.47
(0.02**) (0.24) (0.41) (0.25) (0.40) (0.42) (<0.0001***)
1995 39 0.0465 0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0307 0.1071 0.0074 -0.092 0.67
(0.008***) (0.45) (0.23) (0.30) (0.03**) (0.17) (<0.0001***)
1996 38 -0.0083 0.0037 -0.0002 -0.0952 -0.0844 -0.0105 0.0430 0.15
(0.36) (0.28) (0.44) (0.16) (0.180 (0.19) (0.16)
1997 38 0.026 0.0007 0.0005 0.0637 0.2168 -0.0003 -0.0695 0.16
(0.12) (0.45) (0.390 (0.22) (0.04**) (0.46) (0.02**)
1998 41 -0.0027 -0.0090 0.0007 0.0137 0.0629 0.0033 -0.0006 0.13
(0.43) (0.04**) (0.32) (0.390 (0.22) (0.27) (0.490
1999 41 -0.0009 -0.0013 -0.0001 0.0082 -0.0369 0.0039 -0.0036 0.04
(0.48) (0.40) (0.47) (0.43) (0.29) (0.21) (0.44)
2000 38 -0.0266 0.0015 0.0053 -0.1970 -0.2658 -0.0028 -0.0330 0.34
(0.23) (0.41) (0.05**) (0.06*) (0.006***) (0.39) (0.22)
2001 46 0.0231 -0.0019 -0.0004 -0.0883 -0.0124 -0.0028 -0.0407 0.28
(0.1*) (0.33) (0.41) (0.006***) (0.44) (0.17) (0.04**)
2002 45 0.0170 -0.0140 0.0016 -0.1196 -0.0582 -0.0135 -0.0468 0.41
(0.23) (0.002***) (0.23) (0.05**) (0.12) (0.09*) (0.04**)
2003 52 0.0296 0.0054 -0.0008 -0.0242 0.1173 -0.0174 -0.0460 0.22
(0.09*) (0.13) (0.34) (0.34) (0.003***) (0.1*) (0.08*)
Fixed 
effects 455 0.0235 -0.0018 0.0003 -0.0673 0.0048 -0.0011 -0.0631 0.16
(<0.0001***) (0.1*) (0.29) (<0.0001***) (0.28) (0.28) (<0.0001***)
Fama and MacBeth procedure:  T-test to determine whether the test variable, REQ is              
Different from zero
Variable
Coefficient 
Mean T-statistic
REQ -0.002 -0.86
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test) 
DACC3 = Signed discretionary accrual, residual from the following estimation:
TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 ∆ SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt   [Jones +CFO Model]
REQ = Dummy variable equal to one if a firm requested a rate increase in year t; zero otherwise
SIZE = Natural log of total assets  
CFO = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets 
LG_TAC = Lagged total accruals scaled by lagged assets 
GROWTH = Sales growth  
LEV =Leverage defined as total debt divided by total assets  
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Table 18 (Continued)
Robustness Tests of Hypotheses 3: Results of Cross-Sectional Regression of 
Discretionary Accruals on an Indicator Variable for the Presence of a Rate 
Increase Request Plus Control Variables in the Year Prior to Request
Coefficient (P-value)   
Panel D
DACC4t= α + β1REQt + β2SIZEt + β3CFOt + β4LG_TACt + β5GROWTHt + β6LEVt + εt
Year N α β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 R2
1993 38 0.0536 -0.0055 0.0005 -0.2218 0.0025 0.0132 -0.1031 0.45
(0.01***) (0.14) (0.40) (0.01***) (0.39) (0.28) (<0.0001***)
1994 39 0.0374 0.003 0.0003 -0.0487 -0.0141 -0.0054 -0.0917 0.47
(0.02**) (0.23) (0.43) (0.23) (0.43) (0.40) (<0.0001***)
1995 39 0.0472 0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0341 0.1057 0.009 -0.0923 0.68
(0.006***) (0.46) (0.22) (0.28) (0.03**) (0.12) (<0.0001***)
1996 38 -0.0087 0.0036 -0.0002 -0.0961 -0.0861 -0.0080 0.0428 0.15
(0.35) (0.28) (0.45) (0.16) (0.18) (0.25) (0.16)
1997 38 0.0260 0.0006 0.0005 0.0676 0.2190 -0.0004 -0.0703 0.17
(0.12) (0.45) (0.39) (0.21) (0.04**) (0.45) (0.02**)
1998 41 -0.0027 -0.0090 0.0007 0.0132 0.0630 0.0034 -0.0006 0.13
(0.43) (0.03**) (0.32) (0.39) (0.22) (0.27) (0.49)
1999 41 -0.0010 -0.0014 -0.0001 0.0078 -0.0370 0.0045 -0.0038 0.04
(0.48) (0.40) (0.47) (0.44) (0.29) (0.18) (0.44)
2000 38 -0.0266 0.0015 0.0053 -0.1968 -0.2679 -0.0031 -0.0336 0.34
(0.23) (0.41) (0.05**) (0.06*) (0.006***) (0.38) (0.22)
2001 46 0.0233 -0.0017 -0.0004 -0.0881 -0.0120 -0.0023 -0.0422 0.28
(0.1*) (0.35) (0.41) (0.006***) (0.44) (0.21) (0.04**)
2002 44 0.0271 -0.0135 0.0017 -0.0920 -0.0512 -0.0170 -0.0877 0.44
(0.12) (0.002***) (0.21) (0.1*) (0.15) (0.05**) (0.01***)
2003 52 0.0314 0.0055 -0.0009 -0.0353 0.1238 -0.0041 -0.0461 0.24
(0.07*) (0.12) (0.31) (0.28) (0.002***) (0.38) (0.08*)
Fixed 
effects 454 0.0240 -0.0017 0.0004 -0.0658 0.0064 -0.0004 -0.0672 0.16
(<0.0001***) (0.12) (0.26) (<0.0001***) (0.21) (0.42) (<0.0001***)
Fama and MacBeth procedure:  T-test to determine whether the test variable, REQ is different from zero 
Variable
Coefficient 
Mean T-statistic
REQ -0.001 -0.86
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test) 
DACC4 = Signed discretionary accrual, residuals from the following estimation:
 TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆ SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt   [Mod. Jones + CFO Model] 
REQ = Dummy variable equal to one if a firm requested a rate increase in year t; zero otherwise
SIZE = Natural log of total assets  
CFO = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets 
LG_TAC = Lagged total accruals scaled by lagged assets 
GROWTH = Sales growth  
LEV =Leverage defined as total debt divided by total assets  
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Table 19 reports the results of cross-sectional regressions of discretionary accruals on an 
indicator variable for the presence of a rate increase request and control variables using a 
reduced sample which excludes utilities that issue stock.  Table 19, Panel A, reports mean 
coefficients and T-statistics that are computed following Fama and MacBeth procedure.  The 
results indicate that the test variable, REQ, has a consistent and significant expected negative 
sign across all regression models.  Mean coefficients (T-statistics) are -0.004 (-1.64), -0.004 (-
1.71), -0.006 (-2.84), and -0.006 (-2.85) estimated from model 1, model 2, model 3, and model 4 
respectively.  The T-statistics are significant at p<0.05 in models 1 and 2, and p<0.01 in models
3 and 4.  These results are consistent with the primary findings in tests of Hypothesis 3.  Table 
19 Panel B reports results of pooled regressions with fixed time effects.  The results reveal that 
REQ is negative and significant at p<0.05 in model 3 and model 4 regressions and insignificant 
in model 1 and model 2. Results of primary tests of Hypothesis 3, that rate-regulated electric 
utility firms have lower discretionary accruals in the years they petition for rate increases, hold 
after the elimination of stock-issuing firms.  
Table 20, Panel A reports results of the Fama and MacBeth procedure in the year after a 
rate request is submitted.  Mean coefficients (T-statistics) are -0.009 (-3.59), -0.009 (-3.59), -
0.006 (-4.89), and -0.006 (-4.69) estimated from model 1, model 2, model 3, and model 4 
respectively.  The T-statistics are significant at p<0.01 in all the four regression models.  Results 
of pooled cross-sectional regressions with fixed time effects indicate that REQ is consistently 
negative and significant at p<0.05.  These results suggest that earnings management continues in 
the year after the rate increase request is submitted.  Consistent with earlier discussion, this 
finding is plausible because regulatory authorities may base rate decisions on futuristic earnings 
information, that due to the presence of a regulatory lag of about nine months, rate approvals 
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may likely occur in the fiscal year following the submission of a rate increase petition, and, a test 
period exists for monitoring whether approved rates exceed that allowed for the utility’s return 
on equity (ROE).  These propositions are consistent with why utilities may continue to manage 
earnings in the year after submission of a rate request.    
Table 19
Tests of Hypothesis 3 on Reduced Sample:  Results of Cross-Sectional Regression of 
Discretionary Accruals on an Indicator Variable for the Presence of a Rate Increase 
Request Plus Control Variables
Panel A  Fama and MacBeth Procedure Results: Mean Coefficient (T-statistic)
Model 1: DACC1 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV + ε
Model 2: DACC2 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV + ε
Model 3: DACC3 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV + ε
Model 4: DACC4 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV + ε
Variables Exp. Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept ? 0.006
(4.74***)
0.006
(4.78***)
0.013
(1.26)
0.013
(1.19)
Test variable
REQ - -0.004
(-1.64*)
-0.004
(-1.71*)
-0.006
(-2.84***)
-0.006
(-2.85***)
Controls
SIZE - 0.0006
(0.35)
0.0005
(0.38)
0.0015
(1.63*)
0.0015
(1.63*)
CFO - -0.631
(-7.34***)
-0.633
(-7.35***)
-0.03
(-0.97)
-0.03
(-1.01)
LG_TAC + -0.02
(-0.35)
-0.027
(-0.5)
0.0119
(0.21)
0.0092
(0.16)
GROWTH + 0.0292
(1.74*)
0.0438
(2.23**)
-0.005
(0.18)
-0.00076
(-0.14)
LEV + -0.034
(-1.03)
-0.035
(-1.07)
-0.062
(-2.34**)
-0.06
(-2.30**)
R2 0.54 0.54 0.18 0.17
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test) 
DACC1-DACC4 are signed discretionary accruals, residuals from the following estimations:
DACC1: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) +β1 ∆SALESt + β2 PPEt + εt      [Jones Model]   
DACC2: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + εt     [Modified Jones Model]   
DACC3: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 ∆ SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt   [Jones +CFO Model]
DACC4: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆ SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt   [Mod. Jones + CFO Model] 
REQ              = Dummy variable equal to one if a firm requested a rate increase in year t; zero otherwise
SIZE                = Natural log of total assets  
CFO               = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets  
LG_TAC        = Lagged total accruals scaled by lagged assets 
GROWTH      = Sales growth  
LEV               =Leverage defined as total debt divided by total assets  
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Table 19 (Continued)
Tests of Hypothesis 3 on Reduced Sample:  Results of Cross-Sectional Regression of 
Discretionary Accruals on an Indicator Variable for the Presence of a Rate Increase 
Request Plus Control Variables
Panel B:  Results of Fixed Effects Models: Coefficient (p-value)
Model 1: DACC1 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LE +∑α,jYDUMt+ ε
Model 2: DACC2 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV +∑α,jYDUMt+ ε
Model 3: DACC3 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV +∑α,jYDUMt+ ε
Model 4: DACC4 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV+∑α,jYDUMt + ε
Variables Exp.Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept ? 0.0804***
(<0.0001)
0.0801***
(<0.0001)
0.0171*
(0.06)
0.0162*
(0.07)
Test Variable
REQ - 0.0018
(0.30)
0.0018
(0.31)
-0.0041**
(0.05)
-0.0042**
(0.05)
Controls
SIZE - -0.0019
(0.15)
-0.0014
(0.16)
0.0007
(0.24)
0.0007
(0.23)
CFO - -0.6774***
(<0.0001)
-0.6736***
(<0.0001)
-0.0461**
(0.04)
-0.0452**
(0.04)
LG_TAC + -0.0849***
(0.01)
-0.0866**
(0.01)
-0.0464**
(0.04)
-0.0472**
(0.03)
GROWTH + -0.0102**
(0.03)
-0.008*
(0.07)
0.0031
(0.21)
-0.0021
(0.35)
LEV + -0.064***
(0.001)
-0.0653***
(0.001)
-0.0617***
(<0.0001)
-0.0601***
(<0.0001)
n 348 348 348 348
R2 0.54 0.53 0.09 0.17
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test).
DACC1-DACC4 are signed discretionary accruals, signed residuals from the following estimations:
DACC1: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) +β1 ∆SALESt + β2 PPEt + εt      [Jones Model]   
DACC2: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + εt     [Modified Jones]   
DACC3: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 ∆ SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt   [Jones +CFO Model]
DACC4: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆ SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt   [Mod. Jones + CFO Model]  
REQ            = Dummy variable equal to one if a firm requested a rate increase in year t; zero otherwise
SIZE          = Natural log of total assets  
CFO           = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets 
LG_TAC     = Lagged total accruals scaled by lagged assets 
GROWTH  = Sales growth  
LEV            =Leverage defined as total debt divided by total assets
YDUM        = Year dummy
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Table 20
Tests of Hypothesis 3 on Reduced Sample:  Results of Cross-Sectional Regression of 
Discretionary Accruals on an Indicator Variable for the Presence of a Rate Increase 
Request Plus Control Variables in the Year after Request
Panel A:  Fama and MacBeth Procedure Results: Mean Coefficient (T-statistic)
Model 1: DACC1 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV + ε
Model 2: DACC2 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV + ε
Model 3: DACC3 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV + ε
Model 4: DACC4 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV + ε
Variables Exp. Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept ? 0.056
(4.70***)
0.056
(4.72***)
0.0088
(0.90)
0.0082
(0.84)
Test variable
REQ - -0.009
(-3.59***)
-0.009
(-3.59***)
-0.006
(-4.89***)
-0.006
(-4.69***)
Controls
SIZE - 0.00011
(-0.08)
0.00025
(-0.18)
0.0011
(1.61*)
0.0011
(1.58*)
CFO - -0.655
(-7.30***)
-0.648
(-7.36***)
-0.04
(-1.47*)
-0.041
(-1.50*)
LG_TAC + -0.062
(-1.32)
-0.07
(-1.52*)
-0.015
(-0.31)
-0.017
(-0.36)
GROWTH + 0.0417
(2.53***)
0.0545
(2.67***)
0.0018
(0.36)
0.0071
(1.11)
LEV + -0.014
(-0.47)
-0.013
(-0.44)
-0.044
(-1.79**)
0.042
(-1.73*)
# years 11 11 11 11
R2 0.56 0.50 0.09 0.08
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test) 
DACC1-DACC4 are signed discretionary accruals, residuals from the following estimations:
DACC1: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) +β1 ∆SALESt + β2 PPEt + εt      [Jones Model]   
DACC2: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + εt     [Modified Jones Model]   
DACC3: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 ∆ SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt   [Jones +CFO Model]
DACC4: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆ SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt   [Mod. Jones + CFO Model]  
REQ              = Dummy variable equal to one if a firm requested a rate increase in year t; zero otherwise
SIZE                = Natural log of total assets  
CFO               = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets  
LG_TAC        = Lagged total accruals scaled by lagged assets 
GROWTH      = Sales growth  
LEV               =Leverage defined as total debt divided by total assets
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Table 20 (Continued)
Tests of Hypothesis 3 on Reduced Sample:  Results of Cross-Sectional Regression of 
Discretionary Accruals on an Indicator Variable for the Presence of a Rate Increase 
Request Plus Control Variables in the Year after Request
Panel B:  Results of Fixed Effects Models: Coefficient (p-value)
Model 1: DACC1 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV+∑α,jYDUMt+ ε
Model 2: DACC2 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV +∑α,jYDUMt+ ε
Model 3: DACC3 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV +∑α,jYDUMt+ ε
Model 4: DACC4 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV+∑α,jYDUMt + ε
Variables Exp. Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept ? 0.0597***
(<0.0001)
0.0569***
(<0.0001)
0.0116
(0.12)
0.0107
(0.14)
Test Variable
REQ - -0.0058**
(0.04)
-0.0058**
(0.04)
-0.0061***
(0.006)
-0.0061***
(0.005)
Controls
SIZE - -0.0012
(0.19)
-0.0011
(0.20)
0.0008
(0.20)
0.0008
(0.20)
CFO - -0.6822***
(<0.0001)
-0.6673***
(<0.0001)
-0.0323*
(0.09)
-0.0301*
(0.1)
LG_TAC + -0.0732**
(0.02)
-0.0762**
(0.02)
-0.0275
(0.13)
-0.0274
(0.14)
GROWTH + -0.008*
(0.06)
-0.0048
(0.18)
-0.0026
(0.24)
-0.0013
(0.36)
LEV + -0.052***
(0.004)
-0.0475***
(0.008)
-0.0512***
(0.0002)
-0.0488***
(0.0002)
n 361 361 361 361
R2 0.56 0.50 0.09 0.08
***, **, * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test).
DACC1-DACC4 are signed discretionary accruals, residuals from the following estimations:
DACC1: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) +β1 ∆SALESt + β2 PPEt + εt      [Jones Model]   
DACC2: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + εt     [Modified Jones]   
DACC3: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 ∆ SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt   [Jones +CFO Model]
DACC4: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆ SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt   [Mod. Jones + CFO Model] 
REQ            = Dummy variable equal to one if a firm requested a rate increase in year t; zero otherwise
SIZE          = Natural log of total assets.  
CFO           = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets 
LG_TAC     = Lagged total accruals scaled by lagged assets 
GROWTH = Sales growth  
LEV           =Leverage defined as Total debt divided by total assets 
YDUM       = Year dummy
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Table 21 reports results of cross-sectional estimations in the second year after the rate 
request is submitted.  Results from all the four regression models and from both Fama and 
MacBeth and pooled cross-sectional regressions with fixed time effects indicate that the 
coefficient for the test variable, REQ, is indistinguishable from zero.  As was the case in primary 
findings, earnings management appears to abate (i.e., reversing accruals) in the second year after 
the rate request.  
Table 22 reports results in the year prior to the rate increase submission.  Results of both 
the Fama and MacBeth procedure and pooled cross-sectional regressions with fixed time effects 
reveal that the sign of the test variable, REQ, is indistinguishable from zero.  This finding 
provides evidence that utilities do not manage earnings in the year prior to the submission of a 
rate increase request.  This is consistent with the finding in primary tests.
The results of these robustness tests provide evidence that primary results on tests of 
Hypothesis 3 are not sensitive to elimination of firms with a competing capital market incentive 
for earnings management.
5.2.4 Summary of Hypothesis 3 Results
Table 23 depicts a summary of the earnings management variable, REQ, across time for 
sample two utilities.  Table 23 Panel A, reports a time-line of earnings management using the 
Fama and MacBeth cross-sectional regression results.  These results reveal that there is no 
evidence of earnings management in the year prior to submission of the rate request.  Similarly, 
there is no evidence of earnings management in the second year after a rate request is submitted.
The results also indicate that there appears to be downward earnings management in the year a 
rate request is submitted and in the following year.  
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Table 21
Tests of Hypothesis 3 on Reduced Sample:  Results of Cross-Sectional Regression of 
Discretionary Accruals on an Indicator Variable for the Presence of a Rate Increase 
Request Plus Control Variables in the Second Year After Request
Panel A:  Fama and MacBeth Procedure Results: Mean Coefficient (T-statistic)
Model 1: DACC1 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV + ε
Model 2: DACC2 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV + ε
Model 3: DACC3 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV + ε
Model 4: DACC4 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV + ε
Variables Exp. Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept ? 0.048
(4.67***)
0.047
(4.78***)
0.0089
(0.89)
0.008
(0.81)
Test variable
REQ - -0.001
(-0.30)
-0.001
(-0.40)
0.002
(0.56)
0.002
(0.54)
Controls
SIZE - 0.0006
(0.39)
0.0005
(0.37)
0.0011
(1.36*)
0.0011
(1.38*)
CFO - -0.65
(-6.68***)
-0.642
(-6.74***)
-0.038
(-1.12)
-0.038
(-1.13)
LAG_TAC + -0.082
(-1.70*)
-0.088
(-1.79**)
-0.008
(-0.17)
-0.009
(-0.18)
GROWTH + 0.0359
(2.21**)
0.0496
(2.47**)
-0.001
(-0.32)
0.0034
(0.79)
LEV + -0.015
(-0.49)
-0.014
(-0.44)
-0.045
(-1.85**)
-0.044
(-1.81**)
R2 0.56 0.55 0.11 0.07
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test) 
DACC1-DACC4 are signed discretionary accruals, residuals from the following estimations:
DACC1: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) +β1 ∆SALESt + β2 PPEt + εt      [Jones Model]   
DACC2: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + εt     [Modified Jones Model]   
DACC3: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 ∆ SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt   [Jones +CFO Model]
DACC4: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆ SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt   [Mod. Jones + CFO Model]  
REQ               = Dummy variable equal to one if a firm requested a rate increase in year t; zero otherwise
SIZE                = Natural log of total assets  
CFO               = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets  
LG_TAC         = Lagged total accruals scaled by lagged assets 
GROWTH      = Sales growth  
LEV               = Leverage defined as total debt divided by total assets
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Table 21 (Continued)
Tests of Hypothesis 3 on Reduced Sample:  Results of Cross-Sectional Regression of 
Discretionary Accruals on an Indicator Variable for the Presence of a Rate Increase 
Request Plus Control Variables in the Second Year After Request
Panel B:  Fixed Effects Model Results: Coefficient (p-value)
Model 1: DACC1 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV+∑α,jYDUMt+ ε
Model 2: DACC2 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV +∑α,jYDUMt+ ε
Model 3: DACC3 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV +∑α,jYDUMt+ ε
Model 4: DACC4 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV+∑α,jYDUMt + ε
ariables Exp. Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept ? 0.0548***
(<0.0001)
0.0523***
(0.0002)
0.0099
(0.18)
0.0089
(0.20)
Test Variable
REQ + -0.0032
(0.19)
-0.0031
(0.20)
0.0000
(0.49)
0.0000
(0.47)
Controls
SIZE - -0.0007
(0.32)
-0.0007
(0.38)
0.0009
(0.19)
0.0009
(0.40)
CFO - -0.6881***
(<0.0001)
-0.6726***
(<0.0001)
-0.0321*
(0.1)
-0.0299
(0.12)
LAG_TAC + -0.0908***
(0.006)
-0.0909***
(0.007)
0.0310
(0.12)
-0.0311
(0.12)
GROWTH + -0.0085**
(0.05)
-0.0054
(0.16)
-0.0027
(0.25)
-0.0011
(0.36)
LEV + -0.052***
(0.005)
-0.0475***
(0.01)
-0.053***
(0.0002)
-0.0506***
(0.0004)
n 334 334 334 334
R2 0.56 0.55 0.11 0.07
***, **, * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test).
DACC1-DACC4 are signed discretionary accruals, residuals from the following estimations:
DACC1: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) +β1 ∆SALESt + β2 PPEt + εt      [Jones Model]   
DACC2: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + εt     [Modified Jones]   
DACC3: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 ∆ SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt   [Jones +CFO Model]
DACC4: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆ SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt   [Mod. Jones + CFO Model] 
REQ            = Dummy variable equal to one if a firm requested a rate increase in year t; zero otherwise
SIZE          =Natural log of total assets.  
CFO           = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets 
LG_TAC     = Lagged total accruals scaled by lagged assets 
GROWTH = Sales growth  
LEV          =Leverage defined as Total debt divided by total assets 
YDUM       = Year dummy
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Table 22
Tests of Hypothesis 3 on Reduced Sample:  Results of Cross-Sectional Regression of 
Discretionary Accruals on an Indicator Variable for the Presence of a Rate Increase 
Request Plus Control Variables in the Year Prior to Request
Panel A:  Fama and MacBeth Procedure Results: Mean Coefficient (T-statistic)
Model 1: DACC1 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV + ε
Model 2: DACC2 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV + ε
Model 3: DACC3 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV + ε
Model 4: DACC4 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV + ε
Variables Exp. Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept ? 0.056
(4.86***)
0.058
(5.05***)
0.007
(0.69)
0.0064
(0.63)
Test variable
REQ - 0.0025
(0.80)
0.0026
(0.84)
0.0008
(0.30)
0.0008
(0.30)
Controls
SIZE - 0.00027
(-0.20)
0.00034
(-0.25)
0.0012
(2.63***)
0.0012
(2.68***)
CFO - -0.567
(-6.61***)
-0.573
(-6.68***)
0.0023
(0.12)
0.0014
(0.07)
LG_TAC + -0.085
(-1.39*)
-0.089
(-1.52*)
-0.004
(-0.06)
-0.003
(-0.06)
GROWTH + 0.0206
(1.46*)
0.0342
(1.95**)
-0.004
(-1.34)
0.00028
(-0.06)
LEV + -0.027
(-0.79)
-0.03
(-0.89)
-0.05
(-1.61*)
-0.049
(-1.57*)
R2 0.55 0.55 0.08 0.08
***, **, * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test). 
DACC1-DACC4 are signed discretionary accruals, residuals from the following estimations:
DACC1: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) +β1 ∆SALESt + β2 PPEt + εt      [Jones Model]   
DACC2: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + εt     [Modified Jones]   
DACC3: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 ∆ SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt   [Jones +CFO Model]
DACC4: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆ SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt   [Mod. Jones + CFO Model] 
REQ            = Dummy variable equal to one if a firm requested a rate increase in year t; zero otherwise
SIZE           =Natural log of total assets.  
CFO            = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets 
LG_TAC     = Lagged total accruals scaled by lagged assets 
GROWTH = Sales growth  
LEV           =Leverage defined as Total debt divided by total assets 
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Table 22 (Continued)
Tests of Hypothesis 3 on Reduced Sample:  Results of Cross-Sectional Regression of 
Discretionary Accruals on an Indicator Variable for the Presence of a Rate Increase 
Request Plus Control Variables in the Year Prior to Request
Panel B:  Fixed Effects Model Results: Coefficient (p-value)
Model 1: DACC1 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV+∑α,jYDUMt+ ε
Model 2: DACC2 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV +∑α,jYDUMt+ ε
Model 3: DACC3 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV +∑α,jYDUMt+ ε
Model 4: DACC4 = α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV+∑α,jYDUMt + ε
Variables Exp. Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 0.0907***
(<0.0001)
0.0911***
(<0.0001)
0.0172*
(0.06)
0.0167*
(0.06)
Test Variable
REQ 0.0005
(0.44)
0.0009
(0.40)
0.0003
(0.40)
0.0003
(0.44)
Controls
SIZE -0.0025**
(0.04)
-0.0025**
(0.04)
0.0001
(0.46)
0.0001
(0.46)
CFO -0.6669***
(<0.0001)
-0.6651***
(<0.0001)
-0.0301*
(0.1)
-0.0291*
(0.1)
LG_TAC -0.0936***
(0.006)
-0.0946***
(0.006)
-0.0533**
(0.02)
-0.0528**
(0.02)
GROWTH -0.0104**
(0.02)
-0.0084**
(0.05)
-0.0026
(0.24)
-0.0016
(0.33)
LEV -0.0633***
(0.002)
-0.0666***
(0.002)
-0.0566***
(0.0002)
-0.0555***
(0.0002)
n 333 333 333 333
R2 0.55 0.55 0.08 0.08
***, **, * Denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively (one-tailed test). 
DACC1-DACC4 are signed discretionary accruals, residuals from the following estimations:
DACC1: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) +β1 ∆SALESt + β2 PPEt + εt      [Jones Model]   
DACC2: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + εt     [Modified Jones]   
DACC3: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 ∆ SALESt + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt   [Jones +CFO Model]
DACC4: TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆ SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt   [Mod. Jones + CFO Model] 
REQ            = Dummy variable equal to one if a firm requested a rate increase in year t; zero otherwise
SIZE           =Natural log of total assets.  
CFO            = Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged assets 
LG_TAC     = Lagged total accruals scaled by lagged assets 
GROWTH = Sales growth  
LEV           =Leverage defined as Total debt divided by total assets 
YDUM       = Year dummy
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  Table 23
Summary of Regression Results on Full Sample for Earnings Management 
Variable (REQ) Across Time
Panel A: Fama and McBeth Procedure Results (T-statistics are reported below Mean 
Coefficients)
DACC=α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV + εt
Time (t-1) Time (t) Time (t+1) Time (t+2)
DACC 1 -0.0006
-0.50
-0.006**
-2.41
-0.005
-2.20***
-0.003
-1.26
DACC 2 -0.0007
-0.55
-0.005
-2.27**
-0.006
-2.47**
-0.003
-1.18
DACC 3 -0.002
-0.86
-0.007
-4.28***
-0.007
-3.31***
-0.003
-1.27
DACC 4 -0.001
-0.86
-0.007
-4.54***
-0.007
-3.30***
-0.003
-1.25
Panel B: Results of Fixed Effects Regression Models (p-values are reported below 
coefficient estimates)
DACC=α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV + ∑α,jYDUMt + εt
Time (t-1) Time (t) Time (t+1) Time (t+2)
DACC 1 -0.0009
0.33
-0.002
0.15
-0.005***
0.01
-0.0037*
0.06
DACC 2 -0.0009
0.34
-0.002
0.15
-0.0052***
0.01
-0.0032*
0.09
DACC 3 -0.0018
0.11
-0.005***
0.0002
-0.0059***
<0.0001
-0.0034**
0.015
DACC 4 -0.0017
0.12
-0.006***
<0.0001
-0.0059***
<0.0001
-0.0033**
0.018
DACC1 – DACC4 are residuals from the following models:
DACC1:  TACt = α (1/ASSETS t-1) +β1 ∆SALESt + β2 PPEt + εt
DACC2:  TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1( ∆SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + εt
DACC3:  TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 ∆ SALESt  + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt
DACC4:  TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆ SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt  
Time(t-1)          = Year prior to rate increase request
Time (t)            = Year of rate increase request
Time (t+1)        = Year after rate increase request
Time (t+2)        = Second year after rate increase request
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These results, using all sample firms, indicate more evidence of earnings management in the year 
a rate increase request is submitted than in the following year.    
Table 23, Panel B reports results of pooled regressions with fixed effects for sample two 
utilities.  The results are consistent with those of Panel A in that there is more evidence of 
earnings management in the year a rate request is submitted than the following year.  However, 
results also reveal that earnings management appears to continue in the second year after a rate 
request is submitted, but declining in statistical significance.
    Table 24, Panel A reports results of the Fama and MacBeth procedure applied to the 
reduced sample (after eliminating firms with a capital market incentive).  The results are 
consistent with those for the full sample in that evidence of earnings management exists in the 
year a rate request is submitted and the following year. No evidence of earnings management is 
observed in either the prior year to or the second year after the rate increase request is submitted.  
These results further indicate that there is statistically stronger evidence of earnings management 
in the year after a rate request is submitted than in the year in which the rate request is actually 
submitted.  Results presented in Panel B (pooled regressions with fixed effects) also indicate 
stronger evidence of earnings management in the year following a rate request.
I draw several inferences from these results.  First, utilities appear to manage earnings by 
decreasing accruals in the year they submit requests for rate increases and the year that follows.  
Secondly, as depicted by Fama and MacBeth procedure results, there is statistically stronger 
evidence of earnings management for utilities that do not issue stock in the year after a rate 
increase request is submitted than the year in which it is actually submitted.  Third, there is no 
evidence of earnings management either in the year prior to the submission of a rate request or in 
the second year after the submission is made.  
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Table 24
Summary of Regression Results on Reduced Sample for Earnings Management 
Variable (REQ) Across Time
Panel A: Fama and MacBeth Procedure Results (T-statistics are reported below mean 
coefficient estimates)
DACC=α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV + εt
Time (t-1) Time (t) Time (t+1) Time (t+2)
DACC 1 0.0025
0.80
-0.004
-1.64*
-0.009
-3.59***
-0.001
0.30
DACC 2 0.0026
0.84
-0.004
-1.71*
-0.009
-3.59***
-0.001
0.40
DACC 3 0.0008
0.30
-0.006
-2.84***
-0.006
-4.89***
0.002
0.56
DACC 4 0.0008
0.30
-0.006
-2.85***
-0.006
-4.69***
0.002
0.54
Panel B: Results of Fixed Effects Regression Models (p-values are reported below 
coefficient estimates)
DACC=α + β1REQ + β2SIZE + β3CFO + β4LG_TAC + β5GROWTH + β6LEV + ∑α,jYDUMt + εt
Time (t-1) Time (t) Time (t+1) Time (t+2)
DACC 1 0.0005
0.44
0.0018
0.3
-0.0058**
0.04
-0.0032
0.19
DACC 2 0.0009
0.40
0.0018
0.31
-0.0058**
0.04
-0.0031
0.20
DACC 3 0.0003
0.40
-0.0041**
0.05
-0.0061***
0.006
0.0000
0.49
DACC 4 0.0003
0.44
-0.0042**
0.05
-0.0061***
0.005
0.0000
0.47
     DACC1 – DACC4 are residuals from the following models:
     DACC1:  TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) +β1 ∆SALESt + β2 PPEt + εt
     DACC2:  TACt  = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1( ∆SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + εt
     DACC3:  TACt = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 ∆ SALESt  + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt
     DACC4:  TACt  = α (1/ASSETSt-1) + β1 (∆ SALESt – ∆RECt) + β2 PPEt + β3 CFOt + εt  
  Time(t-1)         = Year prior to rate increase request
  Time (t)           = Year of rate increase request
  Time (t+1)      = Year after rate increase request
  Time (t+2)      = Second year after rate increase request
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Fourth, electric utilities appear to use long-term accruals to manage earnings and these accruals 
are observed to reverse gradually rather than immediately.  This inference is consistent with that 
observed in examining the significance of regulatory assets in the discretionary accrual models 
(Table 12).     
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study represents the first broad-based examination of earnings management within 
the U.S. rate-regulated electric utility industry and provides empirical evidence regarding the 
adequacy of regulatory scrutiny in precluding this manipulation. This represents one of the 
study’s primary contributions. The study’s results also provide empirical justification for 
accounting researchers to exclude rate-regulated firms from cross-sectional, inter-industry 
research designs that use the discretionary accrual metric to investigate earnings management.
Three research questions are addressed. First, does the magnitude of earnings 
management in rate-regulated electric utilities, as represented by discretionary accruals, 
significantly differ from that observed in comparable non-regulated companies? Using both time 
series and cross-sectional research designs, I observe the discretionary accruals of rate-regulated 
utilities to be significantly smaller in absolute value than those of comparable manufacturing 
firms (Tables 5 and 7).  Indeed, the signed discretionary accruals for utilities, on average, are not 
found to be significantly different from zero. This is consistent with regulatory scrutiny reducing 
the opportunities for earnings management, and supports the proposition that, on average, 
regulatory monitoring is adequate in this regard.  Robustness tests indicate that a possible
structural shift due to deregulation in 1999 does not alter the findings from the time series 
design.  Likewise, the elimination of firms that submitted rate requests from the sample to 
eliminate confounding explanations, does not significantly change the primary findings.
The second question examines whether deregulatory forces that affected some regulatory 
jurisdictions in the late 1990s, increased the opportunities for earnings management. Results 
from this study (Tables 8 and 9) provide some evidence that this, in fact, happened. The 
discretionary accruals of utilities in those jurisdictions that undertook some deregulatory action 
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over the sample period, increased in the post-1999 period. This is consistent with relaxed 
regulatory scrutiny and increased economic incentives associated with deregulation; this 
environment may have provided managers increased opportunities and motivation to engage in 
earnings management.
The third research question focuses on whether rate-regulated electric utilities manage 
earnings downward in the year they file for rate increases. Although, as stated earlier, signed 
discretionary accruals for utilities are not significantly different from zero on average, this may 
not be the case for particular periods when a rate request is being considered by regulators.  
During these years, utilities requesting rate increases have significantly smaller discretionary 
accruals than in years when no requests are made. Robustness tests indicate that discretionary 
accruals continue to be smaller in the year following the year of a rate request, only to become 
statistically insignificant in the second year after the request. These results are consistent with 
opportunistic earnings management both in the year a rate increase request is submitted and the 
following year.  Results indicating that earnings management continues in the year after a rate 
request is submitted are not consistent with an immediate reversal of accruals.  The implication is 
that electric utilities do not manage earnings through the use of working capital accruals that 
reverse immediately, but instead use long-term accruals that take longer to reverse.  Earnings 
management in the year following the submission of a rate request is plausible for two reasons.  
First, rate approvals are decided approximately nine months after submission of a rate request; 
this lag may well result in a spill-over to the next fiscal year.  Second, there is a likelihood of 
PUCs using projected rather than historical earnings information in rate decisions. Additional 
tests are inconclusive regarding electric utilities’ use of regulatory assets in accrual management. 
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Regulatory scrutiny may be adequate in curtailing any potential abuse of the accrual discretion 
granted by the FASB to rate-regulated electric utilities in sanctioning the use of regulatory assets.    
Although regulators may take comfort in the study’s finding that “on average” there is no 
evidence of earnings management using discretionary accruals, they should also note the 
unintended consequences of retail deregulation.
Also, if management can depress earnings in order to bolster their requests for increasing 
rates, regulators should be fully aware of the potential for receiving biased earnings information. 
This might lead to increased regulatory (monitoring) costs. Finally, because operating costs are 
“passed through” to ratepayers under rate regulation, increasing costs in order to decrease 
earnings increases the amount passed through which must be covered in rates. However, this 
increase is only a second-order effect; the primary effect being that if regulators are persuaded to 
increase the price of electricity by increasing the allowed rate of return. Unlike non-regulated 
earnings management studies, this raises the social welfare issue of a wealth transfer between 
ratepayers (customers) and shareholders. Providing empirical evidence consistent with this 
argument provides a unique contribution to the literature.
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